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ABSTRACT 
The purpose of this dissertation was to address the problem expressed in the 
following question: "Why have the opposition political parties in Lesotho 
weakened since 1993?" 
A qualitative approach was used. The researcher interviewed officials of twelve 
representative parties out of the total of eighteen parties. The responses of the 
interviewees are in appendix 5. 
This work reveals the problems of the opposition parties in Lesotho. Among 
others, the study addressed the following issues: the reform of the electoral 
system, political party funding, dominance of the ruling party, prohibitive 
legislation and party leadership. The potential strengths and weaknesses of the 
opposition parties have been noted. 
The MMP electoral model, introduced in 2001 and tested in 2002, created a more 
inclusive party system, but it is not the sole solution for the weakness of the 
opposition parties. Patronisation and lack of political party funding appear to be 
major factors. 
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SUMMARY 
The purpose of this dissertation was to address the problem expressed in the 
following question: "Why have the opposition political parties in Lesotho 
weakened since 1993?" 
A qualitative approach was used. The researcher interviewed officials of twelve 
representative parties out of the total of eighteen parties. The responses of the 
interviewees are in appendix 5. 
This work reveals the problems of the opposition parties in Lesotho. Among 
others, the study addressed the following issues: the reform of the electoral 
system, political party funding, dominance of the ruling party, prohibitive 
legislation and party leadership. The potential strengths and weaknesses of the 
opposition parties have been noted. 
I 
The MMP electoral model, introduced in 2001 and tested in 2002, created a more 
inclusive party system, but it is not the sole solution for the weakness of the 
opposition parties. Patronisation and lack of political party funding appear to be 
major factors. 
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The dissertation dealt with electoral political participation of opposition political 
parties, in Lesotho, in the period 1993 to 2006. The study covered the 1993, 1998 
and 2002 general elections. The 2002 general election was the first general 
election after introduction of Mixed Member Proportional representation (MMP) 
electoral model that replaced First Past the Post (FPTP) electoral model in 
Lesotho. 
Rose (1980: 1) states that elections are the central practice for popular 
participation in government. Kriek et. al. (1994: 107) notes that political 
participation has taken place since the earliest times and has been expressed in 
different ways in different ages. Kriek further asserts that participation means 
action; it is well known that actions, reactions and interaction constitute the very 
nature of politics; thus, political participation concerns the interactions in which 
politics is practised. These authors note that in studying the theory of political 
participation there are a number of important perspectives and that they fall into a 
spectrum between two distinct poles. They state that it is important to be aware of 
both these contrasting poles. Some of the perspectives are as follows: 
i) Activities in which persons take the initiative to become directly 
involved in politics, such as attending political meetings, canvassing for 
a political party, membership of a political party, visibly devoting ample 
time to political issues and running as a candidate in the elections 
constitute what is called active participation. However, in other cases 
some people simply talk politics, occasionally airing their views, only 
expressing their wish or opinion that the authorities should attend to 
certain issues; these people do not get directly involved in political 
matters; this is a case called passive participation and it does not lead 
to any political activity or action. 
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ii) Behaviours such as voting, peaceful demonstrations, drawing up 
petitions, canvassing support, and so on, are traditionally accepted and 
they constitute what is called conventional practice. On the other hand, 
actions such as civil disobedience, violence, assassinations, and so on, 
constitute unconventional practice and this has to be taken into 
account. Also phenomena such as alienation in contrast with apathy 
constitute political participation. So, both completely conventional and 
completely unconventional political actions should receive attention, 
according to these authors. 
iii) Due to a number of reasons, such as big human populations, it is 
difficult for every person to directly take part in the discussions of 
national issues, so these persons must elect their representatives. 
There are contrasting views about representation; others criticize it for 
lending elitist quality to politics and for separating the ordinary voter 
from the political process. The contrasting view to representation is that 
real participation can only be effected when each individual personally 
participates in the discussions of political issues, and this is called 
direct participation. 
iv) An individual may write a letter to media such as newspaper, radio, or 
to a representative requesting that authorities address a certain issue; 
also, the individual may directly meet the representative or a role-
player and discuss the matter. People can work as a group to forward 
their request to the media, role-player, or to the authorities, and they 
can work in an organized manner as an interest group and even as a 
political party, to try and persuade government to change its policy into 
legislation. 
According to Almond and Powell (1966: 73), every political system has some 
way of handling public demands. Also there are many ways of forwarding the 
demands to the decision makers; for example, an angry mob can shout, a trade 
union can stage a peaceful protest and hand in a written list of their demands to 
the decision makers, or they can issue a press release calling for increased 
minimum wage. Almond and Powell call the process whereby the individuals and 
groups forward their demands to the decision-makers, interest articulation. 
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Almond and Powell (1966: 98) noted that the decision makers, having received 
the complaints and demands from the labour unions, business organizations as 
well as from elsewhere, juggle, bargain and compromise the conflicting interests 
into some form of general policy statement. This policy statement is an output. 
These authors call this process of converting the demands and complaints into 
output, interest aggregation. 
While accepting the views of Kriek and others, the researcher explains the 
context of the proposed study as follows: electoral political participation of 
political parties in this study is consciously confined to taking part in the national 
general elections, or in the by-elections contesting parliamentary seats, or in the 
local government elections; contributing towards the establishment and 
sustainability of electoral democracies; taking part in the parliamentary debates 
when the government budget is discussed, and when new laws are made and in 
the discussion of other issues related to governance. 
This study was focused on finding out how the opposition political parties manage 
to: influence election campaigns, articulate particular issues in their campaigns, 
present themselves to the electorate, influence parliament and government; and 
it is also aimed at establishing how these parties perform in the elections. Also, 
the study was focused on the role played by the opposition political parties in the 
party politics in Lesotho since 1993. Additionally, this work is intended to reveal 
the reasons why, since 1993, the opposition political parties failed to win 
significant numbers of parliamentary seats. In this study, analysis of electoral 
political participation of the opposition political parties in the 1998 and 2002 
general elections was done. 
The researcher explored information from the party leaders/officials, the related 
literature, newspapers, government gazettes, and from the Independent Electoral 
Commission's reports. The researcher analysed data, developed themes that he 
interpreted and made a conclusion. 
What problems were met during the research, if any? There were problems 
encountered during the research. Some of the party leaders did not want to share 
their problems with the researcher. The researcher left the questionnaire at the 
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home of the leader of the Sefate Democratic Union (SDU), so that he could get 
ready for a face-to-face interview. When the researcher requested an 
appointment for the interview, the political leader over the telephone told him that 
he was not interested in politics anymore. That was an unbelievable story. The 
researcher had to replace that party. 
A leader of another party, the Lesotho Workers Party (LWP), plainly refused to 
cooperate with the researcher. However, after trying for more than a month in 
January 2005 the General Secretary of this same party accepted to assist the 
researcher. Yet another case was that of the leader of the BNP who straightaway 
asked the General Secretary of the party to assist the researcher. This meant 
that the researcher could not interview the leader of the party. Most of the political 
parties do not have offices and the researcher could not make appointments with 
the leaders/officials easily. Most of the interviews were conducted at the homes 
of the party leaders/officials. So, it is important for the future researchers to be 
cognisant of problems of this kind. In general the interviews were successful. 
1.1.1 Historical overview of party politics in Lesotho 
A detailed historical overview is attached as Appendix 2 at the end of the 
dissertation to provide more information and historical context for this study. The 
most relevant points made in Appendix 2 are highlighted in this sub-section. 
In 1952 the first political party, the Basutoland African Congress (BAC), was 
established (Leeman 1984: 173). The BAC experienced internal conflicts as early 
as the mid-1950s and as a result the breakaway factions established other 
political parties. For example, political parties that came into being as a result of 
splits in the mother party, the BAC, were the: the Marema-Tlou Party (MTP) 
established in 1957, the Basotho National Party (BNP) founded in 1958, the 
Basutoland Freedom Party (BFP) which was launched in 1961 (Gill1990: 211), 
(Khaketla 1971: 20), (Leeman 1984: 210, 214, 279) (Moleleki 1994: 93) 
(Weisfelder 1999: 25-27, 37, 42), the Lesotho Communist Party (LCP later CPL) 
founded in 1961 (Moleleki 1994: 94) (Weisfelder 1999: 33), the United 
Democratic Party (UDP) formed in 1967 (Mphanya 2004: 52) and the Lesotho 
Congress for Democracy (LCD) registered in 1997 (MoAfrika 1997: 1). In 1962 
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the MTP and the BFP merged to establish the Marema-Tlou Freedom Party 
(MFP) (Leeman 1984: 279) (Moleleki 1994: 94) (Weisfelder 1999: 44). 
In the District Councils election of 1960 Basutoland Congress Party (BCP), the 
former BAC up to 1958 was well established, especially in the towns and 
lowlands (Weisfelder 1999: 14) and it achieved a landslide victory, winning 30 
seats out of a total of 40 seats. However, the BCP had received 36% of the total 
votes while the opposition had received 64% of the total (Matlosa 1997: 141, 
Mphanya 2004: 44). On the ground the opposition was far stronger than the 
winner, the BCP, but in parliament/Legislative Council the opposition was weak, 
as it had got only 25% of the seats. The explanation for this apparent 
inconsistency was the First-Past-the-Post electoral system in which single 
representatives per constituency were elected. According to Matlosa (1997: 141) 
and Mphanya (2004: 44), out of a total of 35,302 votes, the BCP had received 
12,787 votes and the opposition 22,515 votes. 
The opposition consisted of the following parties: the Marema-Tlou Party (MTP) 
with 5 seats, the Basutoland National Party (BNP) with 1 seat, and the 
independent candidates with 4 seats (Matlosa 1997: 141, Mphanya 2004: 44). 
However, slightly contrary to the results given in Matlosa (1997: 141) the table of 
the 1960 District Council Election results in Mphanya (2004: 44) gives Basutoland 
Progressive Association (BPA) as one of the political organizations that 
participated in the elections and received 231 votes or 0.7% and 0 seats. 
However, it is not necessary to delve into the details of the differences of these 
two sources, as they are mainly similar for the purpose of this dissertation. 
During the 1965 general election, the Basutoland National Party (BNP) had well 
established itself in the countryside including the mountain areas and it won 31 
parliamentary seats, the BCP 25 seats and the Marema-Tlou Freedom Party 
(MFP) 4. The opposition of the two parties, the BCP and the MFP was very 
strong, but it might have been stronger if the idea of "political party alliance" came 
into the minds of the leaders of those two parties. On the other hand, the ruling 
party could have strengthened its position if it had negotiated with one of the 
opposition parties to establish an executive coalition. According to Leeman 
(1984: 669) the MFP MP for Matela constituency crossed the floor to join the 
BNP. The period 1965 to 1970 saw very strong opposition in parliament. In the 
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period 1970 to 1986 the national constitution had been suspended and there was 
civilian authoritarian rule by the Basotho National Party (BNP). That period was 
followed by the era of military authoritarian rule (1986 to 1993) when all political 
parties had been put out of activity by the Military with the infamous legislation, 
Order no.4 (Lesotho 1986: 10). 
In 1993, when Lesotho returned to civilian rule, the BCP under its founder leader 
Dr Ntsu Mokhehle achieved a landslide victory, winning all the 65 seats, having 
received 74.7% of the total votes (Matlosa 1997). Therefore, the opposition had 
received 25.3% of the total votes. So, 1993 was the beginning of a period when 
there was very weak opposition in the Lesotho Parliament. Actually between 
1993 and 1997 there was no opposition in parliament. 
In June 1997 when the BCP split with the establishment of a new political party, 
the Lesotho Congress for Democracy (LCD) that continued as government under 
Dr Ntsu Mokhehle, twenty-five (25) parliamentarians who stayed with the BCP 
formed the opposition side in parliament (Mo-Afrika 1997: 1). The action of the 
parliamentarians who formed the LCD is actually floor crossing. There was little 
time left before the next general election of 1998. The opposition in parliament 
constituted 38.5% of the total seats after the split of the BCP. 
The national constitution of Lesotho and the Electoral Act were silent about floor 
crossing. There were no rules addressing floor crossing. Section 58 of the 
national constitution provided, only, the qualifications of a person to be nominated 
as Senator of the Upper House or to be elected as a member of the Lower 
House, the National Assembly. Also, about the qualifications of a person to be 
elected as a member of the National Assembly, Clause 46 of the National 
Assembly Elections Act of 1992 refers the reader to Section 58 of the constitution 
of Lesotho. So, no regulation addressed floor crossing from one side and/or one 
party to another inside Parliament. 
Opposition political parties did not accept the results of the general election of 
1998 and for some time there was political instability. Lindberg (2006: 149 - 150) 
argues that the political parties that do not accept or delay to accept the results of 
elections declared as free and fair express a form of undemocratic behaviour. 
There was dispute over the election results and over the legitimacy of the LCD 
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government. Three opposition political parties - the Basutoland Congress Party 
(BCP), the Basotho National Party (BNP) and the Marema-Tlou Freedom Party 
(MFP) - formed a temporary united front known as "Setlamo Alliance" (Mphaololi 
1998: 11). According to Karume (2003:10), it is important for political parties to 
establish alliances. 
According to Sithetho (2005: 12), the unity and solidarity of BCP, BNP and MFP, 
under the alliance known as 'Setlamo sa Baitseki', influenced the formation of a 
commission of inquiry led by South African Justice Langa, and also led to the 
establishment of the Interim Political Authority (IPA). Sithetho said that 
establishment of the Langa Commission and the IPA indicated the strengths of 
the alliance. However, on the contrary the researcher asserts that implementation 
of the MoU 1994 signed by Botswana, Lesotho, South Africa and Zimbabwe 
caused establishment of Langa Commission and the IPA. Other political parties 
that were in alliance at the time of writing this dissertation were the Communist 
Party of Lesotho (CPL) and the Popular Front for Democracy (PFD), also the 
United Democratic Party (UDP) with the Lesotho Labour Party (LLP). 
On 10 August 1998 the Deputy President of South Africa met representatives of 
the LCD and three of the opposition political parties (the BCP, the BNP, and the 
MFP) (Langa 1998: 2). By agreement with the LCD, the BNP, the BCP and the 
MFP, a group of experts (known as the Langa Commission) was called upon 
from three countries, namely Botswana, South Africa and Zimbabwe. The Langa 
Commission was tasked to study what occurred at the polling stations during the 
election and thereafter, to draft a report and to give recommendations (Langa 
1998: 2-3; Leon, et. al. 2001: 58; Southall 1998: 3; Sithetho 2005:12; Thai, 1998: 
3). The Commission consisted of four South Africans, three Zimbabweans and 
three Batswana and it was under the chairmanship of Justice Pius Langa. Justice 
Langa came from the Constitutional Court of South Africa. 
From 15 to 22 August 1998, political parties and the IEC had the opportunity to 
expand orally on the written submissions (Langa 1998: 7). Afterward, the Langa 
Commission engaged 200 students from South African universities and 100 
members of the South African National Defence Force to assist them in 
recounting the votes cast in favour of the respective parties (Leon et al 2001: 56). 
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The Langa Commission found that there were small discrepancies between the 
results of the recount and those announced by the IEC (Langa 1998: 27); there 
was not much significance in the difference in numbers (Leon, et. al. 2001: 57, 
58). According to Leon et al (2001: 58) the Langa Commission pointed out many 
serious problems that faced the IEC. Among them were that, shortly before 
general election, IEC had to: start a new registration system; delimit 80 
constituencies; do voter education and cater for additional numbers of voters as 
the voting age had just been reduced from 21 to 18 years; and accomplish all the 
election activities within a period of 8 months. Also, the Langa Commission 
pointed out that at each polling station the agents did certify that the count was 
correct; the Commission noted the fact that some forms were not signed, but this 
was an acceptable human error (Langa 1998: 24). 
Equally important, the Langa Commission had found out that the party agents did 
certify at each polling station that the count was correct. According to Leon et. al. 
(2001: 58) the Langa Commission did not content itself with reporting whether or 
not the alleged fraud had been proved. The report was susceptible to different 
interpretations (Leon, et.al. 2001: 58, 59). 
The Langa Commission made the following recommendations (Langa 1998: 28-
29): 
i) The IEC should enjoy the confidence of the community regardless of 
political persuasion; 
ii) The IEC should have access to sufficient resources; 
iii) The IEC together with its officers must strictly adhere to the laws 
governing the conduct of elections; 
iv) The election personnel should be properly and thoroughly trained. Also 
the contesting candidates and their agents should be trained. 
v) Equipment and sufficient stationery should be acquired and distributed 
in time; 
vi) After the election, it is important to account for the voters lists, ballot 
papers cast, ballot paper counterfoils, unused ballot paper books and 
the attendant completed electoral forms which should be properly 
labelled and sealed in secure containers. These items should be stored 
in secure central point where they can only be accessed as provided 
for by law; 
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vii) The Commission recommended that the electoral system be reviewed. 
An interim report was compiled and submitted to the Chairperson of SADC on the 
26th August 1998 (Langa 1998: 7). 
The Langa Commission report reached Maseru on 17 September 1998, some 9 
days after it had been completed. That caused some misunderstanding, which 
culminated in the SADC intervention and the torching, on the 22 September 
1998, of Maseru and some businesses in other towns such as Mafeteng and 
Mohale's Hoek, loss of lives of 9 SADC troops, 50 Lesotho Defence Force (LDF) 
soldiers and 40 civilians that had allied with the opposition parties (US State 
Department, 2001: 2). 
On the 24th September 1998 a meeting, in the presence of Police Minister 
Sydney Mufamadi from South Africa, took place and the agreement reached by 
the parties was to find a way forward instead of going back to the Langa 
Commission Report (Leon 2001: 49). 
Makoa (2004: 90) noted that a meeting of negotiators between the opposition 
parties and government side was held in October 1998 under the chairmanship of 
the South African Minister for Safety and Security. One of the outcomes of the 
meeting was an agreement to establish the Interim Political Authority. In 
November 1998 the Interim Political Authority (IPA) Act was passed and in 
December the IPA was established and one major purpose of its establishment 
was to level the playing political field, and that included looking at the electoral 
system. 
In 2000 the Leon Commission of Inquiry was established under the chairmanship 
of Justice R. N. Leon, by Legal Notice No. 33 of 2000, referred to as the 
Commission of Inquiry (Political Disturbances) Notice 2000. The Leon 
Commission was set up to study the political instability and disturbances that took 
place between July and November 1998 (Leon et. al. 2001: 1 -3). The terms of 
reference of Leon Commission were to: 
i) investigate, probe, examine and analyse the background to the political 
instability and disturbances, which occurred in Lesotho in the period 1 
July to 30 November 1998; 
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ii) identify the political parties and individuals who led and participated in 
the disturbances, the role played by the bodies or individuals in the 
activities related to the demonstration in front of the Royal Palace; 
iii) investigate and examine whether there was a conspiracy to destabilize 
and overthrow the Government of Lesotho; 
iv) identify the bodies or persons involved in the above-mentioned 
conspiracy; 
v) examine and analyse the role played by the Lesotho Defence Force in 
the preservation and maintenance of law and order in Lesotho; 
vi) examine and analyse the role played by the Lesotho Mounted Police 
Service in the preservation and maintenance of law and order in 
Lesotho; 
vii) examine and analyse the role played by the National Security Service 
in the protection and preservation of the national security in Lesotho; 
viii) examine, analyse and appraise the incidents relating to the 
confrontation between elements of Lesotho Defence Force and 
Lesotho Mounted Police Service in and around the Royal Palace; 
ix) investigate, examine and appraise attacks on some of the Police 
stations; 
x) investigate, appraise and evaluate the bodies or persons who incited, 
aided, persuaded and summoned members of Lesotho Defence Force 
to stage the mutiny of 11th September 1998 and thereafter; 
xi) investigate circumstances attendant and surrounding the arson and 
looting of commercial and business establishments in Maseru, 
Mafeteng and Mohale's Hoek which occurred on 22nd September 1998 
and thereafter; 
xii) investigate, appraise and evaluate any other issue relevant and which 
might impinge on the foregoing; 
xiii) recommend the actions that can be taken in order to prevent a 
repetition of those events. 
The Commission studied evidence given by the witnesses. Also the Leon 
Commission was furnished with the exhibit of the report of the Langa 
Commission and Justice Langa confirmed to the Leon Commission that it was the 
correct document (Leon, et. al. 2001: 55). According to Leon, et. al, the findings 
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of the Langa Commission were in general that the irregularities alleged were not 
proved (Leon, et. al. 2001: 57). 
The Leon Commission discovered that the SADC military intervention was 
sharply criticised by the witnesses claiming that it was illegal (Leon, et. al. 2001: 
116, 117). The Commission found out that the Prime Minister was in breach only 
of Section 92 and not of Sections 23 and 95 of the national Constitution by 
requesting military intervention of SADC without consulting the King (Leon et.al. 
2001: 123). Section 23 of the Constitution empowered the Prime Minister to 
proclaim a State of Emergency and Section 95 required the Prime Minister to 
consult the Council of State. The Prime Minister had not applied those two 
sections. 
The Commission found out the names of inciters and ringleaders of the 11 
September 1998 mutiny. Also, the Commission compiled a list of all the 
mutineers (Leon, et. al. 2001: 106). The Commission discovered that persons of 
low ranks namely Privates, Lance Corporals and Corporals had arrested Senior 
Officers (Leon, et. al. 2001: 104). Further, the Commission compiled a list of 
people involved in looting and torching of properties, etc. in September 1998 
(Leon, et. al. 2001: 127-129). The Commission made recommendations of 
dealing with the individual people and groups, who were involved in the above-
mentioned actions of 1998. Among others it was recommended that a wide 
spread training program be developed for the Army, Police, National Security 
Services and the general public. The purpose of that program was to instil an 
understanding of the roles of the above-mentioned services. The Commission 
recommended that the disciplined forces, Army, Police and the National Security 
Services be retrained so that they could be apolitical. Also the Commission made 
recommendations of what to do in order to prevent a repeat of 1998 actions 
(Leon, et. al. 2001: 124-133). 
The Leon Commission's recommendations were very important. For example, the 
Army and the Police would know their responsibilities and avoid getting involved 
in politics after special training programmes. This factor would assure the 
opposition political parties that neither the Army nor the Police would be used for 
the political purposes by government against the opposition. 
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In October 2001, again the ruling party split as 27 parliamentarians crossed the 
floor, to form a new party, the Lesotho People's Congress (LPC) that assumed its 
position in parliament on 12 October 2001 (MoAfrika 2001: 1) and members of 
parliament of this party increased the number of seats of the opposition from 1 to 
28. The BNP had occupied one seat. After the split the LCD occupied 45 seats, 
the LPC 27 and the BNP 1 (MoAfrika 2001: 3). The seats of the opposition in 
parliament constituted 43.1% of the total. That split, like that of the then ruling 
BCP in 1997, caused in parliament the birth of a political party, and also it took 
place when a short time was left before the next general election. 
After the 2002 National Assembly election, the new party, the LPC, won only 1 
constituency seat and 4 compensatory seats. The LPC lost 26 constituency seats 
back to the LCD out of the 27 that it had in the previous year when it was 
established. Patron-client relationship theory discussed in 2.6.1 a) below 
explained how the ruling party guarantees its victory. 
Once again in October 2006 seventeen LCD parliamentarians crossed the floor 
and established a new political party, the All Basotho Convention (ABC). The MP 
of Mokhotlong constituency, who had recently been expelled from the LCD, 
joined the ABC raising the number of their MPs to eighteen. So, this action 
reduced the seats of the ruling party from 79 to 61 while the number of seats of 
the opposition combined rose to 59 (Matlosa et al 2008: 146). At this point, 
Matlosa et. al. (2008: 146) posed the following question "Has this development 
strengthened or further fragmented the Lesotho's party system; enhanced or 
inhibited effectiveness of the legislature; and ultimately strengthened or 
weakened the country's representative democracy?" 
1.1.2 Other organizations 
The chiefs and colonizers were important actors in the politics of Lesotho, in the 
past. On the one hand the British colonizers worked hard to take control of 
chieftaincy and to use the system to achieve their own colonialist project of 
indirect rule, while on the other hand chiefs resisted and chief Masupha was one 
of the leaders of resistance against colonialism. 
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The background (in Appendix 2) indicates that interest groups like the Basutoland 
Progressive Association and the Commoners' League were established as early 
as 1907 and 1919 respectively, and they brought about varied views about how 
Lesotho had to be governed. The question of the status of the King and the 
Basotho Chiefs was important and the importance of that question continued until 
after independence of Lesotho. In the period after independence, a number of 
non-governmental organizations were established and today one finds the 
Lesotho Council of Non-Governmental Organisations (LCN) that brings together 
eighty-nine (89) Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs). These organizations 
play an important role in the politics of Lesotho today. 
The background indicates that with the birth of interest groups and the political 
parties, various political ideas emerged in the politics of the Basotho. A number of 
political changes also took place, including change of forms of regimes, and from 
these things one could expect change in political participation. 
In its thirty-eight (38) years of political independence, Lesotho passed through all 
four categories of polities identified by Sartori (1979: 262-264) namely: Polyparty: 
1966-1970; Dominant Authoritarian: 1970-1986 (other parties banned); Military 
Rule: 1986-1993 (all parties banned); and Dominant Non-authoritarian: after 
1993. It would be interesting to study electoral political participation of opposition 
political parties after the eras of authoritarian rule. 
1.1.3 Literature review 
This sub-sub-section is a critical review of the literature relating to the topic of this 
dissertation, and electoral political participation in Lesotho in particular. Also it 
briefly discusses the political economy of African countries. Lesotho is one of the 
least developed countries and poverty seems to impact negatively on the 
activities of the opposition political parties. Therefore, it is important to review 
literature explaining why African countries continue to be poor. According to 
Ruttan in Kotze and Labuschagne (1995: 94, 95), in poor countries with per 
capita incomes below $750 there is a positive relationship between political 
development and economic development. The literature includes reviews of 
previously compiled or published studies, books or articles, government gazettes, 
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the Independent Electoral Commission's reports, newspapers and periodicals. 
Additional information for the reader is in appendix 2 and appendix 7. 
The following five questions from Garrison & Scott (2000: 213, 214) will be 
addressed: 
1. Which previously compiled or published studies, articles, or other 
documents provide available and relevant information on the selected 
topic? 
2. What do these studies conclude about the topic? 
3. What are the apparent methodological strengths and weaknesses of 
these studies? 
4. What remains to be discovered about the topic? 
5. What appears to be, according to these studies, the most effective 
methods of developing new information on the topic? 
Before these questions can be addressed, it is necessary to provide a brief 
review of literature on key concepts used in this study, namely "political 
participation" and "electoral political participation". The discussion is on the 
combination of general literature and literature specifically on Lesotho. 
1.1.3.1 Electoral Political Participation 
What does literature say about electoral political participation? Firstly there is 
political participation, which is a very wide-ranging concept (Stultz et al. 1994: 
107). Scaff (1975: 7) maintains that a minor renaissance in the study of political 
participation was witnessed in the 1970s; interest had been aroused in many 
contemporary societies because of preoccupation with problems of 
bureaucratisation, alienation, and the mobilization of citizens for political and 
economic development. In Western societies it was for several years that 
attention had also been attracted to political participation by the demands and 
recommendations for more extensive and satisfactory participation in the political 
process. Existing practices were strongly criticized, and the demands sought 
corrective, positive public and personal functions of participation in politics. This 
author further points out, that the response of social science and political theory 
to those crises focused on either finding an "explanation" for political participation, 
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or on elaborating a rationale supporting large doses of citizen involvement and 
initiative in the public realm. The core problem of political participation is how to 
answer the question, "Who takes part in what, when and how?" (Parry in Scaff 
1975: 8). 
According to Scaff (1975: 18) the term participation is coterminous with the idea 
of politics, and also the existence of participation as an idea, the actuality of 
which presupposed the emergence of the view that human life was valuable and 
meaningful only within a political community. The community's culture depends 
both upon the creation of public space belonging to a collective and upon public 
involvement of the membership. Furthermore, participation being a characteristic 
only of man and his associations, presupposes important qualities that are 
inherent in political life: rational speech, an audience of equals, and free initiative. 
Therefore, participation expresses a political relationship based upon persuasion 
through speech and not upon force, which is known as its opposite. Thus, denials 
of participation may only trigger violence, which is a non-political form of action 
occurring in the case of tyranny (Scaff 1975: 22). 
Further, Scaff (1975: 77) states that in different periods, in life, changes took 
place in concepts depending on the changes in the way individuals and 
communities experienced the factual world. The understanding of the relationship 
between language and experience, and also between theory and practice 
influenced man's thinking; this is why an abstract political concept like 
participation is dependent in a general way, at points in its history, on the 
activities and institutions that govern its use and meaning; so, when activities and 
institutions change conceptual change is likely to occur (Scaff 1975: 77). 
Scaff (1975: 81) notes the growth of two concepts of political participation in the 
history of political theory, namely "interaction" and "instrumental action". The first 
one emphasizes the idea of public membership, of citizens "sharing" justice and 
shaping their actions toward a "common good". The second one is very much 
more about influence and power than justice and community, because it stamps 
the idea of protecting one's rights and advancing individual interests within a 
competitive context (Scaff1975: 82). 
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Interactional participation seems to be embedded in the process of political 
communication among citizens and citizen groups, especially those organized 
around broad interests or issues (Scaff 1975: 87). This author points out that 
beyond the immediate requirements of action the concept of participation, as 
interaction, tends to stress the goal of creating a "just" political order. Scaff (1975: 
88) contends that "Justice" is a fair distribution of rewards among citizens 
according to publicly available criteria, and equal right to participate in the law-
making process, and equal access to political offices. 
Scaff (1975), expounding on the second concept, instrumental participation, says 
that political communication is narrowed to gaining with elites. Also it is focused 
at deployment of power, the most important way of exercising citizenship. 
Further, this author argues that in general the functions of participation are 
connected with the dictates of self-interest. The table below gives the differences 
between these two concepts of political participation expressed according to five 
criteria. 
Table 1.1.3.1a) Participation as Interaction and as Instrumental Action 




1. Language definition "Sharing" "Taking part" 
2. Value-orientation Reciprocity Competition 
3. Action type Communicate among 
citizens 
Influence elites 
4. Ends of action Justice Power 
5. Functions Promote self-realization, 
political knowledge, & 
political "virtues" 
Protect rights, maximize 
interests, & insure 
legitimacy 
Source: Scaff (1975: 83) 
Explanation of table 1.1.3.1a): 
This table compares the two concepts, participation as interaction and 
participation as instrumental action. Criterion 1, "language definition", shows the 
difference between the ordinary means of expression, "sharing" as opposed to 
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"taking part" in the two types of participation. According to participation as 
interaction the people or citizens practise "sharing" while under participation as 
instrumental action people "take part" in order to survive. The second criterion of 
value-orientation is used to show that under participation as interaction the 
citizens orientate their actions toward a "common good", where each one 
benefits. On the contrary under participation as instrumental action there is 
competition; the citizens are obliged to compete for survival against the elites. 
Criterion 3, Action type, shows that under participation, as interaction, there is 
cooperation among the people and encouragement of settling disputes through 
public communication. In contrast under participation as instrumental the action 
is targeted toward the problem of influencing the elites about the distribution of 
political power. Under participation as interaction the citizens share justice while 
under participation as instrumental action there is exercise of power and there is 
also struggle for power. 
Lastly criterion 5 shows that participation as interaction increases political 
knowledge promotes self-realization and develops political virtues. On the 
contrary participation as instrumental action forces individuals and groups to 
protect their rights and to advance their own interests; also this action makes 
provision of legitimacy for elite decisions and for the system. 
Scaff (1975:89) states that his study was not aimed to vote one concept up and 
another down and further mentioned that both are "rational" and "necessary" in 
their own ways. However, this author makes an observation that the concept of 
"participation as interaction" has been slighted or ignored, and it therefore 
deserves more balanced attention in our political practices and scientific 
investigations. 
According to Kersting (2007: 134, 135) elections are the only political instrument 
for broad representation. Also, the electoral systems are significant democratic 
instruments that facilitate participation, which is one of the five criteria that define 
the quality of the electoral system (Kersting 2007: 134, 135, 136, 137). It is 
important for the people to get the opportunity of electing party candidates who 
will represent their parties in the national parliamentary election. The author notes 
that this 'personal vote' will encourage the voters to participate during the national 
17 
election. Further, Kersting (2007: 136) states that SADC calls for: non-
discrimination during the registration of voters, freedom of association, equal 
opportunities, higher participation and voter turnout. 
Further on, Kersting (2007: 136) asserts that both in the African Union (AU) and 
SADC regions there is lack of participation by certain groups, such as the youth 
and women. However, according to the author, both the SADC and AU 
encourage empowerment of the youth to vote. According to Kersting (2007: 145) 
Southern Africa seems to be in the lead with respect to women's electoral rights. 
Also Kersting notes that voter turnout in the Southern Africa region has been 
declining. For example, in Lesotho voter turnout declined between 1993 and 
2002, from 72% in 1993 to 61% in 2002 (Kersting s.a.: 139, 141). 
Kersting (2007: 136) states that in Southern Africa the only countries practising 
automatic or compulsory voter registration are Angola, Lesotho and Madagascar. 
Also, the author cites Jackman and Miller (1995) asserting that electoral systems 
including compulsory voting and sanctions for non-participation could improve 
voter turnout by 10%. 
Bratton (1994: 5) poses the following question: "What do African elections 
suggest about the general relationship between political competition and political 
participation? " In answering this question, Bratton argues that on the one hand 
participation rises as elections become more competitive. People are motivated 
when electoral choices widen. On the other hand participation rises in the 
presence of dominant candidates who seem certain to win. Bratton asserts that 
people are motivated to vote for a sure winner. 
Rose (1980: 84) identified two styles of electoral participation, namely ideological 
and coalition, and these stemming from two types of issues, position issues and 
valence issues. Rose (1980: 79) asserts that position issues are divisive because 
they are about explicit alternative values, for example ''for or against state 
support of church schools and membership of African Union?" This author further 
says that valence issues do not involve legitimate alternative values, and that 
only one value is involved. That value may be positive, for example prosperity, or 
negative for example unemployment, corruption and ineffective leadership. 
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Thus associated with position issues is the ideological style of electoral 
competition in which political parties expect support from their members. On the 
other hand the electoral style that calls for support from all voters regardless of 
their membership is called coalition politics, and this style is associated with non-
divisive valence issues (Rose 1980: 86). The author further states that ideological 
strategists may claim to build coalitions, but they will be coalitions in which only 
those who agree with particular positions are welcome, where only the members 
are able to give support. 
However, this author argues that a political party has choices either of closing 
ranks and stressing its ideological appeal through position issues thus building up 
a bloc of its party supporters, or it can open ranks and establish shifting coalitions 
from election to election. Thus, with open ranks it appeals to floating voters by 
stressing valence themes. This second approach was termed "catch-all politics" 
by Kirchheimer (1966: 184-195) in Rose (1980: 86-87). According to Rose (1980: 
86-87) in the case of ideological style parties activate their ideological base by 
holding rallies, parades, meetings, and by stirring up group antagonisms; but in 
coalition politics the strategists avoid such dramatic appeals as they can frighten 
away potential supporters; instead the coalition parties prefer the techniques of 
advertising and education to persuade voters to approve the best man or the best 
party. 
Gunaratne (2002: 343) states that the old paradigm, Lener's semi-theory, 
established a connection between mass media and political participation or 
voting. In the study of freedom of press, Gunaratne (2002: 344, 345) proposed a 
hypothesis associating media freedom with political participation. On the basis of 
the strong belief that free press leads to enlightenment on public issues and thus 
stimulates political participation and democratic governance, Gunaratne (2002: 
348, 349, 350) proposed the following hypothesis: "political participation is higher 
in nation-states with more press freedom than in nation-states with less press 
freedom". 
The hypothesis that Gunaratne (2002: 349, 350, 360) tested could not be 
confirmed. The author thought of many things as the possible causes of failure of 
the data to confirm the hypothesis, for example that the statistical method used 
was not accurate. In the freest press systems of the world there was not a sign of 
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significant impact of press on voter turnout. Also there was little evidence that 
press did anything to increase voting or participation in government generally. As 
a result of that failure of the data to confirm the hypothesis, the author stated that 
any one or more conjectures could be made of the following: press was not 
performing the role of the Fourth Estate; or political participation is much more 
than mere voting. This intelligent guess of Gunaratne that "political participation is 
much more than mere voting" carries weight and it is important for this 
dissertation. 
Stultz et al. (1994: 105, 106) identified the following factors as relevant for 
participation: stimuli, personal factors, political setting and social position. 
I. Stimuli 
a. Stultz contends that the more stimuli about politics people receive, 
the greater the likelihood that they will participate in politics, and 
the greater the depth of their participation. People who are exposed 
to media, for example are likely to participate in politics. This is a 
fact that cannot be denied. 
b. According to this author, persons living in urbanized environments 
encounter more stimuli about politics than those living in the 
countryside (Stultz et al. 1994: 105). 
II. Personal factors 
The more sophisticated people's cognitions and beliefs are about 
politics, the greater is the likelihood of their participation in the political 
process. This is true, because one will have sophisticated cognitions 
and beliefs about politics only if one has studied and has an interest in 
politics. 
III. Political setting 
a. Stultz maintains that crisis elections, being perceived as important, 
produce higher turnouts than non-crisis elections. In Lesotho it was 
different during the 2002 election because, compared to the results 
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of the 1998 election, the total number of votes dropped from 582 
740 to 554 386 (Matlosa 2003: 17 in CSIR 2003). This happened in 
spite of the fact that the age requirement had been changed from 
21 years to 18 years of age. It was expected that more people 
would participate in the election, but it was not the case. This made 
Lesotho an exception, in the matter raised by Stultz. 
b. People contacted by party workers are more likely to vote and also 
to participate in gladiatorial activities. This happens also in Lesotho. 
IV. Social position 
Higher-class persons have a greater likelihood of participating in 
politics than lower-class persons (Stultz et al. 1994: 106). However, in 
Lesotho it is different because, taking the sizes of the political rallies 
and the 2002 general election results as indicators of political 
participation, the opposite of the author's statement is evident. Voter 
turnout was higher in the rural constituencies than in the urban 
constituencies. Table 3.3h) below illustrates the researcher's 
observations. Also in the neighbouring country, South Africa, it is not 
true. In the rural areas of Lesotho, like in other developing countries, 
there are peasants who are lower class than the elite and the 
bourgeoisie. 
V. Participation 
According to Stultz et al. (1994: 107) participation means action, and he 
further asserts that it is well known that actions, reactions and interaction 
constitute the very nature of politics. Further on, Stultz says that political 
participation therefore, is about the interactions in which politics is 
practised. Furthermore, political participation represents the interactions 
in which values are authoritatively assigned to society. 
Stultz et al. contend that neither class nor the age of a democracy determines 
voter turnout. The International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance 
(IDEA) made the following observation: the overall average turn-out in the period 
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after World War II in established democracies is 73%. The average for other 
countries is 58%. In Western Europe, North America and the Caribbean it has 
remained constant over the last 50 years. Turnout in South America and Asia has 
steadily increased, while in Africa and the Middle East it has declined since the 
1980s. 
Kriek (1994: 108) notes that, looking in the modern era, it is obvious that there 
has been a period when power and authority in the state were vested almost 
exclusively in the monarch. This does not leave out Lesotho; for example, a 
Sesotho phrase: "Le lumme!" or literally "It has thundered!" usually uttered at the 
end of the King's/leader's speech at a public meeting, actually warns the 
participants that the King's/leader's word is final. Kriek (1994: 108) notes that the 
participation of the general public was limited to obeying the laws and decisions 
of the king and to paying taxes. 
According to Southall in Daniel et. al. (1999: 145) the BCP, BNP, MFP and ten 
smaller political parties fielded 242 candidates to contest the 1993 election. Only 
the BCP and the BNP ran candidates in each of the 65 constituencies. The MFP 
placed 51 contenders, the PFD 17 and the Ha Re Eeng Basotho (HB) 13. It had 
been 23 years since the political parties last had the opportunity of exercising 
their right to participate in an election. Southall in Daniel et al (1999: 154) asserts 
that the BNP, the monarchy and the military challenged the BCP's rule and 
eventually the King deposed the BCP's government only sixteen months after the 
election. 
Thabane, in Leon et. al. (2001: 22) stated that the BNP unsuccessfully 
contested the 1993 election results. Also, he asserted that Sekhonyana1 had 
been advocating that Mokhehle, the Prime Minister, would dismiss the army and 
replace it with the former members of his former guerrilla army, the Lesotho 
Liberation Army (LLA). That caused friction between the army and the 
government. Kabemba (2003: 6) avers that one of the challenges the BCP 
government met was that the BNP loyalists were entrenched in the army and in 
1 Rets'elisitsoe Evaristus Sekhonyana was one of the traditional chiefs in Quthing district. Also, he was 
President of BNP since 1992. He was a very militant leader. During BNP government he was a member of 
Cabinet and he held positions of Minister of Finance & Economic Planning, Minister of Foreign Affairs, 
and Minister of Economic Planning and during the Military rule he was Minister of Finance and Economic 
Planning. He passed away in 1998. 
22 
the civil service. Also, there were disagreements with the army over army 
compensation. Further, he stated that in response to their grievances a faction of 
the army mutinied in early 1994. Also, Maope in Leon (2001: 16) asserted that in 
January 1994, two army factions fought a battle on Hilton Hill in Maseru. 
Additionally, Maope stated that in April 1994 a faction of the army kidnapped a 
number of Ministers, including Mosisili, Minister of Justice and Maope himself. 
Matlosa (2001: 12) avers that, without opposition in parliament, the single party 
executive arm of the BCP government found itself in conflict with other key 
organs of state such as the army, the monarchy/chieftaincy, bureaucracy and 
judiciary. So, it became increasingly difficult for the government to deliver on its 
own manifesto. The BCP government was unable to govern effectively and 
authoritatively. According to Matlosa (1997: 148) and Kabemba (2003: 6) 
following the army violence that included assassination of Deputy Prime Minister, 
Selometsi Baholo, in August 1994 King Letsie III dissolved parliament, dismissed 
Mokhehle government and appointed a provisional government that included 
BNP leader, Sekhonyana. Matlosa (1997: 148) noted that removal of the BCP 
government was a coup. 
Also, Southall in Daniel et. al. (1999: 156), had stated that on the 16th August 
1994 the BNP and the MFP supporters had petitioned the King, Letsie III, for 
dissolution of parliament and for restoration of Moshoeshoe II. On the next day 
the King announced deposition of the government and appointment of the six-
person Provisional Council, headed by, a lawyer, Hae Phoofolo (former Deputy 
Governor of Central Bank) and including Sekhonyana, the BNP leader, as 
Foreign Minister. The Council would administer the country and establish an 
Independent Electoral Commission, which would prepare for a new election 
based on proportional representation. The BNP had rejected the election results 
as 'robotic'. Also, Southall in Daniel et. al. (1999: 154, 156) stated that the BNP 
and the MFP had proposed the need for PR electoral model. Further on, Southall 
in Daniel et. al. (1999: 156) noted that the King's government lasted a month and 
the BCP's government was reinstated on the 14th September 1994. 
Under what circumstances and under whose influence was the BCP government 
re-instated? Matlosa (1997: 148) and Kabemba (2003: 6) noted that the elected 
BCP government was re-instated as a result of internal pressure by various civil 
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society groups and intervention by leaders of Botswana, South Africa and 
Zimbabwe, supported by Organisation of African Unity (OAU), Commonwealth 
and United Nations (UN) through extensive diplomacy. Also, Makoa (2004: 87) 
and Matlosa (2001: 12) affirmed that re-instatement of the BCP government was 
effected upon a compromise solution enshrined in the Memorandum of 
Understanding 1994 (MoU 1994) brokered by Botswana, South Africa and 
Zimbabwe in September 1994. Additionally, Makoa (2004: 87) stated that one of 
the conditions in MoU 1994 read as follows: "recognition of the basic rights of 
individuals and groups in a pluralist and civil society shall be duly observed and 
fulfilled." Finally Matlosa (2001: 12) noted that, since then those three countries 
have remained guarantors of young democracy of Lesotho. 
Southall in Daniel et. al. (1999: 27) contends that the plurality system may work 
to disadvantage the minorities. Southall cited the Lesotho 1993 election, which 
resulted in 65 seats to nil victory. The BCP received 74.7% votes and the BNP 
22.6% but the BNP could not participate or represent its electorate in Parliament. 
Also Southall noted that the return to multi-partyism in Lesotho caused a de facto 
legislative one-partyism in an election, which the observers declared free and fair. 
Further Southall in Daniel et. al. (1999: 22), in comparing the winner-takes-all 
with the PR electoral systems, emphasises the virtue of PR in guaranteeing and 
simultaneously legitimising the representation of the minorities. Southall contends 
that PR facilitates coalition governments and encourages cross-party 
compromise and bargaining as normal behaviour. According to Southall in Daniel 
et. al. (1999: 34) in Lesotho the vanquished opposition parties are now enjoying 
the advantages of PR. In 1999 MMP had not been used yet in Lesotho, and 
opposition parties could not be enjoying advantages of PR already. So, this view 
of Southall in Daniel et. al. (1999: 34) came in rather early. 
Gordon et. al. (2007: 76) assert that in order to keep themselves in power, most 
African rulers, taking advantage of monopolizing the scarce resources, build 
strong bases of social support. According to Gordon et. al., these African leaders 
defuse the opposition by a wide variety of patronage devices made possible by 
their control of state. Further Gordon et al contend that these leaders practice 
patronage and develop clientelistic ties to key individuals and groups. Also 
Gordon et. al. state that patron-client relations became the main form of political 
exchange in post-independence Africa. 
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Matlosa (1993: 1 - 2) contends that the 1993 election in Lesotho is an epoch-
making episode in the country's political history. Among the reasons that Matlosa 
gives is that for the first time more than five political parties participated in the 
electoral contest for state power. Twelve political parties placed candidates for 
the election. Also the election was epoch-making because it was the first time a 
single party, namely the BCP, won all the constituencies (65). Further, Matlosa 
argues that the 1993 election had an enormous political significance because it 
removed the mythology of political monopoly by the three traditional parties, the 
BCP, the BNP and the MFP. 
Additionally, Matlosa (1993: 3) states that participation of the new parties 
afforded the voters a wider political choice. Further, he noted that change also 
reflects the plurality of political opinion and views in Lesotho. On the question of 
future relations of Lesotho with post-apartheid South Africa, the MFP and 
PFD/KBP alliance have a common position that Basotho have a right to express 
their will through a referendum about any future relations with post-apartheid 
South Africa. The BCP and the BNP are opposed to integration of Lesotho into 
post-apartheid South Africa, but unlike the BCP, which by 1992, had dropped the 
idea of Lesotho reclaiming the conquered territory the BNP wants negotiations to 
be carried out (Matlosa 1993: 18 - 20). 
According to Matlosa (1993: 14) all the four parties, namely the BCP, BNP, 
PFD/KBP alliance agree on the need to improve social welfare facilities i.e. 
employment, health, education, etc. Also the BCP and the PFD/KBP alliance 
agree on the need to eradicate gender discrimination in society so as to ensure 
full participation of both sexes in productivity. 
Matlosa in EISA (2006: 9) observes that there are four main areas where 
political parties face problems namely, leadership, elections, funding and gender 
equality. He notes that it is crucial how the leaders are selected, rotated, and held 
accountable. Also he warns about a new trend emerging in SADC, wherein a 
leader steps down as national president yet retains his leadership of the political 
party, examples being former presidents of Namibia, Mozambique, Tanzania and 
Zambia. According to Matlosa it is important to know how the leaders of political 
parties are elected as this indicates how democratic the parties themselves are. 
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Further, Matlosa in EISA (2006: 9) states that funding is a big problem because 
most of the challenges of the political parties revolve around resource 
management. He asserts that political parties cannot survive on membership fees 
alone. Further on, he noted that SADC commits member states to 30% gender 
equality by 2005 and after 2005 to raise the margin to 50%. It was agreed in the 
Pretoria workshop, co-hosted by EISA and IDEA, that gender issue is about 
political exclusion and therefore gender quotas had no relevance to democracy. 
Also, it was agreed that a small fraction of the gross national product (GNP) be 
used to create a democracy fund for funding the political parties with respect to 
the representation they have (EISA 2006: 11). 
Kriek (1994: 108,109) asserts that there are a number of approaches to studying 
political participation. Additionally, most perspectives fall within a spectrum 
between two distinct poles. Kriek (1994: 109 - 117) for example, lists some of the 
perspectives as follows: active and passive participation; legitimate and 
illegitimate participation; representation and direct participation; articulation and 
aggregation; participation under constant or changeable structural influences; 
participation under endogenous or exogenous influences; national and local 
participation; input participation and output participation; cross-sectional and 
longitudinal participation; individualistic and ecological fallacies in studying 
political participation; investigating participation in terms of the ideal-typical or 
functional-equivalent approaches; and idiographic and nomothetic approaches to 
research into political participation. 
Dahl (1975: 5) contends that it is only a few countries that have failed to grant at 
least a ritualistic vote to their citizens and to hold at least nominal elections. He 
maintains that even the most repressive dictators usually take heed of the 
legitimate right of the people to participate in the government, that is, to 
participate in "governing" though not in public contestation. In addition, Dahl 
emphasizes that in the absence of the right to oppose, the right to "participate" is 
stripped of a very large part of the significance it has in a country where public 
contestation exists. 
Lindberg (2006: 2 - 3) argues that elections in the newly democratising countries 
do not signal the completion of the transition to democracy. According to this 
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author, in Africa it is only after a series of elections, three electoral cycles, that 
democracy tends to take root. Further, Lindberg asserts that empirical evidence 
testifies that regime breakdowns occur after the third electoral cycle and that it is 
only in rare cases. For this reason, Lindberg emphasizes the need for 12 - 15 
years international community support towards the newly democratising 
countries. Also, Lindberg (2006: 3 & 10) noted that, soon after political 
independence of the African countries, authoritarian regimes dominated the 
political landscape in Africa until the end of the 1980s. Between 1970 and 1993 
Lesotho experienced both civilian and military dictatorships as mentioned in 
chapter 1 and appendix 2. 
According to Lindberg (2006: 12) Barkan's study2 shows that the more agrarian 
the society, the higher the geographic concentration of the vote, that is the rural 
voters seem to continue to prefer representatives based on how good they are as 
"patrons" of their respective community or constituency. Also, Lindberg (2006: 
12) asserts that a couple of empirical studies of multiparty elections of the 1990s 
corroborate the recurrence of personalized patron-client relations in electoral 
politics in Africa. Further, Lindberg noted that it is not clear whether the 
preference for patron over policy is influenced by the international financial 
institutions and the donor community or by the "parochial" political culture in 
which dependency on someone with the right political connections is renowned, 
or whether it derives from something else. 
Lindberg (2006: 16) argues that political participation, freedom of political 
competition and legitimacy of the idea of self-government are the necessary 
instruments for the realization of self-government. Also, he states that these 
dimensions constitute the three democratic qualities required in the elections. 
Expounding on political participation, Lindberg (2006: 37) posits that firstly, 
equality of political participation in elections implies legal guarantees of universal 
suffrage. Secondly, participatory elections imply that individuals and political 
parties have equal rights to exist and to field candidates. Thirdly, participation is 
conditioned if known antidemocrats contest in the elections, either as individuals 
or as parties. 
2 Barkan, Joel D. 1995. "Elections in agrarian societies." Journal of Democracy 6: 106-116. 
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Further on, Lindberg noted the three indicators used in the study namely, "voter 
turnout, opposition participation and autocratic guard gone?" According to 
Lindberg (2006: 38), in his study, opposition participation is measured with three 
ordinal values: "Boycott" for total boycotts, "Partial boycott" for cases where not 
all of the main candidates or parties boycott the poll, and "Yes, all" for elections 
where all major political parties participate. 
The study of Lindberg reaffirms the suggestions of Dahl (1971) and van de Walle 
(2002) that the level and the quality of political competition exerted by the 
opposition groups is crucial in determining the level of democracy of the regime 
(Lindberg 2006: 149). 
According to Lindberg, opposing behaviour should be important in electoral 
regimes where the attainment of democracy is still questionable. Also, Lindberg 
notes that opposition participation is very likely where at least minimal 
requirements for freedom, fairness of elections and relative peacefulness of 
campaigns are instituted. Further, Lindberg (2006: 149) posits that the above 
finding requires both domestic and international actors to police the rules of the 
game. 
According to Lindberg's findings in Africa's free and fair presidential elections, 
losing parties endorsed the results immediately in only 40 percent cases; three 
months later the losing parties endorsed the additional 44 percent of cases. 
Lindberg contends that in Africa it is the new parties that dispute the elections. In 
Lesotho, however, the parties that dispute elections are old and usually big. 
Additionally, Lindberg (2006: 149 - 150) argues that the political parties that do 
not accept or delay to accept the results of elections declared free and fair 
express a form of undemocratic behaviour. These findings and argument thereof 
of Lindberg are corroborated by the findings of Makoa (2003: 2 - 3) below. 
Further still, Lindberg (2006: 150) posits that more research is required in the 
democratising countries on interaction between constitutions and regulations and 
among the individuals within political parties in general and in opposition parties 
particularly. Lindberg suggests that researching this area requires collection of 
qualitative data of a different type from what his study generated. 
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Makoa (2003: 2) in CSIR (2003 Vol. 2) quoting the African charter of 1990 
(p.297), says that nations cannot be built without the popular support and full 
participation of the people nor can economic crises be resolved. Human 
economic conditions cannot be improved without the full and effective 
contribution, creativity and popular enthusiasm of the vast majority of the 
people. Makoa further noted that, while elections are seen as basic to democracy 
and popular participation, only in a few cases have election outcomes not been 
disputed or accepted unconditionally, by the losers. According to the example 
given by Makoa from Bratton and van de Walle (1998:1997), in 7 out of 29 
countries in which elections were held between 1989 and 1994, the losers 
rejected the results. Also Makoa (2003: 2-3) states that in Lesotho in particular, 
losers have disputed the election results, not relying exclusively on the courts of 
law but backing up their case with violence as they saw fit, in various ways since 
1965. The above example given by Makoa shows that the elections results have 
been rejected in about 25% of the 29 countries studied. 
Matlosa in EISA (2006: 31) asserts that the events of the mid-1990s had 
convinced many in Lesotho that, the electoral model was flawed and that stability 
and peace could not be achieved because the electoral model denied many 
voters fair representation. Also Matlosa notes that with the adoption of MMP in 
2001 and its implementation in 2002, the country appears to be on a new and 
positive trajectory (EISA 2006: 30). 
Makoa (2003: 4) in CSIR (2003 Vol.2) contends that people may cast their vote in 
order to perpetuate policies that exclude other sections of the population from 
participating in national decision-making processes. Also he maintains that in 
situations where political power is linked to survival, elections are often used to 
deny one's rival participation in these national decision-making processes. In the 
case of Lesotho elections have not taken place on the rational basis since 1965 
up to the period of this study, 1993-2006. So, both arguments of Makoa are 
rather vague due to lack of supporting evidence. Furthermore, the author points 
out that in deeply divided societies, the main objective of the voters is not to 
appoint parliamentary representatives or rulers, but to defeat and exclude the 
rival party - to deny it power and access to resources. Further-on Makoa asserts 
that according to Africa's history, elections are part of a continuing war against 
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political opponents, to defeat or vanquish them (Makoa 2003: 5 in CSIR 2003 
Vol.2). 
On the contrary the researcher believes that elections may not be war, but a 
political form of action (Scaff 1975: 22), and they stay a political action providing 
genuine competitive contestation for parliamentary seats. Also Kapa (2003: 71) 
argues that in Lesotho, unlike in multi-ethnic countries where elections can be a 
means of perpetuating dominance of one ethnic group over the others, the 
dominant motive of voters of one party is to deny power to the rival party and 
often to inflict a humiliating defeat on it. 
The rulers are not ordinary and unbiased role players in the political system; they 
are competitors in the power contest, acting as prongs and representatives of 
ruling political parties and implementers of their programmes. For this reason, 
governments manage and control electoral processes and this is bound to raise 
questions about trust in and readiness of the government to address its rivals' 
legitimate concerns (Makoa 2003: 6 in CSIR 2003 Vol. 2). The example given by 
this author was that of the election dispute of 1998 in Lesotho; that the 
Independent Electoral Commission (IEC) had failed to provide the voters' list as 
required under the electoral law and that there had been suspicion that 
government had influenced the conduct of IEC. 
Makoa (2003: 6,7) criticizes Matlosa's point of view based on Huntington's 
political development theory, concerning the recurrent elections-related crises; 
that the problem reflected the institutional decay and weakness of the societal 
institutions in Lesotho. Makoa's assertion is that Lesotho political parties were 
probably too powerful if they could, as in the past, paralyse or disrupt 
government, and that the institutions referred to were unspecified, thus further 
weakening Matlosa's argument. 
According to Makoa (2003: 7) in CSIR (2003 Vol. 2), some governments 
manipulate electoral processes, torture their opponents, and deny opportunities 
and important information to their rivals. Further, this author noted that with a few 
exceptions, in Africa elections occur as processes external to and alien to the 
voters, leaving them only the right to cast their vote; and that such alienation 
breeds and nurtures tension, political irrationality and violence. Makoa's view is 
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sound. An example of its relevance is that half (6 out of 12) of the number of the 
party officials interviewed by the researcher argued that the MMP electoral 
system was imposed on the electorate and that it was not discussed but came 
from outside the country. 
Sono (1993) has a view similar to Makoa's idea. Sono (1993) in the unnumbered 
page 3 of the introduction of his book contends that it is wrong to assert that the 
so-called liberal democracies we have today, are governments by the people. 
Sono argues that while they may be governments of the people, and for the 
people, they definitely are not by the people. 
Matlosa and Sello (2005: 4) argue that one of the major weaknesses of the 
political parties in Lesotho is the incessant fragmentation and factionalism. Also 
these authors contend that Lesotho politics is strongly imbued with a personality 
cult of prominent political leaders such as the late Leabua Jonathan and the late 
Ntsu Mokhehle. This view is in agreement with that of the interviewed leaders of 
the MFP and the PFD who maintain that the political leaders in Lesotho patronize 
their political parties. 
Criteria for opposition parties and participation 
Two authors, Nkiwane and Ssenkumba, identify some criteria applicable to 
opposition politics. 
Nkiwane in Olukoshi 1998: (105-108) identified factors that underlied the 
weakness of the Zimbabwean opposition as, neglect of the rural vote, ethnicity 
with permanent majorities, lack of internal party democracy, voter apathy, political 
violence, negative or positive unity. This author explained these factors as given 
below. 
a) Neglect of the rural vote 
It was not the issues and/or ideologies that separated the political parties and 
as a result caused the weakness of the opposition, but the greatest area of 
weakness characteristic of opposition movement in Zimbabwe, had been its 
lack of identification with the rural population. This author gives other possible 
causes of weakness of opposition parties. For example, "The party has also 
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been accused of resorting to blackmail and coercion in order to win the rural 
vote" (Olukoshi 1998: 105) and with a footnote to this statement, the author 
gave evidence to this fact. The matter of blackmail and coercion by the ruling 
party has weight and could be accepted. However, it is difficult to accept that 
the opposition movement neglected the rural vote because the author gives 
no evidence to this factor. In the case of Lesotho most of the opposition 
parties do not have enough funds and as a result they are not able to cover 
the rural constituencies. If Nkiwane could give a reason like this it could be 
understood better, because it is not simply neglecting the rural vote in the 
case of Lesotho, but lack of party funding is one of the problems. 
b) Ethnicity: Permanent Majorities? 
Nkiwane in Olukoshi (1998: 106) asserts that there is very little or no room for 
a vibrant opposition movement in Zimbabwe and that there is no chance for 
any opposition movement or party to make a significant impact nationally. 
This is because the ruling party the ZANU (PF) is made up of a permanent 
majority of Shona people and the opposition consists of permanent minorities, 
for example the PF-ZAPU is made of the Ndebele. Also the author contends 
that in Bulawayo urban the Zimbabwe Unity Movement (ZUM) and the Forum 
Party of Zimbabwe (Forum) achieved success because people in general had 
hope in these parties and they voted in their support but not on the basis of 
ethnicity. The cases of ZUM and Forum introduce a contradiction to 
Nkiwane's assertion. 
Ssenkumba, in Olukoshi (1998: 177), on the 'ideal criteria for evaluating 
opposition parties' argues that, in their view neither the fact of multi-ethnicity 
nor the low level of accumulation need automatically be sources of blockage 
towards democratic reform. The factor of ethnicity, currently, might not be 
applicable in Lesotho. From the information given above by these authors it is 
clear that ethnicity cannot always be a problem in some other countries. 
c) Lack of internal party democracy 
Nkiwane in Olukoshi 1998: (105-108) asserts that an autocratic form of 
leadership coupled with the absence of formal rules and procedures has led 
to internal squabbles and splits within opposition political parties. Opposition 
political parties in Lesotho have the same problem. Matlosa and Sello (2005: 
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xiv) contend that political parties in Lesotho still face numerous internal 
problems to become effective drivers of democratic practice and culture due 
to lack of external regulations governing internal party activities. 
d) Voter apathy 
The writer says that as opposed to the extremely high voter turnout in the first 
two post-independence general elections held in the 1980s, the voter turnout 
seems to be going down, for example a total of 54 per cent in the 1990 
election and 40 per cent in 1995. Nkiwane in Olukoshi (1998: 107) states that 
two things are indicated by the voter turnout: firstly a trend towards voter 
apathy because among the voters who stayed away from voting there were 
some others who could have voted for the opposition. Secondly voters 
seemed not to have found a worthy opponent in the opposition movement and 
therefore did not cast their vote even in a different direction. 
e) Political violence 
Olukoshi (1998: 107) maintains that Zimbabwean political culture has been 
characterised by violence towards any form of opposition. The author cites 
two cases of violence between the ZANU (PF) and the ZUM in which the 
National Organising Secretary for the ZUM, Patrick Kombayi was shot at. 
In Lesotho the cases of political violence that took place might have been 
different from those of Zimbabwe. Except in 1970 when the BNP refused to 
relinquish power, in Lesotho the discontented opposition political parties had 
been initiating political violence. However, the cause of the violence both in 
Lesotho and Zimbabwe had been the purported denial of political rights to the 
opposition by the ruling party. The cases of political violence which occurred 
after 1970 election in Lesotho were between the BCP, which had won the 
election, and the ruling party the BNP which rejected the BCP's victory and 
continued ruling. 
Also in Lesotho, in 1998, the dissatisfied opposition political parties led the 
political violence. In Lesotho, unlike in Zimbabwe, there have not been cases 
of violence during the elections. About all the cases of political violence, in 
Lesotho, occurred after elections. Makoa (2004: 84) contends that although 
the military did eventually relinquish power to the elected civilian government 
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in 1993, their intervention did not bring about national reconciliation because 
political polarization and rancour still pervade political relations in Lesotho. 
According to Kabemba (2003: 16 - 18) Lesotho's political violence has many 
causes, but the most fundamental cause is its weak, dependent economy, 
and the weak state. The dependent nature of economy places restrictions on 
whatever the state is capable of achieving, irrespective of the class or alliance 
of classes that seized control of state power. Firstly, Lesotho offers its citizens 
very few economic opportunities; its formal economy employs about 50, 000 
people, and control of the state allows the ruling party to access these jobs. In 
many cases the party membership cards are used to access state resources 
including the jobs. Kabemba (2003: 16) further argues that nearly all the 
representatives of civil society they interviewed described politics in Lesotho 
as primarily competition for jobs as securing a parliamentary seat assured one 
a job; that contributes to adversarial political culture and increases the 
likelihood of recourse to violence. 
Secondly, the military postures of the 1970s and 1980s contributed to the 
intolerant political culture of the 1990s. Moreover the major parties, the BCP 
and the BNP filled some key leadership posts with former military leaders, 
either from Lesotho Defence Force or the Lesotho Liberation Army (LLA) 
Kabemba (2003: 17). It is not quite accurate that the BCP filled some key 
leadership posts with the LLA, because their former leader and Prime 
Minister, Ntsu Mokhehle, publicly announced that the LLA had been 
disbanded. The LLA members continue holding talks with the BCP/LCD ruling 
party so that they may be employed and also to be provided with benefits. 
Also, other BCP members who were not LLA members in the first few years 
after 1993 did not get any preferential treatment. The BCP probably started 
patronising after the Palace coup of 1994. Mphanya (November 2008) in "the 
Rise and Shine Programme" over Harvest FM radio asserted that the BCP did 
not deploy its key personnel in the government (the BCP deployed wrong 
people to run the government- This is translation of his Sesotho words). 
The failure of civilian political leaders to establish effective control over the 
state in general and part of the security forces, in particular constitutes the 
third proximate cause of political violence in Lesotho. Landsberg in Kabemba 
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(2003:17) suggests the following idea: 'One key lesson from Lesotho is this: 
the smaller and the poorer a country, irrespective of how homogeneous or 
heterogeneous a state, the more fierce and competitive are elections and the 
struggle for power'. Rakuoane, leader of the PFD, in Kabemba (2003: 17) 
gave a similar remark to that of Landsberg: 'A hungry man has no principles'. 
f) Negative or positive unity 
According to Olukoshi (1998: 108) the opposition political parties in 
Zimbabwe have always failed to establish a common platform or a united 
front. This author refers to efforts of unity as "negative unity" in Zimbabwe, 
because they have not served to forge common grounds but rather served as 
expedients for quick advantage and therefore positive unity has not been 
successful in Zimbabwe. 
The case of positive unity is given in the finding of Kabemba about the share 
of small parties during the elections in Lesotho. Kabemba (2003: 8 - 9) says 
that between 1998 and 2002, three main Lesotho opposition political parties 
lost their vote share to smaller parties, because collectively the smaller parties 
increased their share from 5% to 20% of all the votes cast; the LCD had lost 
about 5% possibly to the newly formed LPC. 
Ssenkumba in Olukoshi (1998: 177) proposes that the main yardsticks for 
evaluating the opposition political parties should, in an ideal situation, include the 
following things: the extent to which they pursue their organisational goals 
through the electoral process; the extensiveness and inclusiveness of their 
organisational structure and political constituency; the extent to which they 
employ established political avenues for achieving their goals; and, their record of 
internal organisational stability. These yardsticks are applicable to the case of 
evaluating performance of opposition parties in Lesotho. 
Further Ssenkumba contends that, in practice several things are involved. Firstly, 
the opposition should be stable and coherent. Secondly the opposition should 
have organisational extensiveness and inclusiveness to attract substantial and 
diverse membership. Thirdly, the opposition should have well-focused objectives 
shared not only by the leadership but also by the membership. The importance of 
objectives is tantamount to the importance of the policy and programme issues 
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noted by Matlosa and Sello (2005: 52). These authors state that political parties 
in Lesotho usually fuse their policies with the constitutions and the manifestos. 
Fourthly, Ssenkumba advocates that the opposition should have adequate 
resources to handle its organisational affairs and it should command respect, 
approval and a general appeal from a broad cross-section of the population. 
The question of resources is in agreement with the suggestion of Matlosa and 
Sello (2005: 53) that without resources, political parties cannot play their 
expected role in building democracy. Further, Matlosa and Sello state that one 
major resource that the parties need is money. 
According to Ssenkumba in Olukoshi (1998: 178) the opposition party that 
functions well should serve to provide checks-and-balances mechanism against 
the government rather than merely collaborate with it. It should have credibility 
before the electorate, as it is also an alternative government waiting to take over 
power in case the government falls or the ruling party is defeated in the election. 
Further, the author states that the opposition party is a participant in the 
governmental process because it assists government directly or indirectly. 
Additionally, Ssenkumba asserts that the opposition political party, with its main 
function of providing checks and balances in the broad political process, has to 
accomplish several tasks (Olukoshi 1998: 178). For example, it has to: 
• participate in parliamentary deliberations; 
• oppose objectionable policies; 
• compel the government by all acceptable (legal and constitutional) 
methods to modify its policies; 
• attempt to create public sentiment against government and to harness 
public sympathy as a precondition for winning the next election; 
• propose alternative programmes. 
The researcher accepts the above tasks suggested by Ssenkumba because they 
complement the researcher's explanation (in 1.1.3.1 above) of the context of 
"electoral political participation of political parties" in this dissertation. 
Ssenkumba maintains that opposition can achieve its objectives if there are 
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salient factors such as ideology, race/class, religion or ethnicity around which 
significant segments of the electorate can converge (Olukoshi 1998: 178). 
The researcher does not agree with Ssenkumba. In the case of Lesotho about 
90% of the population is Christian and the remaining 10% consists of the Islamic, 
Hindu and the traditional indigenous religions (U.S. Department of State 2004: 1) 
and (Bureau of Statistics 2005: 7). The segments of the electorate converged on 
the basis of race, religion or ethnicity can be insignificant because they can 
constitute less than 10%. In addition, there is cooperation between Christians and 
Muslims in Lesotho (U.S. Department of State 2004: 2). Perhaps, the factor of 
social class can work out in some years to come because the number of 
industries is increasing and the increasing number of industrial workers is 
organised in trade unions. 
Garrison & Scott asked five questions which are relevant for literature review. 
These questions follow in 1.1.3.2 to 1.1.3.6, below. 
1.1.3.2 Which specific previously compiled or published studies, articles, or 
other documents provide available and relevant information on the selected 
topic? 
The reader should note that a number of issues, e.g. democracy, poverty, etc., 
related to electoral participation were considered in this study. Therefore, there 
are, also, a few theories used to explain these issues. Some of the documents 
provided information about these issues and theories. 
The Electoral Institute of Southern Africa carried out a study between 2003 and 
2004. The study's first stage focused on the impact of political transition on the 
effectiveness of democratic institutions, such as political parties (Matlosa and 
Sello 2005: vi). These authors contend that since the 1990's a number of 
countries of the Southern African Development Community (SADC) went through 
transition towards multiparty politics. The impact of transition on democracy 
remained moot and a number of questions still required to be answered. 
Questions put forward by these two authors, as examples, are the following: 
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• "Has the current political transition enhanced democratic governance?" 
• "Has the transition deepened democratic culture and practice?" 
• "Has the transition improved the effectiveness of democratic institutions 
such as political parties?" 
The specific objectives of the above-mentioned study were to: 
• "assess the general political and socio-economic context of each country 
and its possible impact on political parties; 
• investigate the external regulatory and legislative environment in each 
country and its impact on the role and functions of political parties; and 
• examine the internal functioning and structure of political parties and the 
impact of these on their institutional effectiveness". 
Matlosa and Sello (2005: vii) state that parties everywhere have potential to be 
effective and accountable, but they face big challenges. These authors contend 
that each country's context suggests that political parties are crucial actors in 
articulating and aggregating interests, providing political leadership, recruiting 
and presenting candidates. Also Sadie in Venter (2001: 278) asserts that 
political parties perform important tasks, which vary according to the political 
system in which they operate. 
Further, Matlosa and Sello noted that, although little research had been carried 
out, it was obvious that external environment - the regulatory, financial, political 
and electoral spheres in which political parties operate - influences parties' 
strategies and organization. 
Also these authors state that internal functioning of political parties determines 
how the social demands of various groups in society are represented in 
parliament. Parties select and train their own candidates. 
Information from the above study, by Matlosa and Sello (2005), was very 
valuable for this dissertation. Also, in Appendix 1 (the questionnaire) the reader of 
this dissertation will find that some of the questions asked would also draw 
answers from the above study carried out by Matlosa and Sello. In certain cases 
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the researcher got answers, from some of the leaders, which together with 
Matlosa and Sello's findings, add more value to this dissertation. For example, 
Manyeli (in Annex 5), the leader of the NIP, when interviewed by the researcher, 
stated that the NIP neither used party membership nor membership cards. Also 
Manyeli said that for the past twenty-two (22) years the NIP, did not call annual 
general meetings. The finding of Matlosa and Sello (2005: 34) is that the NIP has 
never held an annual conference. Furthermore, according to Matlosa and Sello 
(2005: 42) the NIP communicates with its membership about once every month; 
this is in agreement with what the researcher (in Annex 5) found that in three 
months the NIP calls public meetings about twice. 
The researcher's dissertation touches on a number of aspects of democracy as 
the topic is about electoral political participation of opposition parties. For 
example, some of the sub-questions under no.10 in the questionnaire are about 
democracy in Lesotho. So, Dahl's theory of democratisation and the other 
information in his book has been very useful to the researcher. In order to enable 
effective political participation of opposition parties in Lesotho the process of 
democratisation has to continue, so that at least all the eight institutional 
guarantees of democratisation, stated in Dahl's theory, are practically available. 
Matlosa and Sello (2005: 14) assert that changing the electoral system alone is 
not enough to solve Lesotho's political problems; much needs to be done 
particularly in terms of institutionalising the democratic governance. This view is 
in agreement with the requirements of Dahl's theory. Further Matlosa and Sello 
contend that political parties have to play the key role in the process of nurturing 
and consolidating Lesotho's democratic gains. The reader should recall that this 
dissertation deals with political participation of opposition parties in Lesotho. 
Ake (2000: 160) contends that in Africa democratisation has to be about 
transformation of the state before introduction of new political processes. Also 
Ake notes that if Africa settles for democratisation as multi-party democratisation 
there will be no democracy because elections will be a choice between 
oppressors. He asserts that a state constituted as an autocracy will remain 
undemocratic regardless of who is running it. In the period 1993-2006, in 
Lesotho, dominance of one party prevailed and in the first eight years of this 
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period the conditions were not different from an autocracy as there was only one 
opposition parliamentary seat. 
Naomi Chazan in Nyango'ro (1996: 243) contends that the issue in Africa is how 
to streamline the state, to delimit its scope without diminishing its control. Further, 
Chazan noted that restructuring of the state involves changing of the economic 
structure. Also, Chazan asserts that any economic progress cannot be achieved 
without state involvement. 
Ake (1996: 132) asserts that the suitable democracy for Africa would have four 
characteristics: 
1. Democracy in which people have real decision-making power over and 
above the formal consent of electoral choice. 
2. Social democracy that puts emphasis on concrete political, social, and 
economic rights, as opposed to liberal democracy that emphasises 
abstract political rights. 
3. Democracy that puts as much emphasis on collective rights as it does 
on individual rights. 
4. Democracy of incorporation. It should be as inclusive as possible. 
Further Ake (2000: 185) avers that while in Africa democracy movement is taking 
the direction of liberal democracy of multi-party electoral competition, social 
democracy is more feasible in Africa. Indeed this type of democracy could allow 
existence of a developmental state practising more developmental intervention 
than regulatory intervention in the economic development. 
Matlosa and Sello (2005: 14, 51) suggest that today Lesotho is a fairly stable 
democracy having transited to this stage in 1993 whereas in the period 1966-
1970 Lesotho was in the embryonic stage of democracy. This is acceptable 
because the colonial ropes had just been shed off and there had been a change 
from the colonial hegemony. It is worth noting that in the socio-economic analysis 
of Lesotho by Matlosa and Sello (2005: 2-10) the GNP per capita value for 
Lesotho is not given and the per capita income is only mentioned. This is a very 
useful indicator of socio-economic development. Another good alternative 
indicator is the Human Development Index (HDI). Matlosa and Sello (2005: 6, 7) 
mentioned the sustainable human development (SDH), which, also like HDI, 
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includes the per capita income. The important thing missed out by Matlosa and 
Sello is giving a value for the SDH or the per capita income at least. 
According to Matlosa and Sello (2005: 8) the most critical policy challenge facing 
Lesotho is poverty. Indeed in order to address the problem of poverty Lesotho 
prepared a poverty reduction strategy paper that has the strategies deployed in 
the fight against poverty. A number of the interviewees such as the leader of the 
MFP asserted that poverty was the greatest constraint impacting on their political 
participation. 
Nyango'ro (1989: 116) states that the dominance of simple commodity 
production, suggests that capitalist production cannot be achieved in the near 
future in Africa. Also Nyango'ro contends that part of the problem of 
underdevelopment in Africa could be explained as the failure of capitalist 
production to take root in Africa. Further, Nyango'ro avers that according to 
dependency theory the periphery has no dynamism of its own, since external 
forces trigger the need for production in the periphery. This explains why Lesotho 
stays dependent on the core countries and why it remains one of the least 
developed countries (LDCs). Also, Nyango'ro (1989: 58-60) asserts that whether 
or not the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and its supporters agree on the 
negative effects of its programs, there is enough evidence supporting that its 
conditions have been devastating to countries that have implemented them. 
Lesotho gets funding from IMF and World Bank. 
Nyango'ro (1989: 100, 101) makes an attempt to reconstruct development theory 
from the perspective of internally generated capitalist development forces in 
Africa by examining the evolution of the internal development structure. He calls 
this process disaggregating capitalism in Africa. Nyango'ro (1989: 109, 110) 
asserts that a better way of analysing modern capitalism, its historical evolution 
and its application to the Third World especially to Africa, should be based on the 
synthesis between the Weberian institutional theory of capitalism and the Marxian 
social theory of capitalism. Nyango'ro asserts that this approach could enable 
easy understanding of development of capitalism in Africa and the rest of the 
Third World. 
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Dahl's theory takes into consideration the GNP per capita (Dahl 1975: 203). The 
researcher suggests that these two co-authors, Matlosa and Sello, have left out a 
theory that they used to measure development of democracy in Lesotho. He 
therefore proposes that a tool such as Dahl's theory is very appropriate to use in 
this respect. The work of Matlosa and Sello as indicated above is very important 
for this dissertation because it gives an analysis of the state of political parties 
and the impact of their operations on Lesotho's democratisation process (Matlosa 
and Sello 2005: 2). 
Also very resourceful was the work of Kabemba, "From military rule to multiparty 
democracy: Political reforms and challenges in Lesotho". The author stated in the 
preface that the research work focused on electoral processes. Kabemba (2003: 
16 - 18) asserts that among the many causes of political violence in Lesotho, the 
most fundamental cause is its weak, dependent economy, and the weak state. 
Kabemba (2003: 8 - 9) noted the case of positive unity during the elections in 
Lesotho in which the small parties increased their share of votes as the bigger 
parties lost considerable percentage of their votes. 
Lindberg's work of 2006 addresses patron-client relations in electoral politics in 
Africa. This is a very important issue in this dissertation because it is a theory that 
explains elections in Lesotho. According to Lindberg (2006: 12) Barkan's study3 
shows that the more agrarian the society, the higher the geographic 
concentration of the vote, that is the rural voters seem to continue to prefer 
representatives based on how good they are as "patrons" of their respective 
community or constituency. Also, Lindberg (2006: 12) asserts that a couple of 
empirical studies of multiparty elections of the 1990s corroborate the recurrence 
of personalized patron-client relations in electoral politics of Africa. Further, 
Lindberg noted that it is not clear whether the preference for patron over policy is 
influenced by the international financial institutions and the donor community or 
by the "parochial" political culture in which dependency on someone with the right 
political connections is renowned, or whether it derives from something else. 
3 Barkan, Joel D. 1995. "Elections in agrarian societies." Journal of Democracy 6: 106-116. 
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1.1.3.3 What do these studies conclude about the topic? 
According to Matlosa and Sello (2005: 40), due to lack of intra-party democracy, 
internal factionalism, power-struggles and splits, there have been considerable 
fluctuations of party membership over the past ten years in percentage terms 
and absolute numbers. Matlosa and Sello (2005: 43) conclude that either by 
default or by design, there tends to be a lull in membership drive and political 
mobilisation between the elections. These authors contend that the phenomenon 
leads to a situation where the political parties, especially the opposition parties, 
hardly hold public meetings and they only wake up from hibernation when an 
election approaches. However, Matlosa and Sello (2005: 40) state that a number 
of political parties notably the, BNP, NIP, LCD, LPC and the PFD had their best 
years of growing membership, particularly women membership surpassing 50%, 
in the post-1998 years including 2001 and 2003. 
According to Matlosa and Sello (2005: 51) political parties are supposed to play a 
key role in driving the democratic project and for Lesotho parties to achieve this, 
they should embrace and sustain a culture of political tolerance and constructive 
management of political conflicts. 
Ake's works are very important in warning that democracy is not only about 
electoral multi-party elections. Ake's work (1996) outlines the characteristics of 
the type of democracy suitable for Africa. Ake's work (2000) concludes that social 
democracy is feasible in Africa. Nyango'ro's work (1989) informs us that with the 
application of the dependency framework or theory the Third World countries, 
notably African countries, could remain continuously dependent on the core 
countries. Also this work tells us the importance of simultaneously developing 
both economy and politics in the process of democratising Africa. Further, the 
works of both Ake and Nyango'ro show the importance of state intervention in 
economic development, less for regulating and more for developing the economy 
by prioritising the industries. Both Ake's and Nyango'ro's works pinpoint the 
weaknesses of the world-systems theory, dependency and development theories 
and conclude by attempting reconstruction of the development theory. 
Nyango'ro (1989: 156) calls for a new development strategy in Africa, to 
restructure Africa's relationship with international economy - inevitably moving 
43 
toward less association. As mentioned above, Nyango'ro (1989: 100, 101) 
suggests reconstruction of development theory from the perspective of internally 
generated capitalist development forces in Africa by examining the evolution of 
the internal development structure. He calls this process disaggregating 
capitalism in Africa. Ake (2000: 185) asserts that while in Africa democracy 
movement is taking the direction of liberal democracy of multi-party electoral 
competition, social democracy is more feasible in Africa. 
Lindberg (2006: 12) asserts that a couple of empirical studies of multiparty 
elections of the 1990s corroborate the recurrence of personalized patron-client 
relations in electoral politics in Africa. Lindberg (2006: 150) suggests that more 
research needs to be conducted in democratising countries on interaction 
between constitutions and regulations and among the individuals within political 
parties in general and in opposition parties particularly. 
Further in their conclusion Matlosa and Sello (2005: 51) state that the external 
regulatory mechanisms for parties should be streamlined and strengthened. 
Additionally, these authors assert that it is imperative that all legal matters 
relating to the existence and operation of the political parties are governed by a 
specific political parties' parliamentary act, enforced by a specific office such as 
the registrar of political parties, as is the case in some SADC countries. It is 
recommended that the parties enhance their systems of keeping membership 
records so that, they may be in a position of knowing their strengths at any given 
time more especially when a national election is called. 
Matlosa and Sello (2005: 52) conclude that lack of policy documents beyond the 
constitution is a problem that tends to adversely affect Lesotho political parties in 
terms of their operations and public image. Their recommendation is that parties 
should develop policy and programme documents that complement their 
constitutions and from which manifestos are drawn. 
According to Matlosa and Sello (2005: 52) it is difficult to conduct surveys among 
members as often as desired due to the fact that the parties have financial 
constraints. These authors recommend that the parties should make a concerted 
effort to sustain production of their own newsletters, both print and electronic. 
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Having noted that no party had indicated any international affiliations and any 
form of alliance or cooperation with other political parties in the country, Matlosa 
and Sello (2005: 53) state that it is imperative that parties in Lesotho establish 
international linkages and explore formal alliances among themselves. 
The membership registers of the parties are not regularly updated and as a 
result they lack accuracy. For this reason the parties are not able to determine 
their political strength especially when it comes to electoral contests (Matlosa 
and Sello 2005: 53). These authors recommend that the parties update their 
membership registers. 
Matlosa and Sello (2005: 53) contend that one major resource that political 
parties need is money. Further they state that one of the challenges facing 
parties in Lesotho is lack of public funding for their institutional development, and 
they recommend that Lesotho government introduce public funding for the 
parties represented in parliament. 
Kabemba (2003: 53) concludes that change of the electoral system from FPTP 
to MMP and restructuring of the armed forces have substantially reduced the 
risks of the rejection of the election results and political violence. But, Kabemba 
warns that there is need for continued vigilance because Lesotho's political 
culture remains adversarial. This author further says that underdevelopment of 
political parties should be taken as one of the greatest obstacles to Lesotho 
democratisation. 
Furthermore, Kabemba (2003: 53) advises that among the challenges facing 
Lesotho are: the inclusion of the new generation in the leadership of political 
parties who would be enthusiastic in multiparty democracy and also acquiring 
gender balance at all levels of political institutions. According to Kabemba (2003: 
54) Lesotho's leadership should apply efforts to alleviate poverty and to redress 
inequalities in income and gender. This author recommends that the new 
electoral system be continuously evaluated to ensure that it remains in line with 
the changing political realities in the country. Also Kabemba says that Lesotho 
needs intensive civic and voter education about its new electoral system. Further 
Kabemba (2003: xii) recommends that the playing field must be levelled among 
all the political parties and candidates, and also equal funding and access to 
media should be continuously guaranteed to all. 
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1.1.3.4 What are the apparent methodological strengths and weaknesses 
of these studies? 
Here, the researcher discusses some of the studies mentioned in the earlier sub-
sections above. 
In the work of Matlosa and Sello the methodology used is explained very clearly 
and the reader easily understands how the information was gathered. The 
methodology used for collecting data was multivariate; data was collected from 
secondary material in the form of written sources including academic 
publications. Also desktop research was used and it was complemented by 
structured interviews using a standard questionnaire. The secondary materials 
are easily obtained for collection of data and also the desktop research is 
convenient. 
The ease of collecting data is a methodological strength. On the contrary 
Matlosa and Sello have not indicated the research method used in their work, 
even though the methodology of collecting data has been so well described. This 
is a weakness. Another weakness that is found in the work of Matlosa and Sello 
is lack of the description or mention of the sampling criteria used to select the 
units of analysis and the units of observation. 
The methodology has not been explicitly given in the work of Kabemba. This is a 
weak point. However, the preface to the work is good and arouses interest of the 
reader to explore the book. 
The work of Lindberg reveals the importance of political competition exerted by 
opposition groups in determining the level of democracy of the regime. The 
works of Ake and Nyango'ro explain why the Third World countries continue to 
be poor and dependent on the developed countries. Poverty seems to impact 
negatively on the activities of the opposition political parties in Lesotho. 
1.1.3.5 What remains to be discovered about the topic? 
The things that remain to be studied about this topic are the following factors in 
explaining the weakness of opposition parties: party membership excluding party 
supporters or voters (Matlosa and Sello 2005: 40); the kind of training, besides 
voter education, offered by some political parties, e.g. the LPC and the PFD, 
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(Matlosa and Sello 2005: 42). Matlosa and Sello (2005: vi) put forward the 
following questions: 
• "Has the current political transition enhanced democratic governance?" 
• "Has the transition deepened democratic culture and practice?" 
• "Has the transition improved effectiveness of democratic institutions such 
as political parties?" 
These above-mentioned matters remain to be studied. 
1.1.3.6 What appears to be, according to these studies, the most effective 
methods for developing new information on the topic? 
Matlosa and Sello (2005: 52, 53) contend that political parties should develop a 
culture of assessing their political strengths through regular surveys and that they 
should regularly update their membership registers right from the branch up to 
the national levels. The parties should have up-to-date records and these will 
facilitate developing new information on the topic. From a research point of view, 
in-depth interviews with party leaders appear to be an indispensable method to 
gain an understanding of the party dynamics in Lesotho. According to Matlosa 
and Sello (2005: 53) very little has been published for a qualitative study. 
1.1.4 Possible gaps in the earlier studies 
The researcher sees the following gap in the earlier studies of electoral political 
participation in Lesotho that needs to be filled: inadequate systematic analyses of 
electoral political participation by opposition political parties during the period 
1993 to 2006 in Lesotho. A number of researchers and writers conducted studies 
of electoral participation of opposition political parties in Lesotho. However, their 
works did not satisfactorily address the following problem question: "Why have 
the opposition political parties in Lesotho weakened since 1993?" Below the 
works of a sample of authors are critiqued. 
Makoa's 2004 work, Electoral Reform and Political Stability in Lesotho, focused 
on interdependence and interconnectedness between the triad of the following 
issues: elections, constitutionalism and political stability. He asserts that together 
these three items could solve political problems of Lesotho and that they are 
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critical sinews of democracy and foundations of peace. This information was 
valuable for the dissertation. However, this work did not answer the problem 
question: "Why have the opposition political parties in Lesotho weakened since 
1993?" 
According to Makoa (2002: 1) his monograph, Elections, election outcomes and 
electoral politics in Lesotho, attempted to capture and explain the utility of general 
election as perceived by Lesotho electorate. Also, it endeavoured to demonstrate 
the relationship between the electorate perception and the recurrent political 
unrest and instability in Lesotho. Makoa (2002: 9) avers that, the similar voting 
patterns of the 1993 and 1998 general elections prompted him and his 
colleagues, of departments of political science and statistics of the National 
University of Lesotho, to embark on a study. 
Their study covered the four general elections of 1965, 1970, 1993 and 1998. A 
total of 883 people of ten electoral constituencies of lowlands and foothills were 
interviewed. The research was directed mainly at finding out "what exactly a vote 
meant to a voter, what influenced the people to vote the way they did in the four 
elections and whether issues count in Lesotho elections. Their finding that 
"issues do not count in Lesotho elections" was very important for this dissertation. 
According to their finding electorates do not vote for a party because they support 
its policy issues (Makoa 2002: 10). However, this monograph did not address the 
problem question: "Why have the opposition political parties in Lesotho 
weakened since 1993?" 
According to Makoa (2005: 69), in the article "Lesotho", opposition Members of 
Parliament do not believe that the present parliament is an agent of democracy, 
as according to them it is not a genuinely representative forum. Makoa contends 
that these MPs complain that the LCD uses its majority to forestall debates on 
important national issues and that the bills are often passed into law before they 
have been properly scrutinised. This information, about democracy in parliament, 
is valuable for the dissertation. However, the article, "Lesotho", focused on 
democracy and did not address the problem question: "Why have the opposition 
political parties in Lesotho weakened since 1993?" The purpose of the study was 
to investigate whether the parliamentary system of Lesotho had strengthened 
democracy. The study revealed that all MPs could participate in the discussions 
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on parliamentary business, engaging one another freely through debates, 
motions and questions. Further, Makoa (2005: 73) avers that, weak and divided, 
opposition has not taken advantage of its freedom to speak to expose the defects 
of the system. 
Matlosa's 2001 Report provided some valuable information for this dissertation, 
but did not answer the problem question: "Why have the opposition political 
parties in Lesotho weakened since 1993?" Matlosa's work focused on elections 
and election administration in Lesotho. Matlosa (2001: 31) states that the election 
and election processes are crucial for sustenance and consolidation of young 
democracies in Southern Africa. Further, he says this is much more required in 
Lesotho, a country with political history marred by recurrent and incessant 
instability and often violent conflicts. 
Matlosa's work answered its own key question: "why did violent conflicts, 
bordering ominously on civil war, erupt in Lesotho after 1998 election?" (Matlosa 
2001: 31). Matlosa contends that the answer to this key question vests in the 
nature of the electoral outcome, which is a by-product of the electoral system 
Lesotho adopted since independence. Expressed simply, the electoral outcome 
was an overwhelming victory for the LCD and with the exclusionary feature of 
first-past-the-post system, the other contestants felt excluded and cheated. The 
sense of exclusion instilled a sense of bitterness and that indicated that before 
the election already there was discontent due to the split of the BCP and 
emergence of the LCD as the ruling party. According to Matlosa the conflict had 
its deeper roots not in the administration of election. In conclusion, Matlosa 
(2001: 31) stated that it was imperative that, Lesotho made a serious review of its 
electoral system with a view to broadening participation in the political system 
and encouraging effective parliamentary opposition. 
Southall's work of about 2005, "The 1993 Lesotho election" focused on the 1993 
election. It answered the question: "why did the BCP win and by such an 
overwhelming margin?" Southall (ca 2005: 114) gave two answers to the 
question. The first one was that the BCP was much better prepared than the 
BNP. The second was that the BCP had greater political commitment and 
experience of its candidates. However, Southall's work did not address the 
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problem question: "Why have the opposition political parties in Lesotho 
weakened since 1993?" 
Matlosa's work, "The 1993 elections in Lesotho and the nature of BCP victory" 
focused on the 1993 election. However, Matlosa (1997) also looked at the 1960 
District Council election, 1965 general election and 1970 general election. 
Matlosa (1997: 148) argued that BCP's total victory denied all other parties even 
a shadow of representation in parliament. He warned that such a situation posed 
a serious challenge for the democratisation of Lesotho politics. Further, he 
pinpointed three challenges: The first was that, since BCP seized power it had 
attempted to entrench itself through politics of hegemony, patronage and 
clientelism. The second was that, BCP had been engaged mainly in managing 
one crisis after another. The third was that, factional fights within BCP continued 
to undermine its capacity to govern. The above information is useful for the 
dissertation. However, Matlosa's work did not address the problem question: 
"Why have the opposition political parties in Lesotho weakened since 1993?" 
Matlosa's work of 2000 "Electoral systems and political stability in Southern 
Africa" only touched the elections results for the purpose of comparison. The 
work was focused on electoral systems and political stability. So, it did not 
address the problem question: "Why have the opposition political parties in 
Lesotho weakened since 1993?" 
Kapa's essay of 2003, "Secrecy and transparency in Lesotho's general elections" 
was focused on secrecy and transparency. Kapa (2003) contends that secrecy 
and transparency are yardsticks to the assessment of any elections. This work 
did not address the problem question: "Why have the opposition political parties 
in Lesotho weakened since 1993?" 
Matlosa and Sello (2005: 53) noted that one of the challenges facing parties in 
Lesotho is lack of public funding for their institutional development. This point is 
very important for this dissertation. However, this issue alone does not answer 
the problem question: "Why have the opposition political parties in Lesotho 
weakened since 1993?" Also, Matlosa and Sello recommended that Lesotho 
government introduced public funding for parties represented in parliament and 
that it should be allocated in proportion to the number of parliamentary seats 
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each party occupied. Their work focused on political parties and democratization 
in Lesotho. 
Kabemba's work of 2003 is "From military rule to multiparty democracy: political 
reforms and challenges in Lesotho". The work was part of a wider EISA research 
project on democratic consolidation in Southern Africa. Its focus was on electoral 
processes. According to Kabemba (2003: xi), in Lesotho the study sought to 
evaluate the prospects for the endurance of multiparty democracy. Kabemba 
(2003: 530) asserts that Lesotho has made progress in terms of democratic 
consolidation, but he warns that the possibility of a reverse process is not 
excluded. Also, he states that the underdevelopment of political parties should be 
regarded as one of the greatest obstacles to Lesotho democratisation. This is 
valuable material for this dissertation. However, like the other works critiqued 
above, the work of Kabemba was not focused on the problem question: "Why 
have the opposition political parties in Lesotho weakened since 1993?" So, it did 
not address that question. 
The above works of various writers provided valuable information for this 
dissertation. However, they had little information to address the problem question 
of the dissertation: "Why have the opposition political parties in Lesotho 
weakened since 1993?" 
1.2 Motivation / Research Problem 
What could have driven the researcher to choose this topic for a dissertation? 
Studies were made about the general elections in Lesotho, but none ever 
provided an answer to the researcher's problem. The problem is expressed in the 
following question: "Why have the opposition political parties in Lesotho 
weakened since 1993? The answers to this problem will explain how the ruling 
party won the successive elections of 1998 and 2002. The researcher wants to 
find out how influential the opposition political parties in Lesotho have been since 
1993. 
Looking back at the District Council Election (local government election) of 1960, 
BCP had won 30 seats, other parties 6 seats and independent candidates had 
won 4 seats (Matlosa 1997: 141), (Mphanya 2004: 44). In all there were 10 
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opposition seats or 25% of the total number of seats. BCP had acquired 36.2% 
votes, Independents 35.3%, the BNP 19.8%, the MTP 8.0% and the BPA 0.7% 
votes (Mphanya 2004: 44), (Leeman 1984: 296, 662-663). The opposition was 
very strong because it had received 63.8% votes. 
The results of the 1965 general election gave the winning party (the BNP) 31 
seats, the BCP 25 and the MFP 4 seats (Matlosa 1997), and it established a very 
strong opposition of 29 seats that made up 44.6% of the total. Also the opposition 
received 58.4% of the total votes. According to the results of 1970 general 
election, the opposition in parliament could have been strong had the BNP 
leader, Leabua Jonathan, not refused to relinquish power. The BCP had won 36 
seats, the BNP 23, the MFP 1 (Gill 1997: 220, Khaketla 1971: 211, Southall 
ca.1995: 111, Mphanya 2004: 69, Matlosa 1997). Therefore, the opposition had 
36.7% of the total seats. 
Comparing the period '1965 to 1970' with the period '1993 to 2006' one would 
notice that there existed a big difference in politics of the two periods. The 
findings will confirm that the following great change took place: the movement 
from a culture of very strong opposition in parliament (in the period 1965 to 
1970), through periods of the BNP autocracy (1970 to 1986) and dictatorship of 
military junta (1986 to 1993), back to inclusive near-polyarchy (Dahl 1975: 8) or 
democratising government or hybrid regime (Gershman 2004: 4) with very few 
opposition parliamentary seats in the period '1993 to 2006'. The results of the 
general election of 1993 allocated zero seats to the opposition. The BCP had 
won all the 65 seats, and when the LCD split away in 1997 the remaining BCP 
parliamentarians formed, in number, a fairly strong opposition of 25 seats in 
parliament. As mentioned earlier, the opposition rose from 0% to 38.5% in 
parliament. However, this situation lasted a short period of less than seven 
months. 
Also, the results of the 1998 election had only one seat for the opposition, 
occupied by the BNP, and in 2001 when the LPC broke away from the LCD the 
seats of the opposition increased to 28. The opposition grew from 1.5% to 43.1%, 
as mentioned in sub-sub-section 1.1.1 above. However, that situation of a strong 
opposition in Parliament, like that of 1997, also lasted less than seven months. 
52 
The researcher's assumption is that, since 1993 general election, opposition 
political parties constituted very weak opposition in Lesotho Parliament. 
Opposition political parties were not able to win more than one parliamentary seat 
in both the 1998 and 2002 general elections. There is therefore need to do further 
analysis of electoral political participation of opposition political parties in Lesotho. 
The reader should note that earlier researchers carried out analyses of elections 
in Lesotho. However, more work has to be done. 
A big opposition party that hopes to become the government, should act like a 
newly elected ruling party when it deals with the public; it should keep the public 
informed about parliamentary affairs and new developments, and should also get 
inputs from the public. In my view, when the political parties do their work 
effectively it should not be difficult for them to do well in the elections. 
1.3 Research questions 
Research questions can be of various kinds depending on the different types of 
studies (Jegede 1999: 64). Maykut and Morehouse (1994: 91) stated that Patton 





Sensory questions; and 
Background/demographic questions. 
Another feature of Patton's question typology is the time frame of each question; 
a question can be posed in the present, past, or future tense (Maykut and 
Morehouse 1994: 92). 
The researcher used a mixture of the types of questions in Patton's typology. It 
was important to explore information from experience, knowledge, observation 
and opinions of the political party officials and also of the members of the public. 
Many of the political parties, for example, had people who had long been in active 
political participation, such as the BAC, the BCP, the BNP, the MFP, the NPP, 
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the UDP and the ruling party the LCD. Below is the list of research questions that 
were used in this research work. 
1.3.1 The main question 
Why have the opposition political parties in Lesotho weakened since 1993? 
1.3.2 Subsidiary questions 
i) Why did the ruling party in Lesotho win successive elections of 1998 and 
2002? 
ii) What are the main causes of the poor election results of opposition 
political parties in Lesotho since 1993? 
iii) What are the perceived remedies for the main causes of poor election 
results of the opposition political parties in Lesotho since 1993? 
iv) What are the problems of the electoral system used in Lesotho? 
v) How does lack of party political funding impact on electoral political 
participation of opposition political parties in Lesotho? 
vi) What is the impact of poverty on electoral political participation of 
opposition political parties in Lesotho, since 1993? 
vii) Since 1993, did the government make it difficult for the opposition political 
parties to participate in elections? 
viii)What is the impact of opposition political parties in Parliament, since 1993, 
on participatory politics? 
1.4 Theoretical framework 
This study is premised on patron-client relationship theory. This theory is 
intended to explain how the incumbent political party won successive elections of 
1998 and 2002. The researcher found it prudent to explain political and economic 
developments in Lesotho and for that purpose he utilized the following theories: 
Dahl's theory of polyarchy and Lindberg's theory of uninterrupted series of 
elections. 
Robert A. Dahl (1975) (in Polyarchy) and Giovanni Sartori (1979) (in Parties and 
party systems) are some of the most prominent scholars who emphasized the 
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role of political parties in elections. Dahl used the indicators of contestation and 
inclusiveness. Dahl (1975: 1-9) developed a framework that is useful for giving 
guidance to transformation of a regime from hegemony to a relatively 
democratised regime or polyarchy and vice versa. According to Dahl (1975: 46), 
there are existing models and no country needs to grope through centuries of 
experience with no idea of the elementary institutions required for a highly 
liberalized regime: competitive parties and uncoerced elections are not merely a 
goal, but a fact. 
All the theoretical assumptions are discussed in chapter 2, sub-section 2.6. 
1.5 Delimitation and Limitation 
i) Delimitation 
This study was confined to exploring earlier studies, interviewing 12 
selected political party leaders/officials from the opposition, qualitatively 
analysing and interpreting the data collected from the interviews, and 
analysing the 1993, 1998, and 2002 general elections. A sample of 24 
constituencies was used in the analysis of the 2002 election. 
Why was a sample of 24 constituencies used in the analysis of the 2002 
election? In the 2002 election the total number of constituencies had been 
increased from 65 to 80. According to Neuman (1997: 222), for small 
populations of study (below 1000) a large sampling ratio, about 30%, is 
sufficiently representative and can give accurate results. Thirty percent, 
(30%) of the 80 constituencies is 24. 
As indicated above, the researcher explored literature related to the topic 
and qualitatively analysed data from the literature. 
ii) Limitation 
Two of the interviewees, Anna Majara, the leader of the New Lesotho 
Freedom Party, and Peete Peete, the leader of the National Progressive 
Party, passed away in 2008 and 2009 respectively. That situation reduced 
the chances of the researcher to get back to them to clarify certain issues 
on what they had contributed. However, the negative impact on the 
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research work was not considerable because, the sample had been 12 
interviewees, a number that constituted 66.7% of the total or population of 
18. Their deaths brought down the number of interviewed leaders/officials 
to 10. 
1.6 Structure of the study 
This section gives the outline of the study and this comprises four chapters and 
five appendices. 
CHAPTER 1 
This chapter introduces the dissertation to the reader. It tells the reader why the 
given topic was chosen. This chapter states the problem identified by the 
researcher and it gives a list of research questions. Also, this chapter is the 
review of related literature. This literature includes books, government gazettes, 
Independent Electoral Commission's reports, newspapers, periodicals, and so 
on. The literature review will enable confirmation of any new finding or criticizing 
of a past finding. So, it is important to study related literature. In this chapter the 
researcher noted the gap left unfilled by the earlier studies of electoral political 
participation in Lesotho. 
CHAPTER 2 
Chapter 2 is about research design, methodology and theoretical framework. 
The chapter explains the sampling method used. It explains the procedures of 
conducting the study. Collected data is given in this chapter. The researcher 
briefly explains the electoral systems used in Lesotho in this chapter, so that the 
reader may understand the used tables. It is here that the researcher compiled 
data from the interviews with political leaders or party officials. Also, in this 
chapter the theory, on which the dissertation is premised, is discussed. 
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CHAPTER 3 
This chapter deals with electoral systems and data of elections results, 
authenticity, trustworthiness of collected data, qualitative data analysis and 
interpretation. 
CHAPTER 4 
In this chapter the researcher gives a conclusion to the study, based on the 
findings. Also, in this chapter the researcher indicates the areas of possible future 
studies. 
APPENDICES 
Appendix 1 is the questionnaire with semi-structured questions used in the 
interviews. Appendix 2 gives the historical background of Lesotho's party politics. 
Appendices 3 and 4 are respectively the sample of constituencies and of the list 
of political party officials. Appendix 5 contains data from the interviews. Appendix 
6 is the analysis of the placement of electoral candidates by opposition parties in 
the 2002 elections. Appendix 7 discusses the dependency and post dependency 
theories. 
1.7 Conclusion 
Political parties should be the enlightening institutions. They should educate their 
supporters, who should acquire basic understanding of politics. The parties 
should organise trainers' workshops. The trainers should train the supporters in 
the branches and constituencies. The supporters should be encouraged to read 
various media and to attend political meetings. The political parties should teach 
the party supporters to discuss political issues and party policies. These parties 
should not wait for the next national election before they hold political rallies; they 
should hold these public meetings frequently and regularly in order to recruit new 
supporters and to promote political participation of the supporters. 
The department of political science in the National University of Lesotho should 
take it as its responsibility to regularly evaluate the opposition political parties. 
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Among other means to be used by the department the researcher recommends 
the yardsticks identified by Ssenkumba in Olukoshi (1998: 177). 
In order to enable effective political participation of opposition parties in Lesotho 
the process of democratization has to continue, so that at least all the eight 
institutional guarantees of democratization, stated by Dahl (1975:3-4), are 
practically available. 
The regulatory, financial and the political spheres in which the opposition political 
parties in Lesotho operate have adversely influenced their strategies and 
organization. 
In Lesotho a number of political parties split and new parties were established as 
breakaway parties and this phenomenon is a result of a lack of tolerance 
amongst the political parties. 
The opposition political parties are capable of performing important tasks, it is of 
utmost importance to give them the opportunity to participate in parliament and in 
the other decision-making processes. Governments, including Lesotho 
government, should understand that the opposition parties are part and parcel of 
the nation-building exercise and their role should be fully recognised and fully 
institutionalised in the political structures. 
On the basis of literature review, the researcher came to the conclusion that, 
although the opposition political parties are weak and have few parliamentary 
seats, they also achieved successes in the period 1993 to 2006. These 
successes are potential strengths of the opposition parties and they are as 
follows: 
i) It was due to the political demands of the opposition parties that the Langa 
Commission was established to study the irregularities in the 1998 
election; 
ii) The Interim Political Authority was established to level the political playing 
ground after the 1998 election; 
iii) The new electoral model, the MMP, was adopted and it has a potential to 
enhance participation of the opposition parties in parliament. 
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Has the literature review answered the major research question, which seeks to 
find out if since 1993 the opposition political parties had gone weak? The answer 
is yes. The reasons are that the regulatory, financial and the political spheres in 
which the opposition parties operate adversely affected their strategies and their 
organisation. The ruling party won the successive elections of 1998 and 2002. 
The records show that opposition parties have been performing very poorly 
during the elections of the period 1993-2006. Considering the poor achievement 
of the opposition at each general election, the opposition political parties are still 
considerably weak. The researcher concludes that unlike in the period 1965 to 
1970, the opposition parties had gone weak in the period 1993 to 2006. 
What pattern did elections in Lesotho follow in the period 1993 to 2006? On the 
basis of information from the related literature the researcher comfortably 
concludes that, in Lesotho the elections followed the pattern explained by patron-
client relationship theory. 
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CHAPTER 2 
RESEARCH DESIGN, METHODOLOGY AND THEORETICAL 
FRAMEWORK 
2.1 Introduction 
In this chapter the researcher explains the research design, describes and 
explains the research techniques of conducting the research work. He explains 
the used sampling method, data collection methods, and the applied triangulation 
method. Also, in this chapter the researcher discusses the technique used for 
data analysis. Additionally, this chapter has the theoretical framework of the 
dissertation. 
2.2 Research Design 
For research purposes quantitative or qualitative research designs or a 
combination of both designs can be used depending on the appropriateness of 
the option chosen by the researcher. According to Myers (1997: 1), quantitative 
research methods were originally developed in the natural sciences to study 
natural phenomena, and their examples being survey methods, laboratory 
experiments, formal methods (e.g. econometrics) and numerical methods such 
as mathematical modelling. Botha (1996: 264) stated that qualitative research is 
important to political scientists, and with it the researcher deals with qualitative 
data or data in the form of values, but with quantitative research the researcher 
deals with data expressed in numerical format. Qualitative design is suitable for 
use in research work that involves handling of small amounts of data, while the 
quantitative method is suitable for a large population (Labuschagne 2003: 100) 
(Trochim 1999). 
In this dissertation the research method mainly used is qualitative in nature. This 
research work is related to the electoral political participation of opposition parties 
in Lesotho in the period 1993 to 2006. The researcher opted for major use of 
qualitative research because it is more suitable than quantitative research 
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regarding the ongoing political process in Lesotho. In support of the choice of this 
design, reference is made to Babbie and Mouton (2001: 270) who related 
qualitative research to a "process", when they stated that qualitative research is 
different from quantitative research in a number of key features, such as the 
following: 'A focus on process rather than outcome'. 
According to Trochim (1999), quantitative research excels at summarizing large 
amounts of data and reaching generalizations based on statistical projections, 
while qualitative research excels at "telling the story" from the participant's 
viewpoint, providing the rich descriptive detail. Neuman (1997: 327) mentioned 
that, even though qualitative and quantitative styles of research differ in several 
ways, they are on the other hand complementary. 
The type of qualitative design used for this dissertation is the interpretive 
approach, which Neuman (1997: 68) says, often, is called qualitative method of 
research. Neuman (1997: 329) asserts that qualitative social research relies 
largely on the interpretive and critical approaches which both are alternatives to 
positivism. Also according to Burns (2003) qualitative research is called 
interpretive method. Burns (2003) says that interpretive research method is used 
to discover meaningful insights and meanings of personal experiences. Gorski 
(2005) states that, the researcher has to use his/her knowledge to interpret 
findings from the collected textual data in order to make wise conclusions. This 
research method derives its name from the involved activity of interpretation of 
findings. 
This dissertation is aimed at revealing the weaknesses and/or potential strengths 
of the opposition political parties in electoral political participation. In view of the 
above explanation, in this study the researcher uses a qualitative design and 
there are a number of types of this design. For example Smith in Creswell (1994: 
146) categorized qualitative approaches into interpretive, artistic, systematic, and 
theory-driven approaches. 
This research work is a combination of research methods that include literature 
review and interviews. Information from the related literature and the interviews is 
analysed from a qualitative perspective. The interviews have contributed a critical 
component to the research, namely that of leadership perceptions. The study 
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deals with the period 1993 to 2006. The universe of analysis is the elections in all 
the eighty (80) electoral constituencies in Lesotho. The units of analysis (sample) 
were the elections in twenty-four electoral constituencies and the units of 
observation were the 'leaders or officials' of the opposition political parties. Up to 
the year 2006, there were eighteen registered political parties in Lesotho. For the 
purpose of this study twelve of their leaders/officials were interviewed. The 
researcher used purposeful sampling approach to select opposition 
leaders/officials for interviews. 
Neuman (1997: 222) says that one important principle of sampling is that, the 
smaller the size of the population the bigger the sampling ratio has to be so as to 
be an accurate sample, or to be a sample with high probability of yielding the 
same results as the entire population. According to Neuman (1997: 222), for 
small populations of study (below 1000) a large enough sampling ratio, about 
30%, is sufficiently representative and can give accurate results. On this basis, a 
sampling ratio of 30% was used in this study. The 30% of 80 constituencies is 24. 
In the process of sampling the twenty-four electoral constituencies, the 
researcher first of all arranged the names of the constituencies alphabetically and 
gave them sequential numbers. Then the researcher used the random number 
table starting anywhere in the table and then allocated random numbers, 
according to simple random selection method, to the twenty-four constituencies, 
thereby identifying the sample. The sample of the electoral constituencies of 
Lesotho appears in appendix 3. 
The focus of this study is on electoral political participation of opposition political 
parties in twenty-four electoral constituencies. This study includes comparative 
analysis of the general elections of 1993, 1998 and 2002, using twenty-four 
constituencies. 
2.3 Methodology 
In qualitative research, the qualitative techniques of data collection are usually 
applied. The researcher also used triangulation of the techniques. According to 
Denzin (1994: 1) triangulation is the application and combination of several 
research methodologies in the study of the same phenomenon. It is appropriate 
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for establishing credibility of qualitative analysis. It is also appropriate for 
validation of quantitative studies. 
The researcher used a number of different research techniques to collect data: 
i) The researcher used the questionnaire given in Appendix 1 for collection 
of qualitative data based on the period 1993 to 2006. The questionnaire 
consists of various types of questions: open-ended, closed-ended and skip 
or contingency questions. He combined different types of questions in 
order to add up their advantages. He used face-to-face-one-on-one 
interviews in order to get the highest possible responses, and also to be 
able to get in-depth information related to the dissertation. 
The researcher did not use these other kinds of surveys, namely, Mail 
Questionnaires and Telephone Interviews because they lack high 
response rates and do not allow for long questionnaires (Neuman 1997: 
253) providing in-depth information. Respondents do not avail themselves 
time for answering long questionnaires and also the telephone calls 
involve high costs. 
ii) A literature survey and analysis of published material and written 
documents for the period '1993 to 2006' proved to be very useful. Botha 
(1996: 253) says that the most important technique for qualitative research 
is intelligent, systematic study of written documents and/or observation of 
phenomena in the life world of the researcher. This literature includes 
books, reports, government gazettes, newspapers, and so on. 
2.4 Interviews 
According to Jegete (1999: 133), an interview is the oral or unwritten form of the 
questionnaire and there could be two methods of conducting interviews, namely 
personal interview and telephone interview. For this dissertation, the researcher 
used a semi-structured interview schedule. The interview schedule is in the 
format of a questionnaire. There are open-ended and closed questions. 
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An open-ended question is an unstructured free-response question to which a 
respondent can give any answer, and a closed-ended question is a structured 
fixed response question which has fixed options from which the respondent has 
to choose an answer (Neuman 1997: 240). Also Jegete (1997: 131) stated that 
an open-ended questionnaire includes questions or statements that require a 
free-range of responses giving no restrictions to the respondents; and the close-
ended questionnaire has predetermined responses to the questions or 
statements. Both types of research questions have advantages and 
disadvantages. 
The researcher conducted the interviews. According to Jegete (1999: 84), it is 
necessary to state who conducted the interviews. During the interviews, both the 
researcher and the interviewee had copies of the questionnaire in their hands; 
but the researcher led the interviewee by reading the questions, while the 
interviewee answered, explained and gave opinions related to each question as 
and/when necessary. The questionnaire used is in appendix 1 and appendix 5 
has data collected from the interviews. 
2.5 Data Analysis 
In this study the researcher used micro-level analysis of the interviews. According 
to Creswell (1994: 153) experienced researchers can do data collection and 
qualitative data analysis simultaneously. However, new researchers may 
separate the two stages. 
Creswell (1994: 156, 157) says that Yin (1989) in a case study research 
discussed dominant modes of data analysis such as the following: 
(a) the search for "patterns", by comparing results with patterns predicted from 
theory or literature, 
(b) "explanation building", in which the researcher looks for causal links and 
/or explores plausible or rival explanations and attempts to build an 
explanation, about the case; 
(c) "time-series analysis", in which the researcher traces changes in a pattern 
over time. 
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The specific mode of data analysis that was found suitable for use in this 
dissertation was the "explanation building". This mode was found appropriate 
because it could reveal the cause/s of the problem being studied in the research 
work. 
2.6 Theoretical design 
This sub-section discusses the theoretical framework of the dissertation. This 
study is premised on patron-client relationship theory. It is assumed that the 
elections in Lesotho take place in accordance with the patron-client relationship 
theory. Also, it is assumed that between 1993 and 2006 the opposition political 
parties in Lesotho were weak. 
The reader should note that, in this study the researcher considered a number of 
issues relating to political and economic developments in Lesotho. Therefore, 
there are two other theories used only to explain these issues individually. The 
following other theories were used: Dahl's theory of polyarchy and Lindberg's 
theory of uninterrupted series of elections. 
2.6.1 Theoretical background and its relevance for Lesotho 
2.6.1 a) Patron-client relationship theory 
Patron-client relationship theory explains how the ruling party in Lesotho 
achieved landslide victory in successive elections of 1998 and 2002. Lindberg 
(2006: 12) asserts that a couple of empirical studies of multiparty elections of the 
1990s corroborate the recurrence of personalized patron-client relations in 
electoral politics in Africa. 
Likoti (2008: 81) contends that the system of patron-client relationship is an 
exchange between a superior patron or patron group and an inferior client or 
client group. Likoti argues that in most developing countries particularly in Africa 
the ruling party acts as a patron and voters become inferior group that votes 
expecting rewards of some kind from the patron. According to Likoti the ruling 
party in Lesotho, the LCD, develops the patronage so that the voters get 
obligated to the patron, the ruling party, for life. Further, Likoti asserts that the 
electorate vote for candidates who have contributed services to their 
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constituencies or those who have the potential to offer services to their 
constituencies. 
Further on, Likoti (2008: 82) states that the rural population takes the ruling party 
and its members of Parliament (MPs) as their patrons who provide practical 
assistance. Likoti points out that with introduction of free education and old age 
pensions, by the LCD, the level of rural communities' dependence on state-
sponsored patronage is overwhelming. Further on, Likoti argues that the victories 
of the LCD were not confined to the rural areas. Likoti was analysing the 2007 
election that is not part of this dissertation. However, the data used applies also 
to the elections of the period 1993 -2006. 
Rakuoane, the leader of the PFD in an interview, stated that due to poverty 
people vote for the ruling party in order to secure their jobs and the unemployed 
people vote in order to get jobs. The PFD Leader contends that the ruling party 
patronises the masses and the opposition parties usually find it difficult to get 
good support from the masses. 
Malebo, the MFP leader in an interview, asserted that since 1992 a great majority 
of people looked up to Mokhehle, the former leader of the BCP, as messiah who 
would save them from poverty and unemployment. Malebo's view is in agreement 
with both Rakuoane's and Likoti's view of the party patronising the masses. 
Malebo says that many people had strong belief in Mokhehle, adored him, and in 
their minds developed an ideology of Congress-ism4. 
Further the MFP leader argued that it is difficult for the new parties to establish 
themselves when an old one is already well established. Also Malebo asserted 
that lack of grass roots organization and finance by political parties and lack of 
understanding of politics are big challenges. Further still, Malebo stated that party 
members adore the political leader, for example, the leader of the BCP was 
Prime Minister for five years, although, he had assumed his position already ill 
and weak so much that he could not work efficiently. 
4 According to Malebo, the ideology of Congress-ism is an unwavering belief in the teachings of the parties 
established in the Congress tradition i.e. of the BCP/LCD. Malebo said they are taught this dogma: "once 
been a Congress always will be a Congress". Further, he asserts that the LCD members looked at 
Mokhehle, the leader, as their messiah. He says that a member of the LCD does not accept any ideas that 
could influence him/her to leave the LCD to join any other party. 
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Gordon et. al. (2007: 76) contend that most African rulers take advantage of 
monopolizing the scarce resources; they build strong bases of social support to 
maintain them in power. According to Gordon et. al., these African leaders defuse 
the opposition by a wide variety of patronage devices made possible by their 
control of state. Further, Gordon et. al. (2007: 76) state that patron-client relations 
became the main form of political exchange in post-independence Africa. Also 
Gordon et. al. (2007: 77) assert that citizens "tie" themselves to the patrons in 
government who can help them somehow. 
According to Gordon et. al., the lower-level patrons are clients themselves to the 
higher-level patrons and at the apex of the patron-client networks are the 
"middlemen" clients of the ruling elite. For example, in Lesotho members of the 
ruling party get employment much more easily than members of other parties. 
Also, in Lesotho, the ruling party uses state resources, such as vehicles, and the 
media; the ruling party monopolizes the use of the state media while some 
political parties such as the ABC are not able to use the state media. Usually, 
when the parties campaign for the national election, the ruling party distributes 
food aid in the villages. 
Further Gordon et. al. (2007: 77) contend that using the political clout, the rulers 
avail powerful positions and access to government monetary resources to enable 
these middlemen-patrons to provide jobs, to finance schools, health clinics, wells, 
storage facilities, roads, and other favours to their regions. Also Gordon et. al. 
assert that patronage binds the local constituencies not only to their network but 
to support for the regime. Additionally, Boone (1990b: 37) in Gordon et. al. (2007: 
77) asserts that acting as a system of control, state patronage and "clientelism" 
serve to consolidate regimes by offering access to state resources in exchange of 
political acquiescence. 
Chiroro (2006: 108) asserts that most of the liberation political parties, such as 
the ZANU-PF in Zimbabwe and the FRELIMO in Mozambique have created 
structures at the grassroots and created links with prominent personalities who 
have sustained forms of pervasive clientelism and patronage. Further, Chiroro 
states that it is difficult for the new parties with few links to break these structures 
of loyalty when they recruit new members especially in the rural areas. The LCD 
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is a splinter party of the BCP that is the oldest party in Lesotho. The LCD has 
similar structures and links to those mentioned by Chiroro. 
In 1997, in Lesotho, the ruling party, BCP, split giving birth to the LCD led by the 
Prime Minister, Dr Ntsu Mokhehle. In the 1998 election the LCD achieved a 
landslide victory scoring 60.7% votes and winning 79 out of 80 contested 
constituencies. According to Matlosa (2008: 25) the LCD participated in the 
election with its muscle strengthened by two main advantages: the popularity of 
its leader, and the control and strategic utilisation of state resources for the 
political mileage. 
In 2001, 27 MPs of the ruling party, the LCD, crossed the floor to form a new 
party, the LPC. In spite of this split, in 2002 election the LCD scored 54.9% votes 
winning 77 out of 78 contested constituencies while the LPC scored 5.8% 
winning only 1 constituency (Government of Lesotho 2002: 1). Also the LCD won 
the remaining 2 constituencies that were contested later. 
The researcher avers that these successive victories of the LCD followed the 
pattern explained by patron-client relationship theory. What is its relevance for 
this study? In principle, it provides an explanation why and how the opposition 
political parties weakened since 1993. 
2.6.1 b) Dahl's theory of polyarchy 
The work of Dahl, Polyarchy - participation and opposition, provided a very 
useful theoretical foundation for this study. Dahl's frame of reference and context 
are mainly American. However, Dahl's theory is applicable to the political 
developments in Lesotho. Dahl's work studied the conditions that favour or 
impede transformation of a hegemonic regime into a near-polyarchy, and the 
near-polyarchy into a full polyarchy. Dahl (1975: 8) defined a polyarchy in terms 
of two criteria (inclusiveness and contestation) as a relatively democratised 
regime or a regime that has been substantially popularised and liberalized to be 
highly inclusive and extensively open to public contestation. Public participation in 
elections in Lesotho should be measured in terms of both criteria. On the other 
hand, Dahl refers to hegemony as a regime type that does not accommodate any 
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competition. Also he identified a near-polyarchy as a regime in between the 
stages of the hegemony and polyarchy. 
According to Dahl (1975: 20) certain classic liberal freedoms constitute part of the 
definition of public contestation or competition, and participation. Some of these 
freedoms are opportunities to: oppose government, form political organizations, 
express oneself on political matters without fear of government reprisals, read 
and hear alternative points of view, and vote by secret ballot in elections. 
Dahl (1971: 121, 122) asserts that in polyarchies there are two kinds of 
institutional arrangements. The first deals with the relationship between the 
executive and the other major political forces in the country including the 
relationship between the executive and the legislature that is usually the source 
of major problems in competitive polyarchies. Dahl further says that the studied 
countries, including France, rejected the classic model of assembly government. 
The second significant institution is the party system. Furthermore, Dahl contends 
that if the political parties have tolerance to one another the party systems 
contribute more towards integration and action than to fragmentation and 
paralysis. 
Also Dahl advocates that highly fragmented multiparty systems can result in 
unstable and weak coalitions and this phenomenon may stimulate loss of 
confidence in representative democracy and willingness to tolerate political 
conflicts. In Lesotho a number of political parties split and new parties were 
established as breakaway parties and this could be the result of lack of tolerance 
to the political conflicts. Seven of the twelve party officials interviewed by the 
researcher confidently alluded to lack of efficient leadership contributing towards 
the splits of political parties in Lesotho. 
During the interviews of political party officials, some of them (such as the leader 
of the MFP) said that one of the problems reigning in Lesotho was lack of 
democracy. In line with Dahl's argument, in Lesotho, the rate of fragmentation of 
the political system, where the population is about 2.2 million and there are 18 
political parties, can cause problems of loss of confidence in the representative 
democracy. The alliances that these parties make are weak. For example a new 
alliance of the BAC, the LPC and a new breakaway group of the BCP 
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(Mahatammoho a poelano le kopano), called the "Alliance of the Congress 
Parties (the ACP)", is weak because in the 2002 elections the BAC, the BCP and 
the LPC had received about 11.3% combined total votes. 
Another example of fragmentation is the split of the LCD resulting in the 
establishment of the All Basotho Convention (the ABC), the 19th political party, on 
the 9th October 2006 (Chefa 2006: 2). This new party with 18 parliamentarians 
increased the fragmentation of the political system. The opposition seats were 
increased from 41 to 59 and the ruling party's seats reduced from 79 to 61. The 
next election was due in 2007. In the last week of November 2006 another new 
party, the Basotho Democratic National Party (the BDNP) a splinter of the BNP, 
was established as the 20th party in Lesotho. 
In 2006 three splinters from the original BCP established an "Alliance of the 
Congress Parties (the ACP)" as mentioned above. Additionally, the All Basotho 
Convention (ABC) and Lesotho Workers Party successfully negotiated an 
alliance; BNP and NPP also negotiated an alliance. 
Dahl (1 975: 3, 4) contends that there are eight institutional guarantees of 
democratisation, which provide a theoretical scale along which it is possible to 
order different political systems. The guarantees are the following: 
i) Freedom to form and join organizations; 
ii) Freedom of expression; 
iii) Right to vote; 
iv) Right of political leaders to compete for support; 
v) Alternative sources of information; 
vi) Eligibility for public office; 
vii) Free and fair elections; 
viii) Institutions for making government policies depend on votes and other 
expressions of preference. 
Further Dahl says that these eight guarantees might be interpreted as 
constituting two rather different theoretical dimensions of democratisation. Firstly, 
in different regimes these guarantees will not be available to the same extent. So, 
it is possible to compare different regimes according to the extent of permissible 
opposition, public contestation, or political competition. Secondly, regimes differ 
70 
in the proportion of the population franchised to participate in the system of public 
contestation. Furthermore, Dahl asserts that there should be a scale measuring 
the extent of the right to participate in public contestation to facilitate a 
comparison of different regimes according to their inclusiveness. Also Dahl 
(1975: 5, 6) admits that there may be more than two theoretical dimensions of 
democratisation. 
According to Dahl (1975: 24, 25) when the suffrage is extended to the groups that 
had been denied political rights, the size of the electorate increases and this in 
turn influences a change in the structure and organisation of political parties. As a 
result political participation and competition increase and for a political party to 
survive this new political life it must reach out to its members, followers, and 
potential voters throughout the country. In Lesotho, in 2001 suffrage was 
extended to the youth who reached 18 years of age. The question is: "Did the 
opposition political parties in Lesotho change in structure and organisation in 
order to survive the new competition?" The answer to the question is that in 
Lesotho the opposition political parties did not change the structures before the 
2002 election because it was too soon. 
Another issue that possibly affects participation and competition of opposition 
political parties in Lesotho is that political parties are not inclusive enough to 
accommodate women participation in the leadership. According to Matlosa 
(2008b: 105) women hardly feature in the leadership structures of political parties 
in Lesotho, men dominate these structures. This happens in spite of Southern 
African Development Community's (SADC's) call for offering women 30% of 
parliamentary seats. The researcher believes that enough accommodation of 
women in party structures could be an incentive to women to participate more 
effectively in politics. 
Why does Lesotho fail to accommodate 30% of women representation in 
parliament? Letuka, et.al. (2004: 49-52) noted that a total of 15 political parties, 
for the FPTP fielded 125 women and 605 men as constituency candidates for 
2002 general election. Letuka, et.al. (2004: 50) interviewed members of the 
executive committees who told them that the procedure of selection of candidates 
for the FPTP component of the electoral model is through competition. Usually, 
women do well at lower levels, at village levels, but they taper off as the 
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competition goes to higher levels, branch and constituency/district levels. That is 
why, according to Letuka, et. al. (2004: 49) and table 2.6.1.1 below, only 125 
women in contrast to 605 men succeeded to be nominated as constituency 
candidates for the 2002 election. 
Below are the findings of the study by Letuka, et. al. (2004), which partly answer 
the above question. Letuka, et. al. (2004: 54) discovered that during campaigning 
women face more challenges than men. These challenges might have 
contributed to the failure of women to be elected in big numbers to the candidacy 
of constituencies for the 2002 general election. 
The challenges include the following: 
i) Women lack confidence to be interviewed and to address 
people/crowds at political rallies; 
ii) Women do not read widely and therefore have minimal awareness of 
the changing political realities and they quickly lose interest in politics; 
iii) Women lack resources to cover campaigns; 
iv) Family responsibilities make it difficult for women to actively participate 
in political affairs particularly campaigning process which is demanding; 
v) Women respect and fear leadership and hence they tend to be 
followers and not leaders. 
The PR list in table 2.6.1.2 below indicates a total of 437 women and 547 men. 
Letuka, et.al. (2004: 52) argue that the differing dimensions show that parties 
utilize varied approaches in drawing up the lists, and that caused different results 
of gender representation. Further, they discovered that preference was given to 
the party leader and members of the executive, who in almost all cases were 
male. Names of these people appear at the top in the proportional representation 
(PR) party lists and this partly answers the above question. Letuka, et. al. (2004: 
52) assert that PR alone does not guarantee inclusion unless it is based on a 
system that alternates men and women in the list. 
The complete answer to the above question is as follows: Lesotho fails to 
accommodate 30% of women representation in parliament because of the 
following major factors: 
a) firstly, competition during the election to constituency candidacy bowls out 
most of the women; 
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b) secondly priority given to party leader and members of executive who 
mostly are men in the PR list. 
Table 2.6.1.1 Nominated political party candidates by gender 
Party Women Men Total 
LCD 10 (13%) 70 (87%) 80 
BNP 7 (9%) 73 (91%) 80 
BAC 6 (8%) 69 ((2%) 75 
LPC 4 (5%) 75 (95%) 79 
BCP 3 (5%) 59 (95%) 62 
LWP 12 (31%) 27 (69%) 39 
MFP 24 (32%) 50 (68%) 74 
NPP 9 (19%) 39 (81%) 48 
PFD 12 (17%) 58 (83%) 70 
LEP 3 (21%) 11 (79%) 14 
NLFP 12 (8%) 24 (92%) 26 
SDU 6 (30%) 14 (70%) 20 
LLP 8 (47%) 9 (53%) 17 
CDP 9 (35%) 17 (65%) 26 
NIP 0 10 (100%) 10 
125 605 730 
Source: Letuka, at.al (2004) 
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Table 2.6.1.2 2002 Election PR list by party and gender 
Party Total Male Female 
Number % Number % 
BAC 42 35 83 7 17 
BCP 41 27 66 14 34 
BNP 118 94 80 24 20 
CDP 40 19 48 21 52 
KBP 40 21 53 19 47 
LCD 58 26 45 32 55 
LPC 41 5 12 36 88 
LWP 46 26 57 20 43 
MFP 85 55 67 30 33 
NLFP 46 20 43 26 57 
NIP 40 32 80 8 20 
NPP 61 47 77 14 23 
PFD 90 58 64 32 36 
SDP 40 31 78 9 22 
SDU 114 25 22 89 78 
UP 82 37 45 56 55 
984 547 437 
Source: Letuka, at.al (2004) 
Botswana is an example of a country in which the governing party did not suffer 
fragmentation like the BCP/LCD in Lesotho did. Selolwane and Shale (2006: 123, 
128-129) assert that the ruling Botswana Democratic Party (the BDP) has been in 
power since independence (1966) and has a track record of performance better 
than any of its peers in Africa in terms of management of both state affairs and its 
internal matters. Also the BDP never experienced any split while within the 
opposition the splits are common. In Botswana none of the opposition parties 
ever ruled. These authors state that for the opposition to remove the BDP, they 
should earn credibility and not accidentally acquire it as windfall from bad 
governance practices of the ruling party (Selolwane and Shale 2006: 129). 
In support of Dahl's approach, Chiroro (2006: 101) contends that viable 
opposition and effective political systems are crucial for the building of democratic 
societies in Southern Africa. The author asserts that the opposition parties are 
faced with the double task of democratising the state and society and their own 
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internal structures. According to Chiroro (2006: 103) the opposition political 
parties are part and parcel of the nation-building exercise. Further, Chiroro states 
that if their role is not fully recognised and fully institutionalised in the political 
structures the Southern African democracies they will remain fragile. Further on, 
Chiroro (2006: 105) notes that in Southern Africa the opposition suffers from 
legitimacy crisis and its role remains largely undefined and regarded as a 
struggle for power only. The incumbents delegitimize the opposition through the 
media and public announcements (Chiroro 2006: 105). Also Chiroro (2006: 106) 
asserts that evidence in the Afro-barometer (Working Paper no 34 of 2004) 
survey shows that support for the opposition in the Southern African region has 
declined; more people trust the ruling parties. 
Dahl (1975: 14) argues that when hegemonies and competitive oligarchies 
transform towards polyarchies they increase the opportunities for effective 
participation and contestation and hence the number of individuals and interest 
groups whose aspirations have to be taken into account in policy making. In 
Lesotho in the 1998 election more political parties contested than in the 1993 
elections. The reason for this phenomenon in Lesotho was the transformation 
from the hegemonic rule of the military in 1993 and re-entrance of multiparty 
democracy. In Lesotho, in 2001 a more inclusive electoral model, MMP, was 
introduced and it was tested in 2002 general election. 
Furthermore Dahl (1975: 31) states that the conceptual scheme employed in his 
book reflects a commitment or choice in favour of polyarchy as against less 
democratised regimes. Also he points out that another person could choose the 
other regime and study the conditions that favour movement or transformation in 
that direction. In addition Dahl says that the analysis carried out is independent of 
his commitments or biases in favour of polyarchy. Further, still Dahl emphasizes 
that he makes no assumption that a shift from hegemony toward polyarchy and to 
the third wave of democratisation (in a polyarchy further political developments 
go on to enhance democratisation) is historically inevitable. 
Dahl (1975: 32) asserts that it would be absurd to impose on societies some sort 
of historical law of development. In his work Dahl (1975: 32, 208, and 209) shows 
that a polyarchy can change back to a hegemonic regime but the trend is that 
hegemonic regimes are transformed into polyarchies. Dahl (1975: 39, 40) 
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proposes four possible paths of transition from a hegemonic regime to a 
polyarchy and also he says that the fourth path avoids risks of failure, if steps 
toward liberalization are accompanied by a dedicated and enlightened search for 
a viable system of mutual guarantees. The researcher suggests that Dahl's 
theory entails a historical law of development determining inevitable transition of 
hegemonic regimes towards polyarchies, as will be seen below. 
In the summary of his work, Dahl (1975: 202) gave conditions favouring 
polyarchy. Dahl's theory of democratisation says: "the chance that a country will 
be governed at the national level for any considerable period of time by a regime 
in which opportunities for public contestation are available to the great bulk of the 
population (that is, a polyarchy) depends on at least seven sets of complex 
conditions". These seven sets of conditions are as follows: 
I. Historical sequences 
II. The socio-economic order 
III. The level of socio-economic order 
IV. Equalities and inequalities 
V. Sub-cultural pluralism 
VI. Domination by a foreign power 
VI. Beliefs of political activists 
Dahl (1975: 208,209) contends that while the number of polyarchies increases, 
movement in the opposite direction on a smaller scale is also possible. The 
researcher is in agreement with Dahl on this theory. 
Furthermore Dahl (1975: 45) contends that in the future as in the past, stable 
polyarchies and near-polyarchies are more likely to result from rather slow 
evolutionary processes than from the revolutionary over-throw of existing 
hegemonies. However, Dahl (1975: 37) acknowledges that there may be 
exceptions to the law and the shortcut path may be taken. Dahl's theory is 
therefore important for this study, because it provides a theoretical space for 
public participation in the broader democratic theories. 
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2.6.1 c) Lindberg's theory of uninterrupted series of elections 
Lindberg (2006: 116) believes that it is not correct to label the first multiparty 
election as the founding election as many theories of democratisation do. He 
contends that there is no democratic regime yet after the first election, because it 
would imply that the improvements in civil liberties have come independently and 
ahead of elections. In his work, Lindberg (2006: 99) suggested and tested the 
following hypothesis: "The longer an uninterrupted series of elections a country 
has, the more its society will become imbued with democratic qualities". Also the 
suggested and tested hypothesis is as follows: "Increases in democratic qualities 
are the effects of holding elections" (Lindberg 2006: 99). Is Lesotho an exception 
to this rule? Tables 2.6.1.3 and 2.6.1.4 below show Freedom House ratings for 
Lesotho and the above question will be answered. 
Table 2.6.1.3 Main hypothesis of overall relationship between elections and 
democratization 
Hypothesis: Uninterrupted ^ Better or more democratic qualities in society 
series of 
elections 
Indicators: Participation: Rights of assembly: to form and join civil 
organisations and have open public 
First elections 
Second elections 
Third elections Com petition: 
discussion. 
P ersonal autonomy and economic 
rights: freedom from excessive 
Fourth+ elections dependence; equality by gender, education, and 
profession; and the rule of law. 
Legitimacy: Intra-social acceptance: peaceful coexistence of 
organisations, and absence of insurgencies. 
Source: Lindberg (2006: 103) 
According to Matlosa (2008: 26-28) in the period 1994-2001 as indicated in the 
table below, in Lesotho there was limited respect for political rights and civil 
liberties; hence the status of Lesotho was "partly free". The other table shows 
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Lesotho's improved status as "free" in the period 2002-2006. Matlosa states that 
Lesotho's political development involved prudent electoral and constitutional 
engineering triggered by the instability of 1993-1998, culminating in electoral 
reforms of 2002 and the ongoing parliamentary reforms that began in 2003. 
Table: 2.6.1.4 Freedom House rating for Lesotho, 1994-2001 
Year Political Rights (PL) Civil Liberties (CL) Status 
1994 3 4 Partly Free 
1995 4 4 Partly Free 
1996 4 4 Partly Free 
1997 4 4 Partly Free 
1998 4 4 Partly Free 
1999 4 4 Partly Free 
2000 4 4 Partly Free 
2001 4 4 Partly Free 
Source: Mat osa (2008: 26) (Freed om House, Freedom in the World Report 
2004) 
Table: 2.6.1.5 Freedom House rating for Lesotho, 2002-2006 
Year Political Rights (PL) Civil Liberties (CL) Status 
2002 2 3 Free 
2003 2 3 Free 
2004 2 3 Free 
2005 2 3 Free 
2006 2 3 Free 
Source: Mat osa (2008: 28) (Freed om House, Freedom in the World Report 
2004; Freedom House, Freedom in World Report, 2006; Freedom House, 
Freedom in the World 2007: Selected Data from Freedom House's Annual Global 
Survey of Political Rights and Civil Liberties) 
Lindberg's hypothesis, discussed above, is valid for Lesotho. The civil liberties 
ranking for Lesotho increased from a low level of 4 in 1994, a year after general 
election, to a better level of 3 by the third election, in 2002. Lesotho maintained 
the level of 3 to 2006, a year before the 2007 general election. 
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Bratton (1998: 51) contends that consolidation of democracy involves the 
widespread acceptance of rules to guarantee political participation and political 
competition. Moreover Bratton asserts that sustainability of democratic rule can 
be guaranteed by regularity, openness, and acceptability of elections, as these 
three factors lay the foundations of democracy. This view of Bratton is in 
agreement with both Dahl's theory and Lindberg's series of elections theory. 
Further, Bratton says that elections are not synonymous to democracy and they 
can be held without democracy, but democracy cannot be achieved without 
elections. 
2.7 Conclusion 
In Chapter 2 the researcher explained the research design used in this 
dissertation, described and explained the methodology of conducting the 
research work. The sampling method used to select the constituencies was a 
combination of simple random sampling and the statistical sampling method. The 
researcher discussed the techniques used for data collection and he explained 
the triangulation method used. 
Since 1993 the opposition political parties were poorly represented in parliament 
and it meant that together with their supporters they were denied the right to 
oppose. The electoral system, the FPTP, and the dominance of the ruling party 
denied them that right. Dahl (1975: 20) emphasizes that in the absence of the 
right to oppose, the right to "participate" is stripped of a very large part of the 
significance it has, in a country where public contestation exists. The MMP 
electoral model used for the first time in 2002 showed a potential of improving 
representation of the opposition in parliament. These developments occurred in 
accordance with Dahl's theory. The regime changed from almost a closed 
hegemony to an inclusive hegemony due to the compensatory parliamentary 
seats that were allocated to the opposition parties. However, opposition 
representation in parliament was still much weaker than in the period 1965 to 
1970. 
Dahl contends that high fragmentation of the party system is one of the causes of 
unstable and weak coalitions and this phenomenon may stimulate loss of 
confidence in representative democracy and willingness to tolerate political 
79 
conflicts. Lesotho has a highly fragmented party system; by November 2006, 
there were twenty political parties for a population of about 1.8 million. This is 
one of the reasons why opposition parties in Lesotho are weaker than in the 
period 1965 to 1970 when there were not more than five parties. 
In general Dahl's theory is valid for explaining the political developments in 
Lesotho. The seven conditions that favour Dahl's polyarchy have been 
considered when assessing whether the regime is a polyarchy or not, and 
Lesotho regime is not yet a polyarchy. According to Dahl's theory, stable 
polyarchies emerge in evolutionary processes rather than through revolutionary 
overthrows. 
Democratic developments measured by the Freedom House prove Lindberg's 
theory of series of elections valid in the case of Lesotho. The Freedom House 
rating of Lesotho rose from PL3 and CL4 in 1994 to PL2 and CL3 in 2006. There 
had been an uninterrupted series of three elections between 1993 and 2006. 
The ruling party, in the period 1993 -2006, achieved landslide victories in the 
successive parliamentary elections of 1998 and 2002. The patron-client 
relationship theory explained how the ruling party achieved landslide victories in 
those elections. The patron-client relationship theory informs us that the ruling 
party usually has advantages over the opposition because, the people know 
about its development actions. Also the ruling party patronises the masses 
through a wide variety of patronage devices. Additionally, the ruling party has the 
resources under its control and it is in a position to use them for promoting its 
interests. 
The ruling party buys votes in many other ways, such as distributing donations to 
the poor people in the constituencies when elections approach. Those who 
benefited usually voted for the patron. In Lesotho the BCP/LCD achieved 
landslide victories in successive elections of 1993, 1998 and 2002. The BCP/LCD 
patronised the masses. However, the BCP landslide victory in the 1993 election 
came after the civilian and military authoritarian rule of the past 23 years, when 
the people wanted a change. Also, the people wanted to give the BCP an 
opportunity of ruling, which it had missed in 1970 when the BNP refused to 
relinquish power. 
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Finally, the researcher asserts that, in the period 1993 to 2006, elections in 
Lesotho took place in agreement with patron-client relationship theory. Also, that 
phenomenon explained why opposition political parties weakened since 1993. 
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CHAPTER 3 
ELECTORAL DATA, DATA FROM INTERVIEWS,QUALITATIVE DATA 
ANALYSIS & INTERPRETATION 
3.1 Introduction 
The main approach in this study is to look at the weaknesses and strengths of the 
opposition political parties in Lesotho by assessing their participation in elections. 
Therefore, as a matter of introduction it is important to identify a working set of 
electoral data as the basis of analysis. 
In sub-section 3.2 the researcher describes and explains the electoral systems 
used in Lesotho in the given period of study, 1993 to 2006. Sub-section 3.3 gives, 
in three tables, the results of elections that took place in 1993, 1998 and 2002. 
Also the allocation of compensatory parliamentary seats is given in this sub-
section. 
It is important to elaborate, at this stage, on the types of electoral systems used 
in Lesotho. Although some opposition political parties including the main 
opposition parties rejected the results of the 1998 general election, and finally 
agreed to hold a fresh election (that ultimately was conducted in 2002), the 
researcher finds it appropriate to include data of the 1998 election results. 
This section focuses on electoral data and data from the interviews with the 
political party leaders/officials. In the process of interviewing, the questionnaire 
form was filled in and also the researcher took some notes. There was a 
considerable volume of collected data from the interviews and personal notes 
earlier mentioned in the dissertation, the questions had mainly been open-ended, 
and also the respondents had been free to elaborate on their answers. In order to 
analyse that voluminous data, the researcher in alignment with guidelines given 
by Creswell (1994:154), had to reduce the data by arranging it into categories on 
the basis of themes. 
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In the process of data analysis, the researcher used coding that according to 
Neuman (1997: 422) involves two simultaneous activities: mechanical data 
reduction and analytic categorization of data. Strauss (1987) cited in Neuman 
(1997: 422), defined three kinds of qualitative data coding namely, Open coding, 
Axial coding and Selective coding. 
During the first pass through the collected data, the researcher performed open 
coding which is a process of locating themes and assigning initial codes. In the 
second pass through the data, the researcher used axial coding, a process 
during which the researcher focused on the initial codes or coded themes more 
than on the data, with new ideas emerging, and the researcher organised these 
ideas and themes (Neuman 1997: 423). 
In the course of the axial coding the researcher identified linkages between the 
themes and also, the researcher reduced the number of coded themes. During 
the final analysis of the data, the researcher used selective coding, identifying the 
major themes of the research project (Neuman 1997: 424) as given in table 3.5 c) 
below. The researcher used the themes or sub-topics from table 3.5 c) for further 
analysis of the data. 
3.2 Electoral systems 
This sub-section will give an explanation of elections, electoral systems, political 
participation and also the context in which electoral participation is used in this 
dissertation. It will explain how the allocation of parliamentary seats is done with 
the current system in Lesotho. Here the researcher will give a brief description of 
activities that took place mainly from 1993 through 1998, culminating in the 
change of the electoral model. 
Schneider in Rose (1980: 75) says that, as a practice of democratic politics, 
elections perform two functions: firstly the ideological function whereby elections 
give voice to the main political cleavages and issue conflicts in society and allows 
major interests to receive due representation; and secondly elections have the 
plebiscitary function, whereby elections are a referendum, an appraisal, a 
passing of popular judgement on the performance of the incumbent government; 
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in other words people vote for a government when it had been doing well and 
they do not support it when it had not been doing well during its term. 
According to Schneider (1980: 84-87) there are two styles of electoral 
competition, namely ideological and coalition politics. Schneider says that while 
ideology is associated with abstract conceptual thinking at the elite level, at the 
mass level it is usually characterized by a sense of group conflict, of "us" versus 
"them"; also the incentives for ideological politics are weak in a two-party system 
and the ideological strategy prevails in highly fractionated multiparty systems with 
proportional representation where there are limited chances for a party to adopt a 
majoritarian appeal. This author asserts that the strategy used in coalition politics 
is to appeal for support from everybody, that is, to all voters; and as it is the 
approach, uses non-divisive valence issues to attract the broadest range of 
voters without excluding any supporters. 
Matlosa (2000: 2), referring to Jackson and Jackson (1999: 366) stated that 
elections fulfil the following functions: 
They -
i) provide a routine mechanism for recruiting and selecting individuals to 
occupy seats in representative institutions; 
ii) provide periodic opportunities to review the government's record, assess 
its mandate, and replace it with an alternative; 
iii) accord the elected government with domestic and international legitimacy 
as well as moral title to rule; 
iv) act as agents of political socialisation and political integration, providing a 
unifying focus for the country. 
What is an electoral system? There are certain accepted procedures, rules and 
modalities followed in the process of conducting the elections; the electoral 
system is commonly understood as a combination of the administrative, 
procedural and the institutional framework for elections; electoral systems 
determine the manner and pattern in which votes are matched with the allocation 
of seats in parliament (Matlosa 2000: 2). 
According to Matlosa (2003: 11) there are many electoral models throughout the 
world with distinctive advantages and disadvantages, but the democratic 
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governance experts do not agree on how to classify them into composite 
categories or clusters. This author gives an example of Reynolds and Reily 
(2002) who classify the various electoral models into three categories namely a) 
plurality-majority; b) semi-proportional; and c) proportional systems. Handley 
(1999: 1) uses the same categorization. The other example given by the author is 
that of Jackson and Jackson (1997) who advocates four categories namely a) 
single-member plurality; b) single-member majoritarian; c) multi-member 
proportional representation; and d) mixed plurality-proportional representation 
systems. 
According to Andrew (1997: 1), the characteristic feature of the majority-plurality 
systems is that they usually use single-member districts. A First Past the Post 
system (FPTP), sometimes called a plurality single-member district system or the 
winner-takes-all system, changes name to Party Block Vote (PB) when the multi-
member districts are used (Andrew & Ben 1997: 1); the Alternative Vote (AV), like 
FPTP, provides for elections to be held in single-member districts, but allows the 
voters to rank the candidates in order of their choice (Ben 1997: 1); another 
majority-plurality system is the French Two-Round system (TRS) (Andrew 1997: 
1). 
Matlosa (2000: 5) contends that FPTP is the simplest of the electoral systems 
used in the world; 18 out of 52 states in Africa, mainly the former British colonies, 
use the FPTP, and out of 14 SADC member states, 8 use FPTP while 4 use 
proportional representation (PR). Thus, FPTP and PR are dominant electoral 
systems in Southern Africa (Matlosa 2000: 5). 
According to Michael (1997: 1), the Mixed Member Proportional (MMP) system, 
one of the PR systems, originated in Germany and was established in 1949 as a 
result of inter-party bargaining between democratic forces. That German system 
is classified as personalised proportional system, while in New Zealand it is 
known as a Mixed Member Proportional system. The essence of this system is 
the way in which it combines a personal vote in the single-member districts with 
the principle of proportional representation as Michael (1997: 1) noted. 
In Germany the electoral system is not quite a Mixed System but a PR; however 
it differs from the pure proportional representation only in that the 5% threshold at 
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national level excludes very small parties from parliamentary representation, but 
these parties worked so hard that now they have been able to pass that 
threshold. In the five decades in Germany since 1945, majority governments 
were usually established in the form of coalitions and any change in government 
came as a result of the changes in the configuration of the coalition (Michael 
1997: 2). According to this author, the coalition governments in Germany were 
not the product of the electoral system, MMP, but could have been caused by the 
culture that developed there after World War II. 
In New Zealand, in 1992 and 1993, a referendum was conducted in the process 
of changing from an FPTP electoral system. In 1993 voters adopted MMP with 
53.9% of votes thus replacing FPTP; the new system was used for the first time 
in the elections of 1996 (Nigel 1997: 3). The referendum in the following year, like 
in 1992, showed that coalition governments are more likely under MMP, as the 
minor parties are also represented. 
In the 1993 and 1998 general elections in Lesotho the FPTP system was used; 
however the number of contested parliamentary seats was 65 (1993) and 80 
(1998). With the 1998 events that followed the election, the winds of change of 
the electoral model began hissing at the old system, FPTP; the view of changing 
the electoral system for some kind of proportional representative system in order 
to accommodate small political parties came into play. In November 1998 the 
Parliament of Lesotho passed the Interim Political Authority Act, 1998, facilitating 
establishment of the Interim Political Authority (IPA) to enable and promote the 
preparation for holding of the next general election (Government of Lesotho 
1998: 998). According to the U.S. Department of State (2001: 6), in December 
1998 negotiations under SADC supervision resulted in the establishment of the 
Interim Political Authority with a mandate to prepare for the new election within 18 
months. 
In 2001 Parliament passed the National Assembly Election (No1) (Amendment) 
Act, 2001, that established MMP. The main purposes of that Act were to enable 
implementation of the decisions of the Interim Political Authority and to establish 
MMP; to raise the number of seats from 80 to 120 and provide that 80 of the 
seats be contested on a constituency based system when the other 40 seats 
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were to be distributed according to proportional representation; and to add a 
schedule of 'Electoral Code of Conduct" (Government of Lesotho 2001: 1135). 
According to Section 49B (2) of Amendment Act 2001, a political party intending 
to contest an election may nominate candidates as per Section 57 (1) (c) (ii) of 
the Constitution and shall submit a list including at least 40 candidates, but not 
more than 120 arranged in order of preference from top to bottom. Two ballot 
papers are used, one for an election of members of Parliament in constituencies, 
and the other for an election of members of Parliament by proportional 
representation, and unlike in Germany, the two votes are cast simultaneously on 
the same day (Government of Lesotho 2002: 985). 
According to schedule 5 (2) of Amendment Act, 2001, the Commission shall 
determine the number of votes required for the allocation of a seat, then dividing 
the total votes by 120 or any number of constituencies that successfully 
contested the elections, plus the forty PR seats and rounding off the number. The 
resulting figure is called "quota of votes". For example the quota used in Lesotho 
during the 2002 elections was determined by dividing the total votes of 554386 by 
the number of parliamentary seats (120) and it was found to be 4699 (though the 
correct figure is 4619.8 = 4620) (Thoahlane 2002: 81). 
Schedule 5 (3) of Amendment Act, 2001, says that the Commission shall 
determine the provisional total number of seats in the National Assembly to which 
each party is entitled on the basis of its share of the total vote and that allocation 
is called 'provisional allocation of the total number of seats' (Lesotho 2001: 1172). 
In order to obtain the provisional allocation of seats, one has to divide each 
party's votes by the quota of votes and the resulting number is referred to as the 
'party's quota of votes' (Lesotho 2001: 1172). 
The example from the 2002 election results in Lesotho: 
BNP: 124234 votes divided by quota of votes 4699 = 26.438391 
BAC: 16095 votes divided by quota of votes 4699 = 3.425197 
LPC: 32046 votes divided by quota of votes 4699 = 6.819749. 
The IEC in Lesotho during the 2002 elections allocated compensatory seats to 
each party by following Schedule 5 (3) (1) (b) of the Amendment Act, 2001, which 
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says that the IEC shall allocate seats to each party equal to the party's quota of 




In Schedule 5 (3) (1) (d to g) the Amendment Act, 2001, states what the IEC has 
to do, by way of subtraction or addition of seats, if the number of seats acquired 
by a political party is greater than, the same as, or smaller than the number of 
seats set aside for proportional representation. As a result of the application of 
these sub-sub-sections of the Act, the final allocation of compensatory seats to 




From the same example above we find that the total number of seats, 




This example shows that the LPC had 1 constituency seat and 4 compensatory 
seats. 
3.2.1 Political developments influencing the electoral system 
The question of the choice of electoral system/s used in Lesotho is very important 
in this study. Below, the researcher elaborates on the political developments and 
events that took place from 1993 until the electoral system was changed. The 
electoral system used in Lesotho since political independence, had been First 
Past the Post (FPTP). Lesotho was a British Protectorate and as a result the 
electoral system used and the kind of Parliament (Westminster type), were both 
copied from the British. At the time of the preparations for political independence 
of Lesotho, the question of the electoral system to be used was not a big problem 
because ordinary people, including political party members, were not even aware 
of it. 
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Matlosa (2003: 12) says that the political history and the concomitant political 
culture of Southern Africa greatly influenced the nature of electoral systems that 
individual states had adopted since independence. Matlosa further mentions that 
the majority of Southern African states adopted Westminster constitutional and 
political arrangements because they were British colonies. 
Section 53 of the Lesotho Independence Order 1966 (Government 1966: 45), 
facilitated division of the territory of Lesotho into sixty constituencies. According 
to section 56 of the current Constitution of Lesotho (Government 1993: 57), the 
National Assembly consists of eighty elected members; and section 57 of the 
Constitution says that Lesotho shall be divided into eighty constituencies, and 
that each constituency shall elect one member to the National Assembly. 
However, when the 1993 general elections were held 65 seats were contested. In 
the 1998 elections the same electoral system, FPTP, was used and 80 seats 
were contested. 
The history of elections in Lesotho shows that among the political parties that lost 
in the elections, there is usually dissatisfaction and also there are complaints 
leading to court cases, and ending sometimes in conflicts, as in 1970 and 1998. 
In 1993 the BNP was dissatisfied with the ballot paper and a court case was 
lodged. In 1994 a number of events, including abuse of human rights contrary to 
the Lesotho constitution, took place. These included in-fighting within the military 
and also within the Lesotho Mounted Police Service (LMP), detentions of people 
without trial, torture in prison, deaths of people during trial, such as that of the 
former Lesotho Liberation Army's (former BCP's military wing during exile period) 
official (Makoa 2005: 187, 188), (Sechaba Consultants, 2000: 9), (U.S. 
Department of State, 1995: 5). 
Makoa (2005: 175) contends that Lesotho's politics remains as polarized as the 
time when the country attained its political independence on 4 October 1966. He 
noted that the MMP might not become the reconciling force it supposedly is, 
because it is already undermined by the differential benefits and treatment 
accorded to the 120 members of Parliament. Further, Makoa (2005: 187 - 188) 
states that a trail of violent episodes took place in the country after the 1993 
election. In January 1994 the military split into two factions that fought each other, 
causing a lot of civilian casualties after they had begun with a battle that lasted a 
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whole day and night (Makoa 2005: 187), (Sechaba Consultants, 2000: 9). In 
April the military held a number of Government Ministers hostage and killed the 
Deputy Prime Minister, the Hon. Mr Selometsi Baholo (Makoa 2005: 187 - 188), 
(Sechaba Consultants, 2000: 9 - 10). In May 1994 the LMP went on strike over 
pay increases and they allowed looting of shops. In April and May 1994, the LDF 
and the LMP arrested a number of senior government officials and a number of 
striking workers. 
Still in 1994, on August 17, another major event was the toppling of the BCP 
government by the King, backed up by both the LDF and the LMP. King Letsie III 
did this without constitutional power in 1994 and dissolved the government, 
putting in place a provisional ruling Council (Makoa 2005: 188), (U.S. Department 
of State 1995: 9). 
According to Ambrose (1994: 5), the Council was sworn in by Chief Justice 
Lebona Kheola, apparently under duress, not long after he had granted a High 
Court Order in which all the significant portions of the Lesotho Order (1994) had 
been declared null and void with immediate effect, together with any other 
legislative instrument made contrary to the Constitution of Lesotho. The palace 
coup was purported to be legalised by publishing an order in the Lesotho 
Government Gazette Extraordinary (no. 73 of 1994 dated 17th August), also 
called the 'Lesotho Order 1994'. It provided for a chairman and sixteen members 
of the council. On 14 September the King backtracked, after experiencing both 
internal and external pressure and negotiations had started; he signed the 
agreement to reinstate the BCP government (Ambrose 1994: 3, 4, 11). In 
February 1995 there was a rebellion of the secret service officers known as the 
National Security Services (NSS) (Ambrose 1995: 3). 
In 1997 there was a mutiny, by certain police officers, that resulted in the death of 
one senior police officer. LDF was ordered to stop the mutiny and they stormed 
the Police Headquarters and two police officers were killed in that action. Others 
sustained injuries, while two alleged leaders of the mutiny, Second Lieutenant 
Phakiso Molise and Sergeant Makateng, escaped to South Africa. Molise was 
arrested a few days later (Makoa 1998: 2). 
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In 1997 three Ministers - Qhobela, Mphanya and Makhakhe - were relieved from 
their positions and two other Ministers - Raditapole and Senaoana - resigned. In 
June, of the same year, the BCP split and remained with 25 seats in Parliament 
when its former leader established a new political party, the Lesotho Congress for 
Democracy (LCD) that took up 40 seats in Parliament and therefore became the 
new ruling party (Leon et al 1998: 23, 71). This schism caused ill feelings 
because the LCD had taken over the reins of Government, the legality of which 
was questioned. 
The opposition political parties, the BNP and the MFP among them, that had 
supported the palace coup, made a call for the election to be held, but the 
government made it clear that there would not be an election held before 1998, 
before the end of its 5 years term (Ambrose 1994: 16). At that point in time there 
was no idea raised about changing the electoral model used. 
Leon et al (1998:114), investigating the political disturbances that took place in 
Lesotho in 1998, sought evidence from Senior Counsel as to whether 
establishment of the LCD was legal and the Senior Counsel advised that it was 
lawful and therefore the LCD legally proceeded to govern the country. Leon et al 
stated that their Commission was not required to express an opinion on the 
correctness of the advice of Senior Counsel. However, the Leon Commission 
contended that, even if the formation of the LCD was perfectly lawful, there could 
be no doubt that its formation angered the BCP and the other political parties, 
escalating the political tensions that existed in Lesotho. According to Thabane in 
Leon (1998:23), the main antagonists to Mokhehle, the former leader of the BCP, 
were Qhobela, who was deputy president of the BCP, Mphanya, Toloane and 
Makhakhe. 
In July 1997 the National Assembly Election (Amendment) Act, 1997, was 
passed and it established the Independent Electoral Commission (IEC) in 
accordance with section 66 of the Constitution (Government of Lesotho 1997: 
515, 516). According to Section 6 of this 1997 Act, every political party has a right 
to nominate not more than two delegates to the IEC, who have the right to be 
informed of all the sittings of the Commission relating to electoral matters and 
decisions taken thereat. 
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In preparation for the next election, the number of constituencies was raised from 
sixty-five to eighty, as mentioned above, and the voting age was also lowered 
from twenty-one to eighteen (Leon, et al 1998: 16). In May 1998 these general 
election was held under the observation of 150 international observers and 400 
local observers, and also there were observers from Ireland (Leon, et al 1998: 16; 
51; 72). The LCD won the election capturing 79 constituencies while the BNP 
won the only remaining 1 constituency. Although the results were a sore 
disappointment to the BCP, the BNP and the MFP, there was no immediate 
response from the opposition political parties. 
As the Chairman of the IEC stated to the Leon Commission, no political party 
made any objections or complaints about the proceedings during the election, but 
instead submitted favourable reports about the election. It was only after a few 
days that they criticized Mafisa, the chairman of the IEC (Leon 1998: 51; 72). The 
opposition political parties namely, the BCP, the BNP and the MFP, formed an 
Opposition Alliance known as "Setlamo" Alliance as mentioned earlier, and this 
alliance established a 16-member team whose mandate was to audit the election 
results. That was done in June 1998. 
On 4 August 1998 Setlamo Alliance led a procession that took a petition to the 
King at the Palace, and on 5 August there was a gathering, comprising mainly the 
youth, outside Parliament. As Morrison in Leon (1998: 74) said, those were 
defiance processions organized by Setlamo Alliance as programmes of 
lawlessness or "civil disobedience". Among the "civil disobedience" activities of 
Setlamo was their action to inhibit all the official, commercial and private life in 
Maseru, and the result was a dead city of Maseru. 
In December 1998 the Interim Political Authority (IPA) was established and one 
major purpose of its establishment was to level the playing political field, and that 
included looking at the electoral system. IPA came up with a mixed system of 
proportional representation: Mixed Member Proportional (MMP). 
The electoral system used in May 2002 general election was the MMP. When the 
MMP replaced the FPTP, the contested seats were 80 and the proportional 
compensatory seats were 40 in the election of 2002. The BNP was able to get 21 
compensatory seats, and the other parties shared the remainder as shown in 
table 3.3 e) below. These 40 compensatory seats plus 1 seat won by the FPTP, 
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made up 41 seats of opposition in parliament. Why was the opposition so weak? 
In sub-sub-section 2.6.1 a) above, patron-client relationship theory illuminated the 
problem of the opposition political parties. 
3.2.2 Mixed Member Proportional (MMP) system 
Reynolds (2006: 1) contends that mixed electoral systems attempt to combine 
the good qualities of the plurality/majority (or other) and Proportional 
Representation (PR) electoral systems. There are two types of the Mixed 
Systems, namely the Mixed Member Proportional (MMP) and the Parallel system. 
The Parallel system has the elections of PR detached from and not dependent on 
those of the plurality/majority (or other). With the MMP system the seat allocation 
process at PR level is dependent on the outcome of the plurality/majority (or 
other) elections. The seats allocated at PR level compensate for any 
disproportionality that might be produced by the district seat results. Therefore 
the system is called Mixed Member Proportional (Reynolds 2006: 1). 
In the MMP system both the plurality and PR apply at local, regional and national 
levels, that is, throughout the country (Louis 1997: 6). According to Reynolds 
(2006: 1), each country uses its own proportion of seats allocated to the two 
elements of the system. In Lesotho, parties and independent candidates contest 
80 FPTP constituency seats and 40 PR compensatory seats are allocated, while 
in Germany there are 299 FPTP seats and 299 PR seats. This author further 
noted that though the MMP system is designed to produce proportional results, it 
is possible that in a single-member district the disproportionality is so great that 
the PR list seats cannot fully compensate for it. 
In order to solve a problem like the above-mentioned one, proportionality can be 
improved by slightly increasing the size of the legislature as it is practised in 
Germany and also in New Zealand. In Lesotho, by contrast, the size of the 
legislature is fixed and it was not possible to improve the proportionality of seats 
of the first MMP election in 2002; the extra seats are called overhang mandates 
or Uberhangsmandaten (Andrew 2006: 1). 
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3.3 Elections results 
Table 3.3.a) Results of the 1993 general election 
Parties 27 March 1993 
Total Votes % Votes Seats 
BCP5 398,355 74.5 65 
BNP 120,686 22.6 0 
MFP 7,650 1.43 0 
LEP 63 0.011 0 
LLP 244 0.045 0 
PFD 947 0.17 0 
NIP 241 0.045 0 
UDP 582 0.10 0 
Registered Voters 736,930 
Total Votes 532,678 
Voter Turnout 72% 
No of captured Constituencies 65 
No of Parliamentary seats 65 
Sources: Government Gazette of 2 April 1993 
Table 3.3.b) Results of the 1998 general election 
Parties 23 May 1998 
Total Votes % Votes Seats 
BCP 61793 10.5 0 
BNP 143073 24.5 1 
MFP 7460 1.3 0 
LCD 355049 60.7 79 
Others 16244 2.9 0 
Total 584740 100 80 
Source: Matlosa 20 )00 
5 The results of the ruling party are given in bold print in all the tables of electoral results in this 
dissertation. 
94 
Table 3.3.c) Results of 2002 general election 
Parties 25 May 2002 
Total Votes % Votes Seats 
BAC 16,095 2.9 0 
BCP 14,584 2.6 0 
BNP 124,234 22.4 0 
KBP 1,155 0.2 0 
MFP 6,890 1.2 0 
NPP 3,985 0.7 0 
LCD 304,316 54.9 77 
LEP - - -
LLP - - -
LPC 32,046 5.8 1 
PFD 6,330 1.1 0 
LWP 7788 1.4 0 
NLFP 1671 0.3 0 
NIP 30346 5.5 0 
CDP 1919 0.3 0 
SDP 542 0.1 0 
SDU 1,584 0.3 0 
UDP - - -
UP 901 0.2 0 
Registered Voters 831,315 
Total Votes 554,386 
Voter Turnout 66.1% 
No of captured Constituencies 80 
No of Parliamentary seats (Incl. Compensatory) 120 
Sources: IEC Report 28 - CSRS of 19 June 2002; Matlosa, 2003a. 
Table 3.3 d) Turnout & Percentage objected and rejected votes during the 





























Motete No 3 11,768 7,797 66.26 0.05 4.9 
Butha-Buthe No 5 9,398 6,315 67.20 0 3.14 
Thaba-Phatsoa No 8 9,202 6,465 70.26 0 5.68 
Nokong No 20 9,393 6,332 67.41 0 3.84 
Mahlatsa No 22 6,981 5,092 72.94 0 4.77 
Pulane No 25 8,448 5,874 69.53 0 2.2 
Thupa-Kubu No 26 10,245 7,379 72.03 0 3.84 
Mabote No 29 17,339 10,459 60.32 0 1.61 
Maseru No 32 14,170 7,811 55.12 0.18 0.03 
Lithabaneng No 35 14,151 8,715 61.59 0 1.39 
Qeme No 42 12,247 8,687 70.93 0 2.50 
Rothe No 43 9,766 6,999 71.67 0 4.73 
Maliepetsane No 50 8,435 5,457 64.69 0 3.45 
Thabana-Morena No 
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10,599 7,761 73.22 0 4.03 
Likhoele No 53 11,548 8,384 72.60 0 3.2 
Qhalasi No 57 9,485 6,763 71.30 0 2.2 
Mohale's Hoek No 
58 















Mekaling No 59 9,015 6,190 68.66 0 1.76 
Ketane No 62 10,453 6,662 63.73 0 3.44 
Qhoali No 68 10,676 7,320 68.57 0 4.73 
Tsoelike No 71 10,933 7,787 71.22 0 3.06 
Semena No 75 11,560 8,459 73.17 0.05 6.86 
Senqu No 78 9,395 6,472 68.89 0 4.64 
Source: IEC Report 28 - CSRS of 19 June 2002. 
Table 3.3 e) Allocation of compensatory seats in Lesotho Parliament with 
MMP system 
Parties Total Party's Allocati Remainder Party's Constitu Party's 
Party Quota of on of votes provisio encies provisio 
Votes votes based (equivalent nal won by nal 
(valid on full to highest allocatio party allocatio 
votes) quotas decimal n of n of 
fraction) total compen 
number satory 
of seats seats 
BNP 124234 21.020981 21 124 21 0 21 
BAC 16095 2.723350 2 4275 3 0 3 
BCP 14584 2.467682 2 2764 3 0 3 
CDP 0 0.000000 0 0 0 0 0 
PFD 6330 1.071066 1 420 1 0 1 
KBP 0 0.000000 0 0 0 0 0 
LCD 0 0.000000 0 0 0 77 0 
LPC 32046 5.422335 5 2496 5 1 4 









































MFP 6890 1.165821 1 980 1 0 1 
NIP 30346 5.134687 5 796 5 0 5 
NPP 3985 0.674281 0 3985 1 0 1 
NLFP 0 0.0000 0 0 0 0 0 
SDU 0 0.0000 0 0 0 0 0 
SDP 0 0.0000 0 0 0 0 0 
UP 0 0.0000 0 0 0 0 0 
Indepen 
dents 
0 0.0000 0 0 0 0 0 
Totals 242298 41 38 17718 41 78 40 
Quota of votes 5910; Allocated seats were 41 
Source: IEC Report 28 - CSRS of 19 June 2002. 




1 Column no.1 contains abbreviations of 
party names. 
The column contains 
party names. 
2 In column no. 2, only correct accepted 
votes, that is, valid votes are recorded. 
Reference is made to Table 3.3 d) above, 
which provided for the valid, the objected 
and the rejected votes at Constituency 
level. So, in the final seats allocations only 
valid votes were used, for allocating 
constituency seats and the compensatory 
seats. 
The votes recorded in 
column no.2 represent 
the correct votes 
obtained by each party 






The purpose of this table was to show how 
compensatory seats were allocated to 
various political parties and that is why the 
LCD was given zero in all the fields related 
to compensatory seats. Since the LCD won 
77 out of 78 contested seats, it did not 
qualify for compensatory seats (Matlosa 
2003: 24 in CISR 2003). 
3 This column contains the party's shares of 
votes as the ratio of party's total votes to 
the full quota of votes. The full "quota of 
votes" is used to divide the party's votes. 
This ratio is called the party's quota of 
votes. This ratio has decimal fractions. 
This ratio is used to determine the total 
number of seats in the National Assembly 
to which each political party is entitled. It is 
important to take notice that the LCD quota 
of votes equals zero because it has been 
taken out of the list of parties that were 
given compensatory PR seats. 
At the bottom of this column the total 
number with the fraction is 40.997969. 
According to Lesotho 
National Assembly 
Election (No.1) 
(Amendment) Act, 2001, 
this ratio is interpreted as 
the "party's quota of 
votes". 
4 Column 4 is filled in with the provisional 
allocation of seats based on the party's 
quotas of votes. The decimal fractions of 
figures appearing in column 3 were thrown 
away and only whole numbers were used 
to fill in column 4. The total, without a 
fraction, in the column of party's quotas 
should be 40. 
This column contains the 
number of seats 
approximating the 
provisional total number 
of seats in the National 
Assembly to which each 
political party is entitled. 





of getting the exact 
number of required seats 
is not over. 
5 According to the Amendment Act, 2001, 
the total number of compensatory seats 
provisionally allocated is equal to the 
number of seats put aside for proportional 
representation, that number shall be the 
final allocation. 
In the case above, the provisional number 
is less than the required number of seats 
for PR. So, those fractions that were left 
out in column 4 are used, and they are 
converted to the equivalent numbers of 
votes. These are referred to as the 
"remainder of votes" because they were 
not considered when the provisional 
allocation of seats was made. 
The remainder of votes is 
interpreted as the votes 
equivalent to the 
fractions that were left 
out when provisional 
seats were calculated. 
According to the 
Amendment Act 2001 the 
fractions (or remainder of 
votes) are taken into 
account only when the 
total number of 
provisional seats is less 
than the total number of 
seats allocated in the 
Act. 
6 Column no.6 contains the total of number 
of seats won in the constituencies plus the 
total number of provisional PR seats of the 
party. For example the LPC won 1 
constituency seat and its quota of votes 
earned it 4 PR seats; so, the LPC had a 
total of 5 provisional seats in column no.6. 
The figures in this 
column are totals of 
provisional seats that 
each party received. 
7 Column no.7 shows the numbers of 
constituencies won by each party. 
The number of 
constituencies won by 
each party is interpreted 
as the number of 
constituency seats won 
by each party. 





total compensatory seats (PR seats) 
provisionally allocated to each party. 
compensatory PR seats 
only allocated to each 
party. 
Table 3.3 g) Final seat allocation summary 
Parties Total Constitue Party's Total %Party % Seats won 
Party ncies won allocation number votes (constituenc 
Votes by party of of seats (valid y seats + 
(valid compens votes) compensator 
votes) atory y seats) 
seats 
BNP 124234 0 21 21 22.4 17.8 
BAC 16095 0 3 3 2.9 2.5 
BCP 14584 0 3 3 2.6 2.5 
CDP 1919 0 0 0 0.3 0.0 
PFD 6330 0 1 1 1.1 0.8 
KBP 1155 0 0 0 0.2 0.0 
LCD 304316 77 0 77 54.9 65.3 
LPC 32046 1 4 5 5.8 4.2 
LWP 7788 0 1 1 1.4 0.8 
MFP 6890 0 1 1 1.2 0.8 
NIP 30346 0 5 5 5.5 4.2 
NPP 3985 0 1 1 0.7 0.8 
NLFP 1671 0 0 0 0.3 0.0 
SDU 1584 0 0 0 0.3 0.0 
SDP 542 0 0 0 0.1 0.0 
UP 901 0 0 0 0.2 0.0 
Indepen 0 0 0 0 0.0 0.0 
dents 
Totals 554386 78 40 118 100 100 
Source: IEC Report 28 - CSRS of 19 June 2002. 
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Table 3.3.h) Comparison of voter turnout between rural and urban areas 






8 Thaba-Phatsoa Rural area 70.26 
22 Mahlatsa Rural area 72.94 
29 Mabote Capital 
suburb 
City 60.32 
32 Maseru Capital 
suburb 
City 55.12 





Rural area 73.22 
Source: Author used results in table 3.3d above, sourced from IEC Report 28 -
CSRS of 19 June 2002. 
The purpose of the above table is to show that in the 2002 election the 
percentage voter turnout in rural areas was higher than in urban areas. 
3.4 Trustworthiness and authenticity of collected data 
Lincoln and Guba (1985), cited in Babbie and Mouton (2001: 276, 277), stated 
that the basic issue of trustworthiness is simple: "How can an inquirer persuade 
his or her audiences (including him- or herself) that the findings are worth paying 
attention to or worth taking account of?" Below, the researcher responds to this 
question. 
The researcher used various sources about each question asked in the 
interviews, and in that way he applied triangulation of methods of data collection. 
According to Lincoln and Guba (1985) cited in Babbie and Mouton (2001: 277), 
triangulation is an important instrument of trustworthiness of qualitative research. 
It is the best way to elicit the various and divergent constructions of reality that 
exist within the context of study. 
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Lincoln and Guba (1985), cited in Maykut and Morehouse (1994: 276), assert that 
the key criterion or principle of good qualitative research is found in the notion of 
trustworthiness: neutrality of its findings or decisions. Credibility of data, 
according to Lincoln and Guba (1985), cited in Babbie and Mouton (2001: 276, 
277), is one of the most important factors of trustworthiness. In order to achieve 
credibility of the data collected during the interviews, the researcher used probing 
so that the interviewees could elaborate and repeat the response given at first. In 
that way the interviewee repeated the response when asked differently. 
The other important factors identified by the same authors above are, 
transferability, dependability and confirmability. The findings can be applied with 
other respondents and they can prove that there is transferability. Also if the 
inquiry or search were to be replicated with the same or similar respondents in 
the same or similar context the findings would be repeated and they would show 
dependability/authenticity. The findings in this work are the product of inquiry and 
not the biases of the researcher and this stamps confirmability. 
3.5 Qualitative data analysis 
Table 3.5a) Open Coding 
Categories Item Counts 
A. Gone weak: 
(Notes for column 2 
of this category:) 
The interviewees 
had said, "Yes the 
opposition parties 
have gone weak". 
These phrases are 
portions of their 
views as remedies 
for the weakness. 
Remedy: era of Mokhehle and Congress-ism is 
over; grassroots level organisations; sustain 
established democracy, then culture will change, 
role of political parties will be clearer and unity of 
opposition will just follow; solution in hands of 
people with evolutionary change; evolutionary 
change of people's attitude towards opposition 
parties; need for rulers to change attitude 
towards opposition parties to provide resources 
to these parties; need to move to PR (MMP still 
not fair); clear policies; ruling party must be 
accommodative; reducing number of splinter 
parties; funding of parties; address issue of 
poverty; develop democratic culture; all 
16 
103 
Categories Item Counts 
stakeholders to engage in democratic practices. 
B. Gone strong Strong 2 
C. Alliance Alliance 8 
D. Internal divisions Internal divisions 5 
E. Ballot system Ballot system 4 
F. Democracy of 
electoral system 
Democracy 1 
G. Transparency Transparency 4 
H. Political party 
funding 
Funding 12 




Messiah; Congress-ism; polarised; 3 
L. Democratic 
culture 
Government; absence of strong democratic 
institutions; lack of democracy. 
9 
M. Government 
making difficult for 
opposition 
Government making it difficult 11 
O. Poverty Poverty 12 
P. Transparency of 
parties 
Transparency 4 
Q. Lack of freedom Lack of freedom 1 
R. Lack of sufficient 
voter education 
Education 4 
S. Lack of 
understanding of 
politics 
Lack of understanding 4 
T. Illegitimacy of 
elections 
Illegitimacy 3 





Table 3.5b) Axial Coding 
Categories Item Counts 
A: Internal divisions Internal divisions 5 
B: Ballot system Ballot system; 3 
C: Transparency Transparency 4 
D: Political party Funding 10 
funding 
E: Lack of leadership Leadership 10 
F: Gone strong; Strong; 2 
Adoration, Messiah; Congress-ism; polarised; 3 
Patronisation & 
polarisation; Gone weak 16 
Gone weak. 
G: Democratic Government; 6 
culture absence of strong democratic institutions; 1 
H: Gov making Government making it difficult; 9 
difficult for Government. 11 
opposition 
I: Poverty Poverty 9 
Table 3.5c) Selective Coding 
Categories / Themes Item Counts 
A. Poverty & Political party funding Funding; 12 
Poverty. 12 
B. Lack of efficient leadership & Leadership; 10 
Internal divisions splinter parties; 1 
internal divisions. 4 
C. Potential strengths or weaknesses Strong; 2 
of opposition parties Messiah; Congress-ism; 3 
polarised; 
Gone weak. 16 
D. Lack of democracy Government; 24 
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Categories / Themes Item Counts 
ballot system; 





In table 3.5a) Notes have been provided immediately in the column of categories 
so that the reader may understand what the phrases in column 2 stand for. The 
phrases stand for "gone weak". 
When the analysis of data has been completed the stage of interpretation of data 
follows. In order to facilitate data interpretation, themes should be developed in 
the final stage of data analysis. Therefore the researcher had to combine the 
linked categories step by step as explained below. 
The researcher combined the linked categories of table 3.5a) and filled in table 
3.5b). He then prepared table 3.5c) of Selective Coding by combining linked 
categories of table 3.5b). He combined categories D & I to form Category A; he 
combined A & E to form Category B; Category F was renamed Category C; he 
combined categories B, C, G & H to form Category D. At the stage of Selective 
Coding each of the combined categories represents a theme. 
3.5.1 Poverty 
Some of the categories in the Selective Coding will be analysed here. The first is 
category A that is a combination of poverty and political party funding. These two 
items have been combined in category A because they are linked. Political 
parties are expected to get their funding from membership fees, concerts and 
from the Government. Due to poverty in Lesotho the opposition political parties 
have poor funding. So, in this study poverty and political party funding belong 
together. 
The theme poverty has in it political party funding. This also has the element of 
government taking advantage of the situation and commanding the elections by 
way of distributing food aid (liphallelo). Also campaigning for elections, knowing 
that situation, the ruling party (government) misuses government property, 
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vehicles and media (radio & newspaper) to its advantage. The Ministers hold 
political gatherings using this property, according to some of the interviewees. 
Information from the interviews shows that the parliamentary allowances are not 
balanced. All the parliamentarians get allowances for being in Parliament, but in 
addition to these, there are also constituency-allowances that are available to 
MPs who are electorates of constituencies, and the ruling party with its majority 
constituencies gets the lion's share of these allowances. The opposition gets 
such allowance only for one constituency. 
Most of the twelve party representatives interviewed alluded to poverty and lack 
of political party funding as greatly contributing towards unfair competition 
between the opposition political parties on the one side and the ruling party on 
the other side, hence poor performance of the opposition during the elections. 
In the above tables of the analysis of data from the interviews, the words 
"funding" and "poverty" each appeared twelve times giving a total of twenty-four 
appearances [See table 3.5 c)]. However the representative of the BNP stated 
that the ruling party, the LCD, is not stronger than the BNP, and that the BNP had 
rejected the 2002 elections. 
The leader of the MFP, Malebo (15-12-2004), admits that the opposition political 
parties in Lesotho have gone weak. He says that since 1992 a great majority of 
people looked up to Mokhehle as the messiah who would save them from poverty 
and unemployment. He contends that poverty is one of the major causes of the 
weakness and he calls it a double-wedged knife. He says that on the one side of 
the blade, the poor of the poorest do not go to vote. Also he says that those who 
cannot afford a morsel of bread do not bother to vote. On the other side of the 
blade, people who still have hope of survival, and those who still have some 
water and a little food need to be financed. 
Malebo asserts that lack of political party funding and lack of grass roots 
organization and finance by political parties are also major factors hindering 
political participation of the opposition political parties. He says that these factors 
are related to poverty. He puts forward the following respective remedies: that, 
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the political parties should be financed, and that there should be well planned 
organizational campaigns at grass roots level. 
Rakuoane (16-12-2004), the PFD Leader, says that poverty adversely affects the 
people. The PFD Leader contends that people vote for the ruling party in order to 
secure their jobs and the unemployed people vote to get jobs. According to 
Rakuoane, political parties are not able to establish and run party offices due to 
lack of funds. Rakuoane argues that, under such circumstances, it is difficult to 
do party work efficiently. 
Further Rakuoane says that it is unfortunate that Lesotho is a poor country that if 
a Parliamentarian or a Councillor of Local Government, as an example, receives 
monthly earning, he/she feels like in full-time employment and cannot like to be 
replaced. 
Rakuoane asserts that government should provide enough political party funding. 
According to Rakuoane there is comparatively better political party funding in 
South Africa and in Zimbabwe than in Lesotho. Additionally, Rakuoane argues 
that in Lesotho, the ruling party patronises the masses, and opposition parties 
usually find it difficult to get good support from the masses. 
Also the leader of the LPC, Maope (24-12-2004), finds poverty as the most 
central factor impacting on the performance of the opposition political parties. He 
contends that due to poverty opposition political parties lack resources. Maope 
asserts that parliamentarians shy to criticise the government in fear of losing their 
jobs, as it happens in Lesotho. 
Mphanya (25-12-2004), of the BCP, argues that the government of a poor 
country is unfortunate because politicians look for their opportunities more than 
for the public interests, and it is like that in Lesotho. According to Mphanya the 
MMP electoral system had a negative impact on the opposition political parties. 
He says that the opposition parties made a mistake by not discussing within the 
parties the question of who were to go to parliament. The members of Executive 
Committees felt that they had to be in parliament and poverty was the reason 
why they wanted to be in parliament. Mphanya contends that the opposition 
parties have the weakness of failing to campaign for support from their potential 
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alliances the farmers, workers, traditional organizations, corporations, and street 
vendors. 
Mphanya says that Lesotho is a poor country and government does not teach the 
people that when they work they will be freed from poverty, but teaches them to 
rely on donations from outside. The parliamentarians also teach people to build 
up committees to receive donations. The ruling party distributes the donations 
and this affects the choice of people. 
According to Mphanya (25-12-2004), usually when elections are close, instead of 
developing agriculture, government brings in the donations in the form of food, 
clothing, and so on, from outside. So, people vote for the government that gives 
them food. Donations are given to ruling party members who can certify that by 
producing membership cards. That incidence, in November 2005, occurred in 
Nokong constituency, and Red Cross cancelled the offer after getting the report. 
Further, Mphanya (25-12-2004) asserts that in his home village of Mapoteng, 
there are the disabled people and also there are the aged people (around 90 
years of age), who did not get these donations. 
Mphanya argues that, these donations are dangerous because they are not fairly 
distributed. He says that the donations should be distributed by neutral bodies 
such as the Red Cross, churches and chiefs directly and not by political parties. 
Also he asserts that political parties should have a say in the request for, and 
distribution of, donations. 
The leader of the BAC, Raditapole (30-12-2004), says that politics of poverty is 
another cause for the weakness of opposition political parties. She says that the 
ruling party can control everything because it has money. For example, it can 
control employment. So, people support the ruling party for social security 
reasons. Further, she argues that poor funding or non-funding of the opposition 
political parties is another cause of the weakness. Specifically she says that the 
electoral party funding is not enough for the opposition political parties. 
Also Raditapole says that these parties are not able to establish institutionalised 
structures such as the village, branch, constituency organizations of the party; 
and the strength of the party is in these structures. These structures need funds 
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to be maintained. "In the past the BCP used to have district offices, but today 
they are not there anymore," says the leader of the BAC. Raditapole argues that 
lack of these structures causes lack of legitimacy of opposition political parties. 
In addition Raditapole asserts that poverty created a new society of Basotho 
dependent on the mercy of the ruling party; and that even for the registration of 
senior citizens the temporarily employed officers came from the ruling party. 
The leader of the BAC argues that if the number of splinter parties can be 
reduced, it will be meaningful to fund a few political parties. This is the remedy 
that she finds appropriate to apply in order to control political party funding. 
Raditapole contends that in reality poverty has not been addressed, and it should 
be addressed. 
The leader of the NPP, Peete (12-01-2005), argues that the opposition political 
parties are not weak. He says that the ruling party has more opportunities than 
the other parties. Peete contends that the Ministers of the ruling party use 
government vehicles for campaigning. He asserts that the political parties are not 
equal because the campaigns of the opposition parties do not satisfactorily cover 
some of the regions of the country due to the mountainous and rugged terrain. 
Further he states that it is because of these unequal living conditions that the 
ruling party always finds donations to distribute, and gets opportunities of 
revisiting its specific areas of interest, for example education, and as a result it is 
able to improve its political methodologies or approaches. 
Peete, however, says that poverty adversely impacts on the performance of the 
political parties in general. Further he says that South Africa gives opportunities 
to opposition parties for exposure; it gives more funds to opposition parties than it 
gives to the ruling party [Comment: the last statement is incorrect because in 
South Africa funding is distributed on a proportional basis (Government of South 
Africa 1998: 2]. Furthermore he asserts that in Lesotho the allowances of the 
Parliamentarians are not equal. Even though the M150 is a common allowance, 
the members of the ruling party receive also the constituencies' allowances. 
Peete contends that poverty, lack of political party funding and lack of democracy 
in the electoral system are the most influential factors for the poor performance of 
opposition political parties. 
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The leader of the NPP proposes the following remedy. He asserts that in a 
democratic situation the ruling party has to give equal opportunities with respect 
to: learning, effectiveness, exposure to the outside world, to being in position, and 
to getting funds. Also Peete says that the NPP and other opposition political 
parties pointed out to the local representatives of international organizations that 
there were imbalances between the ruling party and the opposition parties in 
relation to the preparations for the elections. Furthermore, he argues that these 
parties should get equal opportunities mentioned above. 
Matete (19-01-2005), the general secretary of the BNP, asserts that lack of 
political party funding, poverty and government, in that order, hamper the 
performance of the opposition political parties. He suggests, as a remedial action 
to the lack of political party funding, that the state should provide political party 
funding to build competitive democracy. Also he proposes that poverty can be 
alleviated with sound economic policies that are currently non-existent. According 
to Matete, the overwhelming majority of people live in misery and poverty. He 
argues that, this situation adversely influences their support for their parties, 
particularly financially. On the other hand the ruling party uses the state facilities 
to promote its image. 
The general secretary of the LWP, Leneha (26-01-2005), argues that lack of 
political party funding adversely impacts on electoral participation of the 
opposition parties in Lesotho. Also Makoa (26-01-2005) of the LEP contends that 
the most influential factor on the participation of the opposition parties is the lack 
of political party funding. However, she strongly disagrees with the suggestion 
that poverty is the cause of poor performance of the opposition. 
The official of the LLP, Mpela (12-01-2006), asserts that poverty, lack of 
democracy and lack of leadership are the main causes of weakness of the 
opposition political parties. He states that in Lesotho there is the elite group that 
is rich while the other people are poor. Mpela argues that Basotho have no 
'ownership of government' because elections are funded with donations and 
grants from outside the country. 
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Manyeli (02-03-2006), the leader of NIP, contends that poverty, insufficient voter 
education and lack of transparency are the major impediments to political 
participation of the opposition parties in Lesotho. Majara (07-03-2006), the leader 
of the NLFP, asserts that lack of democracy, poverty and lack of transparency 
are the main problems of the opposition political parties. 
3.5.1.1 Interpretation 
Almost all the interviewed party officials assert that poverty and political party 
funding are great impediments of electoral political participation of opposition 
parties in Lesotho. Also, according to Matlosa and Sello (2005: xv), one of the 
numerous internal problems facing Lesotho political parties is "lack of 
mobilization and party funding". 
The researcher's interpretation is that poverty is one of the major problems that 
the opposition political parties face with respect to electoral political participation. 
From the data analysis the researcher is convinced that these parties are not 
able to run their branch offices and carry out campaigns efficiently. Also they are 
not able to carry out development projects because of lack of funds. 
The effect of poverty extends to the parliamentarians, because they feel like 
people who have got employment and they tend to protect their jobs even at the 
end of their term. This is evident when the political parties elect the candidates 
for the next national election; some of the former parliamentarians who happen to 
be replaced have attempted to stand as independent candidates for the next 
election. In the period of study 1993 to 2006 poverty had been a serious problem 
adversely impacting on the electoral political participation of the opposition 
political parties in Lesotho while the ruling party had the advantage of being in 
control of the resources and using them. 
3.5.2 Leadership 
A second theme in the Selective Coding is lack of efficient leadership and internal 
party divisions. According to Rakuoane (16-12-2004), the leader of the PFD, lack 
of efficient leadership is one of the major factors that adversely impact on the 
electoral political participation of opposition political parties in Lesotho. 
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Raditapole of the BAC goes deeper into the question of inefficient political 
leadership in Lesotho. She argues that the leadership is poor and as a result 
conflicts inside the parties arise. She asserts that the emerging splinter parties 
are a major cause of the weakness, because there are now too many opposition 
political parties which fail to work together. 
The leader of the BAC contends that there is general lack of leadership in 
Lesotho, for example in churches, and in many other organisations. She 
therefore makes a deduction that organisations that are brought up by the people 
without leadership skills will be weak. She states that the remedial action to be 
taken is to reduce the number of splinter groups/parties so as to have a 
meaningful opposition led by people with good leadership skills. 
According to the leaders/officials of the BCP, BNP, LPC, MFP, NLFP and the 
NNP, internal party divisions and lack of efficient leadership have almost no 
impact on political participation and therefore need not to be identified as issues. 
The general secretary of the LWP and the official of the LEP say that the internal 
party divisions need not be considered as issues, but the lack of efficient 
leadership has an adverse impact on the political participation of the parties. 
The official of the LLP contends that internal party divisions and the lack of 
efficient leadership hamper political participation of the political parties in 
Lesotho. The leader of NIP, Manyeli (02-03-2006), asserts that the other main 
problems of Lesotho political parties are their internal party divisions and the lack 
of efficient leadership. He says that there are many opposition political parties 
and that there might not have been sound reasons for establishing some of them. 
Manyeli suggests the following remedy. He says that there should be sound 
legislation regulating the establishment of political parties. Manyeli says that on 
the 2nd March 2006 he mentioned in Parliament, that there is lack of principled 
leadership of political parties. 
3.5.2.1 Interpretation 
According to some political parties (the BCP, BNP, LPC, MFP, NLFP and the 
NNP, as indicated in the analysis) the question of efficient leadership is not a 
113 
problem with the opposition parties. However, there are no sound reasons 
supporting their view. Some other interviewees such as the leaders of the BAC, 
PFD and NIP, give sound reasons why they contend that leadership of the 
political parties in Lesotho is not efficient. The important things in qualitative 
analysis are the given reasons or content and not only the figures or numbers of 
parties. So the researcher has looked closely at the tabled reasons. 
The researcher's interpretation is that the leadership of political parties in Lesotho 
requires training for capacity building. There is lack of efficient leadership that 
adversely impacts on the electoral political participation of opposition political 
parties. It is through appropriate training that the political leaders in Lesotho may 
acquire efficiency in political participation. 
3.5.3 Democratic culture and the Government 
This sub-section deals with the analysis of the issues raised by some of the 
interviewees, which they think touch on democratic practices. These matters 
involve both the opposition and the ruling parties. Some of the interviewees claim 
that the government makes conditions difficult for the opposition political parties. 
Also others show that it is important for the opposition parties to start now to 
apply democratic principles. 
The leader of BAC, Raditapole (30-12-2004), asserts that an environment 
conducive to effective functioning of political parties and recognition of the role of 
opposition parties is absent. It is the number 1 cause of the weakness of 
opposition parties. She argues that the ruling party sees the opposition as the 
enemy. Also she maintains that the media may facilitate this environment, but 
they are weak. Maope (24-12-2004), the leader of LPC, holds a similar view, 
because he says that the media are weak in Lesotho. Also Raditapole asserts 
that the internal divisions and in fighting are outcomes of the problem of the ruling 
party's disregard for the opposition parties. 
Raditapole notes that in the questionnaire she could have grouped together 
questions 10(10) [lack of transparency within the political parties], 10(11) [lack of 
freedom] and 10(14) [lack of understanding of politics], under one question called 
"Lack of democratic culture in political parties". She argues that at the end every 
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party has a chance to become the ruling party; therefore it must start now to 
practice democratic culture and give reports. 
The leader of the BAC maintains that most of the political parties are patriarchal; 
for instance, people do not see a party if they do not say 'Ntate Ntsu (Mokhehle, 
the founder of BCP) or Mandela (former leader of the ANC of South Africa). 
Raditapole advocates that the people should not fear that a leader is being 
toppled when he/she is criticized or his/her party is criticized. 
Further Raditapole says that the ruling party denied the opposition parties the 
opportunity of meeting with the pioneers of the MMP (electoral system) such as 
New Zealand. She says that the MMP has positively affected the political 
participation of the opposition political parties. According to her, the Basotho have 
not yet taken the advantage of the system because they still have the old 
attitudes. She states that the opposition political parties had written an invitation 
letter requesting the Secretary General of the Commonwealth to invite countries 
experienced in the system, such as New Zealand, to send people to Lesotho to 
give their experiences of the system to Basotho. To their disappointment, the 
Prime Minister of Lesotho refused to assist the opposition parties saying that they 
are a disgruntled opposition. 
As mentioned earlier, in 3.5.1 above, Raditapole asserts that politics of poverty 
put the opposition political parties at a disadvantage in comparison with the ruling 
party. She contends that the ruling party can control everything, because it has 
public money in its custody. For example, it controls employment. Accordingly 
people support the ruling party for social security reasons. She poses the 
question about overseeing good governance, and also about the rejection of the 
government put in place by force: "Who oversees these things?" She further 
argues that demonstrations are allowed on paper, but in practice they are not 
allowed in Lesotho. She says that demonstrations are a tool to be used by the 
opposition political parties when need arises. 
The leader of the BAC suggests the remedial steps to address the above-
mentioned problems inflicted by the government. Firstly, the laws should be 
improved so as to facilitate empowering of the private sector. Secondly, the laws 
that allow the ruling party to control everything, such as the resources and 
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projects, should be reviewed so that the opposition parties can have the 
opportunity of undertaking projects without frustration. She says that currently 
when one attempts to undertake a project and one has no association with the 
government, there is usually no success. 
According to Malebo (15-12-2004), leader of the MFP, there is insufficient voter 
education. He maintains that there is freedom and there is fairness in the 
elections. He argues that the electoral system is very democratic, because it 
allows women and the disabled people to be members of Parliament. Malebo 
contends that the ballot system could not be the cause of the problem of the 
opposition political parties. He says that it is, however, an unnecessary expense. 
On the contrary Matete (19-01-2005), of the BNP, asserts that the ballot system 
is a problem. He suggests that it could be done on a plane paper with a 
watermark, and that only the name be written. According to him the current 
system is wasteful, even though it is correct. 
Malebo (15-12-2004) asserts that the IEC does not answer the question: "Why do 
people vote?". It only misleads the people. Raditapole, the leader of the BAC 
says that the government is using voter education only as a ploy and not as 
genuine voter education, arguing that the less the people know the easier it is to 
control them. Malebo believes that sound voter education is required, that 
teaches people why they vote and not how to vote. 
The leader of the MFP says that there is lack of transparency within the political 
parties, because of the inefficiencies of the Press. He asserts that, some of the 
newspapers are owned by the political parties, so that in general the Press 
favours various political parties and as a result reporting about the proprietor 
political party, is not always accurate (Comment: This is a worldwide 
phenomenon. If the Media support different parties, they will serve as a watchdog 
on each other.). 
According to Malebo (15-12-2004), government has money, the Ministers use 
government vehicles and the ruling party has the upper hand during campaigning 
period. He says that, although the ruling party wins, it also gets a low score 
because many people do not vote, because their belief is that "they already had 
elected a government, what else could be demanded of them?" Malebo maintains 
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that the second reason why the ruling party gets a low score is due to 
dissatisfaction with the Members of Parliament of the ruling party. 
Malebo (15-12-2004) contends that parliamentarians get interest-free loans and 
this is likely to cause problems in the future, and it makes it difficult for the Prime 
Minister to replace such people. He says that when parliamentarians have got 
these loans it is not easy to replace them, even by elections, before they can pay 
back their loans. 
Further, Malebo (15-12-2004) argues that the Parliament did not have 
committees and that comparatively speaking Botswana is far ahead of Lesotho. 
He emphasizes that the Parliamentary Reform Committee is a must, and that 
there should be Parliamentary committees. Also he says that the former 
committees were not effective and they have begun improving them. 
Malebo (15-12-2004) agrees that internal party divisions and inefficient 
leadership contribute towards poor electoral participation of the opposition 
political parties. 
The leader of the PFD, Rakuoane (16-12-2004) tables two reasons why 
opposition political parties are weak: (a) there is no democracy, and (b) the main 
opposition political party is not ready to play its role in Parliament. Elaborating on 
each of these reasons, Rakuoane argues that: 
(a) for a long time in Lesotho there has been no democracy, so much that a 
culture of no democracy has developed. Under these circumstances people 
do not want to be in the opposition, everybody fights to be in the ruling 
position. 
(b) the main opposition party, BNP, is not ready to play its role in Parliament. 
Instead it is always complaining about the voter turnout. For this reason, the 
small parties cannot support the main opposition party. In short, there is no 
unity among the opposition political parties. 
Additionally, Rakuoane (16-12-2004) says that on the ground the opposition is 
about 6% less than the ruling party, LCD. He advocates that the remedy to the 
above-mentioned situation is to sustain the democratic process that has just 
started, as it will change the culture and eventually the role of the opposition 
117 
political parties will be clearer. Also, Rakuoane asserts that unity of the opposition 
political parties will be enabled. 
The leader of the PFD contends that the MMP electoral system has very 
positively affected the political participation of the opposition political parties. He 
asserts that their small political party has its leader heading the Parliamentary 
Reform Committee. Rakuoane, also, proudly says that in the Pan-African 
Parliament, Lesotho is the only country that has representatives of four political 
parties, while other countries have a maximum of two parties represented. 
Maope (24-12-2004), the leader of LPC, as earlier mentioned, says that the 
media are weak and as an example, one hardly sees media people in Parliament. 
Maope further states that if there could be solutions to the above-mentioned 
problem; there could be a change of people's attitude towards the opposition 
political parties. Maope contends that democracy in Lesotho assumes that 
political parties have a role to play, and that even the constitution allows for that, 
but the rulers have neglected these facts. According to Maope, there is need for 
the rulers to change their attitude, and to avail the resources to the political 
parties. 
Maope (24-12-2004) asserts that the ruling party does not use the electoral 
model as it was agreed upon. He says that, as an example, candidates of the 
opposition parties are denied certain benefits such as "constituency benefits" and 
as a result they cannot perform effectively. He believes that the responsibility of 
the parliamentarians from the opposition political parties is much greater than that 
of the ruling party, because they look after all the constituencies and not only 
single constituencies, and they give reports to these constituencies. In spite of 
this responsibility, only the parliamentarians from the ruling party get the 
constituency allowances. 
Maope (24-12-2004) contends that the LCD government did not accept the MMP 
system, and it is like they were forced into it. Maope argues that, however, this 
electoral model is still not fair, and the remedy is to move to a Proportional 
Representation (PR) model. He says that the MMP system does not allow 
candidates to represent the constituencies effectively. Further, Maope asserts 
that the "Arbitration Award" after the 1998 events had said that there was an 
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agreement in Lesotho to increase the number of First Past the Post (FPTP) seats 
to be equal to that of the MMP compensatory seats in the forthcoming general 
election of 2007. [Comment: It was not done because in the 2002 election the 
allocation had 80 FPTP and 40 MMP compensatory seats]. Elkit (2000: 1) 
contends that the Award states that the first election should be with an 80/50 mix 
ratio of constituency seats (FPTP) to Proportional Representation seats and also 
that in the later election the mix ratio shall be 50 per cent of each category of 
seats. Elkit's statement confirms Maope's assertion]. 
According to Mphanya (25-12-2004) of the BCP, as earlier mentioned under 
poverty, the MMP electoral system has a negative impact on the opposition 
political parties. His argument is that the members of the executive committees of 
the parties nominated themselves to take up MMP compensatory seats. Matete 
of BNP says that MMP has positively affected political participation of the 
opposition parties. He states that, however, some problems of attitude of failing to 
accept the MMP model, mainly from the ruling party, make things difficult. He 
asserts that the ruling party even now maintains that its parliamentarians are 
more legitimate than those of the proportional representation component. 
Mphanya (25-12-2004) argues that government has no policy that the opposition 
political parties can criticize. He believes that government relies on foreign 
powers to do its business in the country. According to Mphanya the ruling party 
should be accommodative. He says that the rulers should know that the 
opposition political parties are their own Basotho and their views should be 
heard. Mphanya cites the example of Botswana that he believes has a stable 
government, because its constitution says that the opposition should be in 
parliament. Also according to Peete (12-01-2005), the ruling party Ministers have 
the opportunity to impose whatever they want without prior discussion with the 
opposition parties. The leader of NNP asserts that in a democratic situation the 
ruling party has to provide equal opportunities to all the political parties with 
respect to: learning, effectiveness, exposure to the outside world, to being in 
position and to getting funds. 
Mphanya (25-12-2004) contends that there is a problem of illegitimacy of 
elections, such as in 1998. Raditapole holds a similar view as she says that in 
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Lesotho the only legitimate and normal elections were two (the 1965 and 1970) 
general elections. 
According to Mphanya, a poor country is unfortunate because military 
intervention is used in order to suppress the political unrest in it as it was done by 
SADC in Lesotho in 1998. [Comment: When SADC military intervened the Langa 
Commission had done its work of studying whether there had been discrepancies 
during the 1998 election and had submitted the Report, which had not yet been 
seen by the public]. Further, Mphanya avers that on the contrary a similar case 
of political unrest in a developed country is not suppressed with the military 
intervention from other countries. According to him, in the Ukraine the opposition 
political parties rejected the results of the October 2004 election and then political 
unrest followed, like it had happened in Lesotho in 1998 before SADC 
intervention. Further, Mphanya says that, unlike in Lesotho, in the Ukraine there 
was no military intervention but the law was amended and elections were held on 
26 December 2004. 
Peete (12-01-2005) contends that, when comparing the advantages of 
democratic involvement in day-to-day affairs and also the relations of the ruling 
party with the opposition political parties in Lesotho and South Africa, it is found 
that South Africa is more open in democracy than Lesotho where there is no 
openness. He argues that South Africa gives opportunities to opposition parties 
to gain exposure. As mentioned earlier, Peete says that in Lesotho the 
allowances are not equally distributed. Each Member of Parliament of the ruling 
party, in addition to the common daily allowance of M150, gets constituency 
allowance.. 
According to Peete (12-01-2005), the law that prohibits the establishment of 
alliances by opposition parties, particularly those which got into parliament as a 
result of the proportional representation, shows that the political parties in 
Lesotho are not treated equally. Mphanya and Maope also say that the law 
prohibits their political parties from establishing alliances before Parliament is 
dissolved in preparation for the next election. 
Matete (19-01-2005), general secretary of the BNP, says that in 1998 the ballot 
paper seemed to have been manipulated and was not uniform as it had two 
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different textures for one and the same election. Hence the paper was called 
"Pampiri sekokoto" or a hard version and a soft version. He further says that it 
was questionable why two versions of the paper were used in one and the same 
election. Also the officials of the LWP and the LEP, Leneha (26-01-2005) and 
Makoa (26-01-2005) respectively, complained about unequal rights between the 
ruling party and the opposition parties, and they also criticized the ballot system. 
Additionally Matete (19-01-2005) criticizes the balloting system itself. He argues 
that they had been accusing the IEC of giving itself the monopoly of developing 
the ballot paper, when it is the responsibility of both the IEC and the 
stakeholders, political parties. However, Matete says of late it is better, because 
parties are invited, although eventually their views are thrown away. He believes 
that the remedy to this problem is that the IEC and government acknowledge that 
preparation for elections is the responsibility of all stakeholders. Matete asserts 
that the remedy to illegitimacy is to give the stakeholders the opportunity to 
exercise their full responsibility over the process of the elections, unlike what is 
currently taking place. The legitimacy of elections will then be enhanced. 
According to Matete (19-01-2005), the BNP is still not satisfied with the process 
and outcome of both the 1998 and 2002 general elections. He says that after 
1998, the election was postponed thrice. He argues that the ruling party seemed 
reluctant to provide for the election to be held; he suspects they purposefully 
delayed the election. He believes government made it difficult for the Interim 
Political Authority (IPA) to prepare for the election. Matete contends that while the 
election had to be held within 15 to 18 months, it was delayed for three years. 
Mpela (12-01-2006) of the LLP argues that the opposition political parties are 
weak, because of two main reasons. Firstly, opposition political parties do not 
have a clear mandate from the government of Lesotho with respect to what has 
to be done; in other words, government does not give the opposition direction 
about the course of action. Secondly, the system of PR is not well accepted in 
Parliament. For example, the leader of the opposition has not yet been given his 
due respect such as being given a vehicle, and so on, by government. 
Mpela (12-01-2006) also says that the members of the ruling party in Parliament 
undermine the opposition members of Parliament by calling them losers. Mpela 
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asserts that remedial action to be taken could be to amend the constitution in 
order to enable smooth handling of matters. He also states that the question of 
parliamentary reform should be fully addressed. 
3.5.3.1 Interpretation 
The researcher's interpretation is that the opposition political parties are not 
satisfied with the role of media in Lesotho. The media are not effectively and 
efficiently doing their work to improve the political environment. For example, they 
do not report sufficiently about parliament. This attitude of media reporters has 
adversely affected electoral participation of the opposition political parties. 
The law that was passed to call the parliamentarians by different title-names 
caused a problem between the ruling and the opposition political parties. This 
law could have a negative impact on the relations between the ruling party and 
the opposition and on the performance of the opposition political parties. Also the 
law that prohibits establishment of alliances by opposition parties that joined 
Parliament to fill up the compensatory seats of the MMP is contentious. 
Different electoral systems have advantages and disadvantages, and this is why 
some interviewees find the MMP system good and others find it the same as the 
FPTP, while still others rate it worse than the FPTP. The MMP electoral system 
will influence the politicians from the opposition and the ruling parties, to change 
their attitudes towards one another. Taking an example given in the data 
analysis, in the Parliamentary Reforms Committee the chairman is from the 
opposition party, and its members have been working together. The situation was 
different before the MMP system was introduced. This is an indicator of the 
potential of the MMP system to improve political participation of the opposition 
parties in Parliament. The researcher's interpretation is that the MMP electoral 
system has potential to enhance political participation of the opposition parties. 
The opposition political parties are willing to take an active part in the 
development projects; they require the government to avail the resources without 
discrimination. The opposition political parties are willing to work hand in hand 
with the ruling party in the development projects. They want government to 
develop clear policies that can be constructively criticized. Also they want the 
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Constitution to be reviewed in order to accommodate the MMP electoral system. 
The desire of the opposition parties is that they be involved in all the stages of the 
process of preparing for the elections. The researcher interprets the raised ideas 
in this paragraph as the sign of potential strength of the opposition political 
parties, because if their desires could be met, they have the potential to 
participate effectively. 
The three leaders of the opposition political parties, Malebo, Rakuoane and 
Raditapole, share the same view expressed in different words. The view they 
share is that it is usually difficult to draw the people away from the ruling party, 
because they adore the leader of the ruling party. The researcher's interpretation 
is that the ruling party patronises the masses. 
3.5.4 Potential strengths or weaknesses of the opposition political parties 
In table 3.5c) the responses such as "gone strong", "Congress-ism", "gone weak" 
and others, express the potential strengths or weaknesses of the opposition 
political parties. 
Malebo, the leader of the MFP argues that since 1992 a great majority of people 
looked up to Mokhehle as messiah who would save them from poverty and 
unemployment. Many people had a strong belief in him, adored him, and in their 
minds developed an ideology of Congress-ism. Also he asserts that it is, 
therefore, difficult for the new parties to establish themselves when an old one is 
already well established. However, Malebo contends that the Mokhehle era, of 
Congress-ism is over and change is imminent. He says that in 1965 opposition 
political parties occupied 29 seats with on-the-ground support of 60% of the 
voters, and the ruling party had 31 seats with on-the-ground support of 40% of 
the voters. 
As already mentioned in 3.5.3 above, Rakuoane (16-12-2004) of the PFD says 
that there are two reasons why the opposition political parties are weak: lack of a 
democratic culture in Lesotho and the attitude of the main opposition political 
party. According to Rakuoane, in Lesotho, the ruling party patronises the 
masses, and the opposition parties usually find it difficult to receive good support 
from the masses. However, he asserts that on the ground the opposition has 
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about 6% less support than the ruling party, the LCD. This small percentage 
difference indicates potential strength of the opposition political parties. However, 
opposition political parties are numerous, 17, and do not work together in 
alliances. He had deduced this percentage difference from the 2002 election 
results and not from party membership. Also, according to Government notice 28 
of 2002, the correct percentage difference is 9.8% because the LCD received 
54.9% votes and opposition got the rest, 45.1%. Some voters are not members of 
any political party. 
According to Maope (24-12-2004) people participate in elections in order to get 
jobs and therefore they support the ruling party. When talking about establishing 
alliances, he says that he strongly supports the idea, but in Lesotho the 
opposition political parties are so weak that, such a principle cannot be used 
successfully. Mphanya (25-12-2004) argues that the opposition political parties 
are weak and that it is not their fault; the fault lies with the government because 
the government is weak and it is difficult to criticize a weak government. Also he 
says that the ruling party should be accommodative, arguing that the rulers 
should know that the opposition political parties are Basotho and their views 
should be heard. 
Raditapole (30-12-2004), the leader of BAC, contends that there should be three 
political parties in Lesotho. She argues that the escalation of splinter parties 
weakens the opposition parties. Similarly, the leader of the NIP contends that 
there are too many opposition political parties and that is why they are weak. 
Also, as mentioned earlier, Raditapole asserts that poor funding or non-funding of 
political parties and politics of poverty are some of the major causes of weakness 
of opposition political parties. Also the general secretary of the BNP, Matete (19-
01-2005), accepts that the opposition political parties are weak. According to 
Matete there are a number of reasons including poverty, lack of political party 
funding, and the use of government resources by the ruling party give it an 
advantage over the others. 
Majara (07-03-2006) of the NLFP argues that the opposition political parties are 
weak because they do not work for the good of the nation but for their individual 
interest. Leneha asserts that the opposition political parties are new and therefore 
they do not have enough experience. Makoa (26-01-2005) of the LEP accepts 
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that the opposition political parties are weak and they could do better if they form 
alliances. Mpela (12-01-2006) of the LLP argues that the opposition parties are 
weak because they have not got a clear mandate from the government, of what 
they are expected to do. 
Peete (12-01-2005), of the NPP, asserts that the opposition political parties are 
not weak, but the ruling party has more opportunities than the other parties. He 
argues that these Ministers have the opportunity to impose whatever they want 
without prior discussion with the opposition parties. Also he says that the ruling 
party uses government resources to meet its programmes. 
3.5.4.1 Interpretation 
Peete of the NPP contends that the opposition political parties are not weak. The 
secretary general of the BNP mentions two contradictory things, namely that 
opposition parties are not weak and while at the same time he also accepted that 
they are weak. The researcher picks the first response that opposition parties are 
not weak. So, leaders/officials of two parties say that opposition parties are not 
weak. All the others accepted that they are weak. However, one of the causes of 
the weakness supported by most of the interviewed party officials is that, the 
ruling party has the advantage of using government resources. 
The leader of the MFP says that the people developed the ideology of Congress-
ism and they do not accept any idea of the opposition, while the leader of the 
PFD says that the ruling party usually patronises the masses. Also the leader of 
the BAC maintains that most of the political parties are patriarchal. The 
interpretation of the researcher is that, these three leaders share the same view 
that the opposition political parties fail to draw supporters from the ruling party, 
but they express this view in different words. The essence of the given reason/s 
is that the supporters of the ruling party have a strong belief in their leader and in 
their party and this is a patron-client relationship issue. 
The general interpretation of the researcher for this sub-section is that, the 
leaders of the opposition political parties contend that their parties are weak 
because of lack of resources and that, the ruling party has the advantage over 
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their parties because of using government resources. Also, the ruling party 
patronises the masses. 
3.6 Conclusion 
This section gives the researcher's conclusion drawn from analysis of electoral 
data and from interpretation of the analysis of data from interviews. 
In each of the elections of 1998 and 2002 the ruling party, the LCD lost only one 
constituency out of 80. This reflects how weak the opposition parties had been. 
On the basis of analysis and interpretation of data from the interviews, the 
researcher reaches a conclusion from each theme and at the end he makes a 
general conclusion. 
About the first theme (poverty) the researcher draws the following conclusion; 
poverty is one of the major causes of weakness of the opposition political parties. 
The opposition political parties find it difficult even to run their offices and much 
more difficult to cover the country with political campaigns. Poverty is negatively 
related to electoral political participation. The ruling party is better off than the 
opposition parties; it takes advantage of being in power and it uses the 
resources, such as government vehicles and foreign aid to facilitate its political 
campaigns throughout the country. 
The second theme (leadership) brings the researcher to the conclusion that 
leadership of the opposition political parties is weak. Among the views raised by 
the interviewees were that the leaders need capacity building. Lack of efficient 
leadership is another major cause of the weakness of opposition political parties. 
On the third theme (democratic culture) the researcher draws the conclusion that 
whilst the elections are regularly held in Lesotho, the democratic culture is still 
poorly developed. The current legislation falls short of providing a level ground for 
development of the democratic culture and also the media are weak. This is yet 
another major cause of the weakness of opposition political parties. 
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Considering the fourth theme (potential strengths or weaknesses of the 
opposition political parties) the researcher draws the conclusion that the 
opposition parties were weak. Out of twelve interviewees, only two did not accept 
that the opposition parties were weak. 
Finally, the researcher draws a general conclusion, from the electoral data and 
from all the four themes, that in the period 1993 to 2006 the opposition political 
parties in Lesotho had gone weak. The major factors contributing to the 
weakness of the opposition political parties were: poverty, weak leadership and 





This chapter reaches conclusions about the study as a whole and answers the 
research questions articulated in the beginning of the study. It also identifies 
future areas of research. 
4.2 Conclusion from the literature review 
On the basis of the literature review the researcher concludes that the opposition 
political parties should encourage their supporters to discuss political issues, use 
various media and attend political meetings in order to be informed about political 
matters. These parties should not wait for the next national election before they 
hold political rallies; they should hold these public meetings regularly in order to 
recruit new supporters. The literature review confirms that the more stimuli about 
politics the people receive the greater the likelihood that they will participate in 
politics and the greater the depth of their participation (Stultz et al. 1994: 105, 
106,107). 
The yardsticks identified by Ssenkumba in Olukoshi (1998: 177) for evaluating 
the opposition political parties are very important. They were very useful for this 
study and therefore the researcher's conclusion is that they may be used in future 
studies relating to evaluation of performance of the opposition parties in Lesotho. 
These yardsticks are the following: 
a) the extent to which they pursue their organisational goals through the 
electoral process; 
b) the extensiveness and inclusiveness of their organisational structure and 
political constituency; 
c) the extent to which they employ established political avenues for achieving 
their goals; 
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d) their record of internal organisational stability. 
The literature confirms that electoral political participation does not end on the 
day of an election but continues until the next election. It includes providing 
checks-and-balance mechanisms against the government and participating in the 
governmental process by assisting government directly or indirectly. 
In order to enable effective political participation of opposition parties in Lesotho 
the process of democratization has to continue, so that at least all the eight 
institutional guarantees of democratization, stated by Dahl (1975:3-4), are 
practically available. 
Nyango'ro (1989) suggests a new developmental strategy in Africa, to restructure 
Africa's relationship with international economy - inevitably moving toward less 
association. Ake (2000) asserts that social democracy is feasible in Africa. 
According to Nyango'ro (1989) and Ake (1996), in the case of Africa, both 
political and economic development have to be done simultaneously6 for the 
African states to be transformed from autocratic to democratic states. It is 
imperative that Lesotho is successful in its struggle for economic independence. 
Poverty negatively impacts on the activities of opposition political parties. It is 
concluded from Matlosa and Sello that the regulatory, financial and the political 
spheres in which the opposition political parties in Lesotho operate have 
adversely influenced their strategies and organization. 
In Lesotho a number of political parties split and new parties were established as 
breakaway parties and this phenomenon could be a result of a lack of tolerance 
amongst the political parties , as Dahl (1975:3-4) warns. Dahl (1975: 202) gave 
seven conditions favouring polyarchy. Lesotho has not yet met those conditions. 
Also as noted in the literature that the political parties perform important tasks, it 
is of utmost importance to give the opposition political parties opportunity to 
participate in parliament and in the other decision making processes. According 
to Chiroro (2006) the opposition parties are part and parcel of the nation-building 
6 See Ake's comments about the African Charter on page 220, in appendix 7, of this dissertation. 
129 
exercise and their role should be fully recognised and fully institutionalised in the 
political structures. 
Finally, based on the literature review, the researcher came to the conclusion 
that, although the opposition political parties are weak and have few 
parliamentary seats, they also achieved successes in the period 1993 to 2006. 
These successes are potential strengths of the opposition parties and they are as 
follows: 
i) It was due to the political demands of the opposition parties that the Langa 
Commission was established to study the irregularities in the 1998 
election; 
ii) The Interim Political Authority was established to level the political playing 
ground after the 1998 election; 
iii) The new electoral model, the MMP, was adopted and it has a potential to 
enhance participation of the opposition parties in parliament. 
Has the literature review answered the major research question, which seeks to 
find out if since 1993 the opposition political parties had gone weak? The answer 
is yes. The reasons are that the regulatory, financial and the political spheres in 
which the opposition parties operate adversely affected their strategies and their 
organisation. The ruling party won the successive elections of 1998 and 2002. 
The records show that opposition parties have been performing very poorly 
during the elections of the period 1993-2006. Considering the poor achievement 
of the opposition at each general election, the opposition political parties are still 
considerably weak. The researcher concludes that unlike in the period 1965 to 
1970, the opposition parties had gone weak in the period 1993 to 2006. 
4.3 Conclusion from data analysis 
The effect of poverty is one of the major problems that the opposition political 
parties face with respect to electoral political participation. With the evidence from 
the data analysis it is concluded that the opposition political parties are not able 
to run their branch offices and to carry out political campaigns efficiently due to 
lack of political party funding. Also they are not able to carry out development 
projects because of lack of funds. 
130 
The researcher's conclusion, based on the data analysis, is that there is a lack of 
efficient leadership that adversely impacts on the electoral political participation of 
the opposition political parties. The leadership of political parties in Lesotho 
requires training for capacity building. Seven of the twelve party officials 
interviewed by the researcher confidently alluded to lack of efficient leadership 
contributing towards the splits of political parties in Lesotho. 
The researcher draws a conclusion that poorly developed democratic culture is 
yet another major cause of weakness of the opposition political parties in 
Lesotho. It is evident, from the same data analysis, that opposition political 
parties are weak. However, it is also concluded that the MMP electoral system 
used for the first time in 2002 in Lesotho, has a potential of enhancing political 
participation of opposition political parties in parliament. The researcher observes 
that a number of things still have to be done, such as revision of the legislation in 
order to iron out any discomfort of the opposition parties and also to 
accommodate the MMP electoral Model. 
Have the researcher's own data answered the research question? The answer is 
yes. The data have indicated that the opposition parties are weak. Also the data 
indicated that the introduction of the MMP had a potential of making political 
participation of the opposition parties in parliament considerably better. Currently, 
their electoral political participation is much weaker than in the period 1965 to 
1970. 
4.4 Conclusion on the research question 
On the basis of the findings from literature, analysis of electoral data and analysis 
of data from interviews, the researcher concludes that opposition political parties 
had gone weak in the period 1993 to 2006. 
The patron-client relationship theory explained how during that period the ruling 
party was able to win the successive general elections of 1998 and 2002. The 
ruling party patronised the masses. Also, the ruling party took advantage of being 
in control of the state resources, which it used to promote its interests. The 
researcher draws a conclusion that the elections conducted in the period 1993 to 
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2006 in Lesotho can be well interpreted and understood by using the patron-
client relationship theory. 
The opposition political parties have a number of problems including, but not 
limited to, regulatory, financial and political. Both the party regulations and 
membership record keeping have to be improved. The national legislation has to 
be reviewed and amended as appropriate to facilitate better control of registration 
of political parties, and to provide equal treatment of parliamentarians. Provision 
of political party funding could enable the parties to carry out their work and run 
offices efficiently. Intra-party and inter-party democracy has to be developed. 
If Lesotho continues to hold elections regularly, it will increase the democratic 
qualities in agreement with Lindberg's theory. Freedom House ratings in tables 
2.6.1.3 and 2.6.1.4 above show Lesotho's achievements. 
Nyango'ro and Ake urge the African states to carry out simultaneous political and 
economic development. Also, Ake recommends social democracy for the African 
states. These ideas of Nyango'ro and Ake, if applied, could bring a better change 
in the African states including Lesotho. Poverty could be eradicated and 
problems of the opposition political parties could be minimised. 
What remains to be discovered about the topic? Two research focus areas that 
still require much more attention and future research are the following, also 
identified by Matlosa and Sello (2005: 40-42): 
• party membership and not only party supporters or voters; 




To whom it may concern 
I am a postgraduate student pursuing (MA) Politics with the University of South 
Africa and I am currently preparing a dissertation that studies the following 
problem: "Since 1993, have the opposition political parties gone weak in 
Lesotho?" Please kindly spare a few minutes of your time to assist me by 
answering the attached questionnaire. Provide answers by ticking in the 
appropriate boxes or filling in the given tables/spaces, and/or simultaneously as 
you give answers I will fill in the form and take down notes. 
QUESTIONNAIRE 
1. i) Since 1993, have the opposition political parties gone weak in Lesotho? 
If the answer is yes, in your opinion, what is the most important cause? 
ii) What could be the remedy to overcome the above-mentioned cause of 
weakness? 
2. Where is your permanent residence? Please give the name of the village 
or town and constituency in the table below. 
Village/Town Constituency name 
3. Indicate the name of your political party in the table below: 
Name of political party Abbreviation 
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4. What is membership of your political party? 
5001-10 000 10 001-15 000 15 001-20 000 20 001 - 30 000 30 001-50 000 >50 001 
5. In three months how many times do you hold public meetings in the 
constituency? 
0 1 to 2 2 to 3 3 to 4 4 to 6 Other 
(Specify) 
6. i) Does your party constitution provide any clause/s on the disclosure of 
party finances and their usages? 




ii) If the answer is 'Yes' in i) above, how often are disclosure reports given 










1. Did your political party form a coalition/alliance of any kind 
with another/other political party/s in the period '1993 -2006'? 
Yes No 
2. If the answer is yes to i) above, answer the following 
question: Which kind/s of coalition/alliance did your party 
establish with another/other party/s? Tick as many boxes as 
appropriate. 
Electoral Executive/ Minority Legislative United Mergers 
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Alliance Cabinet Executive Coalition Front /Other 
(For Coalition Coalition (For Alliance (Name the 
elections) ( F o r gaining (Being in the supporting (for driving other) 
majority seats to minority, ruling party on towards a 
control a cabinet support the various issues common 
responsible to cabinet in in goal) 
parliamentary parliamentary parliamentary 
majority) debates). debates). 
3. Do you think that the use of political coalitions/alliances can 
strengthen electoral political participation of opposition 
parties in Lesotho? 
Strongly agree Agree Neutral Disagree Strongly 
disagree 
8. How has Mixed Member Proportional (MMP) electoral system affected 
political participation of the opposition parties in Lesotho? 
Very 
negatively 
Negatively No change Positively Very positively 
9. Do you think poverty has an impact on electoral political participation of 
opposition parties in Lesotho? 
Strongly 
disagree 
Disagree Neutral Agree Strongly agree 
10. Below is given a list of possible causes of weak electoral political participation 
of opposition political parties in Lesotho. Please rank these possible causes by 
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writing numbers, 1) to 16), in the boxes against them; the most important cause 
must be labelled 1, the second 2, and so on. 
1. Internal divisions D 
2. Lack of transparency of the electoral system D 
3. The ballot system used D 
4. Lack of democracy, in general, of the Electoral system D 
5. Lack of party political funding D 
6. Lack of efficient leadership D 
7. Government making it difficult for the opposition parties D 
8. The role of the military D 
9. Poverty • 
10. Lack of transparency within the political parties D 
11. Lack of freedom D 
12. Lack of fairness D 
13. Insufficient voter education D 
14. Lack of understanding of politics D 
15. Illegitimacy of elections D 




In 1907, the first interest group called the "Basutoland Progressive Association 
(BPA)" was established, and among its tasks were to address questions relating 
to: 'progress and interests of Basotho, working in harmony with the government 
and the missionaries, etc.' (Machobane 1990: 129). In September 1919, a more 
radical interest group, the "Commoners' League" or in Sesotho Language 
"Lekhotla la Bafo" was established (Gill 1997: 170). 
The Commoners' League, under leadership of the founder Josiel Lefela, fought 
very strongly against turning Basutoland into a Crown colony. The Commoner's 
League maintained that Lesotho had to remain a protectorate and it advocated 
establishment of the House of Commoners. That organization published its views 
in the local newspaper, Naledi, between March and November 1921, slamming 
imperialism and chiefs (Machobane 1990:160). In the same year, 1921, Naledi 
newspaper was prohibited from publishing articles submitted by the Commoners' 
League and since then, the organization used the South African newspapers, 
Inkululeko (Freedom) and Umsebenzi (The Worker) (Machobane 1990: 158, 159, 
160). The appearance of the two organizations mentioned above probably 
enhanced political participation through informal organizations. 
The Lekhotla la Toka (LLT) or the League of Justice led by Justice Malitsane 
Mphanya Ratsiu broke away from the League of Commoners, but it died away 
after World War II and its leader rejoined the League of Commoners (Matlosa 
and Sello 2005: 16). The BPA launched their own onslaught against the chiefs 
and published their views in the Naledi newspaper (Machobane 1990: 162). In 
1929 the BPA and the colonial powers wanted to reform chieftaincy and the 
Commoners League greatly opposed that move and together with the chiefs who 
had ultimately consulted the nation they were successful in stopping the Council 
from passing those laws (Machobane 1990: 182, 183). In 1931 the National 
Council passed a resolution, that made it mandatory for chiefs to consult the 
public at regional gatherings both before and after each session of the Council 
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(Gill 1997: 183) and that was the beginning of accountability (Machobane 1990: 
183). In the Council the chiefs tabled motions of the commoners, ultimately 
customary law, the laws of Lerotholi, were recognized, like it was done in 
Bechuanaland and in 1938 what were called Native Courts were established 
(Machobane 1990: 221). 
Leeman (1984: 88) notes that Perham (1967) estimated, in 1933, that at any one 
time between 50% and 70% of able-bodied Basotho men were away working in 
South Africa due to increasing shortage of land and unemployment problems in 
Lesotho. The issue of shortage of land, raised by Leeman, is questionable. 
According to Gill (1997: 202), in 1947 the issue of Basutoland's status as a 
Protectorate or Crown colony arose again. By 1948 some members of the 
National Council were elected by the District Councils, and six recognized 
associations elected six other members (Machobane 1990: 241, 242). In 1959 
the Legislative Council was established, mainly due to the efforts of the 
Basutoland African Congress party (BAC) founded in 1952 by Mr Ntsu Clement 
Mokhehle (Gill 1997: 203), (Machobane 1990: 253). The BAC demanded a 
number of things and among them was "self-government in Basutoland by the 
Basotho". In 1954 the BAC had its press organ, Mohlabani (The Warrior) 
(Machobane 1990: 253, 254, 255). 
The 1959 Legislative Council was unicameral and had eighty, 80, members, half 
of whom were elected during the District Council elections. There were forty, 40, 
non-elected members, twenty-two, 22, ex-officio principal chiefs; the King 
nominated fourteen, 14, and there were four, 4, British officials: Government 
Secretary, Financial Secretary, Legal Secretary and Commissioner for Local 
Government (Gill 1997: 204), (Machobane 1990: 262). The King, Moshoeshoe II, 
was head of the Executive. The increased membership provided for better 
representation and increased political participation than in the former Council of 
Advice. 
In the 1960 District Councils election three political parties, Basutoland Congress 
Party (BCP) (new name of BAC since 1958), the Marema-Tlou Party (MT) 
(established in 1957) and the Basotho National Party (BNP) (established in 
1958), also the BAP interest group placed candidates (Leeman 1985: 135). This 
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election was the first of its kind during the colonial era and one might say that it 
facilitated greater political participation after the distortion, by colonialists, of the 
good purpose of the 'Popular gatherings' or the Basotho 'pitsos'. 
According to Matlosa (1997: 141) the District Council election was aimed at 
building a firmer foundation for efficient local government and democratizing the 
local structures of government. The first point of establishing 'efficient local 
government' could be an accurate statement to make, as for the second 
statement about 'democratising the local structures of government' there might 
be inaccuracies because, it could be difficult to say that at that time either 
Basotho people or the British colonialists had the same conception of democracy 
that Basotho and the British of today have, for example it could be any type of 
democracy, 'multi-party democracy', or 'socialist democracy' and so on; however, 
local governments cannot be discarded as important tools of democracy when 
they are used for that purpose, that is when they are enabled to serve that 
purpose, for example in the Soviet Union there were local governments and the 
Soviets said that they had democracy, but the Western world taught that there 
was no democracy there mainly because there was only one political party in the 
Soviet Union. For example, Popa and Munteanu (2001: 9) made a study about 
local governments in the Soviet and the building of democratic local governments 
in the former Soviet Republics. Samoff (1989: 1) said that strong local 
government was widely regarded as critical to administrative efficiency, citizen 
participation and regime legitimacy; and he further said: "At independence, 
Tanzania inherited the colonial variant of administratively dominated local 
government, a distinctly undemocratic form". 
In the 1960 District Councils election women were not able to vote as the 1959 
constitution had no room for their participation and also the political parties were 
reluctant that women vote (Machobane 1990: 295, 296). Weisfelder (1999: 14) 
noted that the BCP by 1960 had become a genuine 'mass' political party and the 
BCP had established a youth League in 1960 (Machobane 1990: 288). The MTP 
was established in 1957 as a result of the split of the BAC, and Chief Samuel 
Matete led it (Leeman 1984: 210), (Spence 1968: 37), (Weisfelder 1999: 37). 
There had been a difference of opinion about the new Paramount Chief, when 
Matete quit the post of being 'Mantsebo's Councillor. Also Matete had been a 
member of the BCP. 
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According to Leeman (1984: 210) and Weisfelder (1999: 8) in September 1955 
the Basutoland National Council, heavily influenced by the BAC, passed a motion 
requesting that the Council be granted power to make laws on internal affairs with 
the approval of the Paramount Chief. The Secretary of State gave a favourable 
response in May 1956. Upon completion of the work on the "Report on 
Constitutional Reform and Chieftaincy Affairs", in July 1958, the council accepted 
it and in November sent a delegation to London. 
Leeman (1984: 212) asserts that as constitutional developments unfolded the 
movement among the Oblates of Mary Immaculate (OMI) Catholic missionaries 
and the minor chiefs felt that it was time that a political party was established to 
protect their own interests against what they called the rising 'communist' 
influence of the BAC. Two separate groups that could accommodate the 
sentiments of the OMI and minor chiefs pronounced themselves. Chief Kaiser 
Leabua Jonathan, former BAC member (Khaketla 1971: 18), led the first group 
while Gabriel Manyeli and Anthony Manyeli Catholic mission teachers who had 
political activity with the OMI led the second group. These two groups later 
merged to form the BNP. Jonathan got assistance of Duncan, a businessman in 
Ladybrand South Africa, to draft a constitution for the Basotho National Party 
(BNP) and the party was established in 1958. In the same year the Manyelis 
through the encouragement of the OMI formed the Christian Democratic Party 
(CDP) (Leeman 1984: 215). 
According to Weisfelder (1999: 25) at the end of the visit of Paramount 
Chieftainess 'Mantsebo Seeiso to London in 1957 two members of her delegation 
remained behind to attend a conference on African Administration at the 
Cambridge University. The two men were Jonathan and Gabriel Manyeli who 
discussed at length political developments in Basutoland. Jonathan and Manyeli 
followed up the Cambridge discussions with in-depth consultations in Basutoland 
throughout 1957 (Weisfelder 1999: 25). According to Leeman (1984: 216) at the 
end of 1958 in London, during the constitutional talks, a private meeting was held 
at St. Ermin's Hotel (former British Intelligence Service Centre). The meeting was 
attended by chiefs Kelebone Nkoebe, Leabua Jonathan, Nkoebe Mitchell, Patrick 
'Mota, along with the Regent, Constantine Bereng Seeiso7, Chaplin, Wilson, Ian 
7 The author had omitted the surname 
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Fraser (a leading businessman in Basutoland), Father Romeo Guilbeault (the 
French Canadian secretary for Catholic Schools in Basutoland) and Mr Pheko, 
who served as interpreter during the conference. It was in that meeting that the 
CDP with other conservative elements merged into the BNP. Upon return from 
the London constitutional talks the founding of BNP was announced (Leeman 
1984: 216). 
According to Khaketla (1971: 53) at the annual conference of the BAC in 1958, it 
was decided to change the name of the party from the Basutoland African 
Congress to the Basutoland Congress Party (BCP). 
Once again, in March 1961, Khaketla and others split from the BCP and 
established the Basutoland Freedom Party (BFP) (Weisfelder 1999: 42), (Spence 
1968: 38). There had been a difference of opinion in the BCP leadership about 
the participation of women in the 1960 election and that culminated in the split of 
the party in 1961 and establishment of the Communist Party of Lesotho 
(Weisfelder 1999: 33), (Machobane 1990: 281), (Moleleki 1994: 93, 94, 95, 96). 
In 1962 the MTP and the BFP merged to form the Marema-Tlou Freedom Party 
(MFP) (Leeman 1984: 279), (Machobane 1990: 290). According to Leeman 
(1984: 295) two other political parties were founded in 1962. The first was the 
Basutoland Citizens' Association led by Paulus M. Ramatlapeng of Peka and it 
was never heard of after its announcement of February 1962. The second was 
announced at the end of 1962 and it was the Basutoland Labour Party (BLP). 
Prior to its establishment the meetings between the BLP's president, Elliot 
Lethata, and South African officials were held at the Crocodile Inn Butha-Buthe. 
Leeman asserts that the BCP reported that the South African media gave the 
BLP some publicity and South Africans allowed Lethata to address meetings 
throughout South Africa and provided him with transport. The BLP quickly 
disappeared. 
From the early fifties to the mid-sixties in Basutoland prevailed politics for 
independence from colonial bondage; the question of the constitutional status of 
the King, as earlier mentioned, was very important (Spence 1968:37), (Weisfelder 
1999: 37); however, the question of women participation was not important 
(Machobane 1990: 295). During the preparations for political independence the 
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Constitution Reform Committee had been established with the purpose of 
preparing the constitution for independence; that committee wanted the 
commoners and the chiefs to interact in a single chamber as they used to, and 
the idea of a bicameral parliament became important (Machobane 1990: 262, 
263). 
Between November 1963 and February 1964 the Legislative Council debated on 
the report of the Constitutional Commission of 1962 and finally drew up a 
resolution that had four sections with Section 2 containing eight amendments to 
the 1959 Constitution (Machobane 1990: 295-299). Among the amendments 
were: "... adult suffrage to be extended to include women"; and also 
establishment of "trias politica" by introducing an independent Judiciary in 
addition to the already existing Executive and the Legislative. Also an important 
amendment made was the increase of the number of members of the Lower 
House from forty, 40, to sixty, 60, (Machobane 1990: 299). According to the 
constitution the Executive Council consisted of: Resident Commissioner who was 
chairman, Government Secretary, Financial Secretary and the Assistant Attorney 
General; and in addition it had four ex-officio members: three of whom were 
elected by the Legislative Council and one was to be nominated by the King from 
among members of the Legislative Council (Machobane 1990: 262-265). 
In the 1965 general election four political parties contested, namely BCP, BNP, 
MFP and MTP (Leeman 1984: 307, 663-669), (Matlosa 1997: 142). Also 
independent candidates contested. Out of a total of 60 parliamentary seats BNP 
got 31, BCP 25, MFP 4 and MTP 0 (Matlosa 1997: 142). BNP had won 42% of 
the votes. According to Leeman (1984: 669) the MFP Member of Parliament for 
Matela constituency crossed the floor to join the BNP. The new constitution 
resulting from the conclusions arrived at in London, came into force on 30 April 
1965, a day after the election commenced on 29 April 1965 (Machobane 1990: 
300, 301). On 4 October 1966 Basutoland got political independence and 
changed its name to Lesotho. At the time of independence apartheid South Africa 
controlled imports and more than 100 000 jobs of Basotho (Gill 1997: 215), and in 
2003 (New) South Africa controlled 61 415 jobs of Basotho (Central Bank of 
Lesotho 2003: 73). 
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According to Spence (1968: 79, 80) the Prime Minister of Lesotho, Chief Leabua 
Jonathan had been on record as strongly opposing sanctions against the 
Republic of South Africa, although in October 1966 during the independence 
talks in London, at a Press Conference, he said that he was principled and not an 
apartheid man. The Prime Minister of the Republic of South Africa, Dr Verwoerd 
had to be diplomatic and assure Chief Leabua Jonathan the Republic's desire for 
friendly relations with Lesotho (Spence 1968: 81). 
The year 1966 came in with the constitutional crisis (Spence 1968: 79) and the 
Prime Minister deported eight South African refugees. Chief Leabua Jonathan, 
coming back from Lancaster House Conference introduced four bills into 
Parliament the: Emergency Powers Bill, Internal Security Bill, Printing and 
Publishing Bill, and Societies Bill. The bills caused countrywide discomfort among 
the BCP and the MFP people and they organized a joint protest meeting that was 
held in Maseru on 11 September 1966. The meeting resolved to write a petition 
to the King and the British Government and the petition indicated that the old 
Basutoland National Council had rejected the Societies Bill as undesirable. 
However, Chief Leabua Jonathan went ahead and enacted the four Bills 
(Khaketla 1971: 142, 143). 
The King had been campaigning to get public support so that his powers, 
including control of the military, could be increased in the constitution. On the 27 
December 1966 the Prime Minister through his Police Mobile Unit (PMU), the 
para-military troops stopped the King's last 'pitso' or public gathering and the 
result was bloodshed and deaths (Khaketla 1971: 147). On 28 December 1966 
the King was suspected to be under house arrest and the Prime Minister never 
confirmed that when a member of the King's Privy Council, Mr Khaketla, 
investigated the matter (Khaketla 1971: 148, 149). The King's 'pitsos' used to be 
very big and it was suspected that the BCP gave him support (Gill 1997: 217). 
The climax of the King's power struggle was reached in October 1967 when the 
Prime Minister attempted to force the King to either support his government 
positively or choose between exile and abdication (Gill 1997: 217). The Prime 
Minister did not get support from the Principal Chiefs and as a result the 
proposition of exile or abdication failed. 
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In the first five years after independence the BCP penetrated the rural 
constituencies, where it was weak before 1965 election, and it built up its 
membership (Gill 1997: 219). According to Leeman (1985: 95) Mokhehle, the 
leader of the BCP, said that, since the electorate were mostly peasants, the BCP 
used "short, itemized manifestos" to enable candidates and field workers to 
expound on them as they found fit and applicable, and that approach was 
exercised in the 1960, 1965 and 1970 elections. Khaketla who ultimately broke 
away to form Freedom Party did not support that style; Ntsukunyane Mphanya 
supporting Mokhehle's idea added that if there were no talks about soil, the 
peasants could not want to listen (Leeman 1985: 95). 
Moleleki (1994: 137) said "BCP ha se Lekhotla le ratang ho joetsa-joetsa 
sechaba hore na ho hotle bakeng la sona ke ho fe". In English, Moleleki's 
statement said that the BCP was not an organization that practiced dictating to 
the people what could be good for them; instead the BCP could be pleased to get 
demands from the people, and it was the reason why from 1952 the BCP used to 
prepare very few items to tell the masses; and it used a few items in preparation 
to beat the BNP in the 1970 election (Moleleki 1994: 137). 
Still in the preparations for the 1965 election, Khaketla (1971: 173, 174) said that 
the leader of the MFP, Dr Makotoko wanted to compromise the work of the party 
by giving more attention to his surgery and postponing party general annual 
conferences (AGMs) of 1965, 1966 and 1967, and party political campaigns 
(Khaketla 1971:173). Dr Makotoko was replaced with Mr Ts'epo Mohaleroe who 
discovered that in the villages where the MFP used to reign, the BCP had taken 
over the members who said that they deserted the MFP because they did not see 
their leaders (Khaketla 1971: 170). In preparation for the 1965 election the BCP 
leader and the BNP leader toured the whole country three times (Khaketla 1971: 
173). 
The period before the 1970 election was indeed a testing one for the ruling party 
to show that it could lead Lesotho somewhere, maybe towards economic 
independence and also for the opposition parties it was advantageous to building 
themselves up and working as a constructive opposition by criticizing the 
government and so on, or building themselves through pinpointing the 
weaknesses of the ruling party. For both the ruling party and for the opposition 
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the period had advantages and disadvantages. The big question that still had to 
be answered was whether political participation declined in the period after the 
year1960. 
The 1970 general election was held on 27 January 1970 (Southall ca.1995: 110), 
(Khaketla 1971: 207). The Prime Minister and his clique excluded many of 
legitimate the BNP party leaders from the list of candidates for election (Maqutu 
in Rembe and Kalula 1990: 268). From 28 January to 29 January 1970 Radio 
Lesotho announced the election results and had always been the BCP or the 
BNP, and that continued until the results stood at 23: 23; since then there was 
complete blackout for further results (Khaketla 1971:210, 211), (Moleleki 
1994:142, 143). Finally the BCP had won the greatest number of constituencies: 
BCP 36; BNP 23; and MFP 1 (Gill 1997: 220), (Khaketla 1971: 211), (Southall 
ca.1995: 111). 
Khaketla (1971: 207) stated that the Prime Minister had announced over Radio 
Lesotho on 28 and 29 January that the election had been conducted in an 
atmosphere of peace and quiet throughout the country. However, after receiving 
strong opposition from his Cabinet of Ministers on his intention to handover 
power to the BCP and resign, the Prime Minister on 30 January 1970 announced 
that he had seized power, that he was not ashamed of it, even though it might 
appear undemocratic, because he had people behind him; and he declared 
Lesotho in a state of emergency and also he announced suspension of the 
national constitution (Gill 1997: 221), (Khaketla 1971: 207, 208,212), (Matlosa 
1997: 143), (Matlosa 2000: 7), (Southall ca.1995:111). Ntsu Mokhehle leader of 
the BCP, Mohau Mokitimi and Pelesana Mofelehetsi leaders of the Youth 
League, and two others were the first to be arrested (Moleleki 1994: 143) and 
thereafter other party leaders and hundreds of the BCP members also were 
arrested. 
In the years that followed the PMU, the BNP party fanatics and their Youth 
League made life horrible, with the implementation of the reign of terror, for 
anyone who protested (Gill 1997:221), (Khaketla 1971:267 - 291) and for any 
other BCP supporters especially in the villages. The BCP civil servants were 
dismissed in big numbers and much of the party leadership (Gill 1997:222) and 
supporters went in exile and on the other hand the BNP tightened security in the 
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country (Gill 1997:222). Ntsu Mokhehle was released from detention on the 31 
December 1971 (Moleleki 1994: 149). 
According to Gill (1997: 221) Leabua Jonathan declared a five-year moratorium 
on politics stating that the Westminster system was not in tune with Lesotho's 
traditions and would need to be modified to meet Lesotho's requirements. In 
1973 an Interim National Assembly was established with the mandate of 
developing a new constitution of Lesotho and its establishment caused a division 
within the BCP where a faction led by the deputy leader, Gerard Ramoreboli 
joined the Assembly and the leader Ntsu Mokhehle and his followers refused to 
join anything less than a true coalition government (Gill 1997: 221). In July 1974 
the BCP launched the Lesotho Liberation Army (LLA) that operated mainly from 
Qwaqwa and Transkei against the BNP government (Leeman 1985: 77), 
(Leeman 1984: 425), (Moleleki 1994: 229), (Mphanya 2004: 93), (Southall 
ca.1995: 111). 
The Internal Security Act of 1974 provided for detention of government 
opponents for up to sixty days without trial and without access to lawyers 
(Maqutu in Rembe and Kalula 1990: 267) and this, together with threats made, 
caused the BCP members to go out on exile and to take up arms again (Maqutu 
in Rembe and Kalula 1990: 267). The so-called "Likhetho-mohlolo" (meaning 
miracle election) was held in September 1985; all the opposition parties had 
boycotted it and the BNP took all the seats without opposition (Gill 1997: 239). 
This bogus election had excluded many of the legitimate BNP leaders (Maqutu in 
Rembe and Kalula 1990: 268). 
According to Leeman (1984: 88) the World Bank report states that in the 1980s 
about 60% of the Basotho labour force worked in South Africa mostly as migrant 
labourers on short-term contracts. About 200,000 to 300,000 Basotho out of a 
population of 1.2 million were employed in South Africa and 40% of them were 
mineworkers. These migrant labourers do not have enough time to be with their 
families. Leeman asserts that thousands had long settled in South Africa and 
they regard Lesotho as their home. Further Leeman contends that from the early 
20th century Lesotho had been a labour reserve society for South Africa. Also the 
annual migration of such great numbers of the able-bodied people gave Lesotho 
a lasting problem, which continued to plague her. So, Basotho both at home and 
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in South Africa have been faced with multi-pronged problems, cultural, social, 
economic and political. 
Tensions within the BNP grew stronger when the leftwing radicals, within the the 
BNP allied to the ANC and the Eastern Bloc, gained control over the BNP 
through its Youth League and certain sections of the army and village militia (Gill 
1997: 239). Daniel et al (1999: 138) states that when Jonathan had somersaulted 
against working with Pretoria, a radical faction, that supported him within the BNP 
attempted to transform the BNP Youth League into an alternative military force. 
The BNP government replaced the Internal Security Act of 1974 with Internal 
Security Act of 1984 (Maqutu in Rembe and Kalula 1990: 280). The BNP left-
wing radicals believed that the BNP could entrench itself in power and ultimately 
establish a socialist state. South Africa could not entertain a pro-ANC 
government in Lesotho (Gill 1997: 240). In January 1986 South Africa instituted a 
border blockade that caused a crisis in Lesotho that ended up with a military coup 
on 20 January 1986 lead by Major General Metsing Lekhanya (Gill 1997: 240). 
A military Council was established and Order No.2 of the Council placed 
appointed Ministers under the Military Councillors to serve as advisors of the 
Military Council; the Monarchy was trapped and could not bring democracy or 
govern effectively because all the power was in the military (Maqutu in Rembe 
and Kalula 1990: 273). On 26 January 1986, the Military Junta deported sixty, 60, 
ANC activists and detained another fifty, 50, South African refugees who also 
later had to leave (Makoa in Rembe and Kalula 1997: 291). In 1990 the National 
Constituent Assembly was established for the purpose of making 
recommendations on the new constitution (Gill 1997: 243). The Military Council 
passed Lesotho Order No.4 of 1986, which banned political activities (Gill 1997: 
244). 
In 1991 junior military officers, under the leadership of Colonel (later Major 
General) Phisoana Ramaema, toppled the Military Government (Gill 1997: 244). 
In 1992 the Electoral Commission was established to supervise the process of 
election that was about to be held in 1992, but finally held in 1993 (Gill 1997: 
246). The talks on reconciliation between the Military Government and the 
organization of Heads of Churches of Lesotho (HCL) established in the 1980s, 
went on up to 1988 (Maqutu in Rembe and Kalula 1990: 302) and the return, in 
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early 1987, of Mr Ntsu Mokhehle and others from exile was attributed to the HCL 
(Gill 1997: 240). 
The general election was finally held in March 1993 with the BCP achieving a 
landslide victory (Daniel et al 1999: 136). The second General Election after the 
era of authoritarian military rule came in 1998. The opposition political parties did 
not accept the results of the election and as a result political crisis followed 
culminating in the process of inquiry by a Commission from SADC. Worst of all, 
the problems ended up with the burning of business facilities, shops, looting in 
Maseru, Mafeteng and Mohale's Hoek, and burning of residential places of some 
of the members of the ruling party, bloodshed and deaths. Upon request by the 
Prime Minister, Pakalitha Mosisili, SADC sent military troops to intervene. 
In November 1998 the Interim Political Authority (IPA) Act was passed and in 
December the IPA was established. It comprised representatives of the 
registered political parties, twelve in number. The IPA made recommendations 
that included a new electoral model, Mixed-Member Proportional (MMP). In May 
2002, the general election was held for the first time with MMP and eighteen 
registered political parties placed candidates for the general election. 
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Appendix 3 
Sample of constituencies 
Constituency No. Constituency Name Random Number 
2 Hololo 24202 
3 Motete 12003 
5 Butha-Buthe 56005 
8 Thaba-Phatsoa 11208 
20 Nokong 80320 
22 Mahlatsa 44222 
25 Pulane 19325 
26 Thupa-Kubu 21926 
29 Mabote 67529 
32 Maseru 6332 
35 Lithabaneng 74235 
42 Qeme 28042 
43 Rothe 48943 
50 Maliepetsane 5950 
52 Thabana-Morena 3252 
53 Likhoele 15553 
57 Qhalasi 38157 
58 Mohale's Hoek 35558 
59 Mekaling 19259 
62 Ketane 63162 
68 Qhoali 41068 
71 Tsoelike 33971 
75 Semena 97375 
78 Senqu 19878 
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Appendix 4 
Selected opposition political party officials 
Interviewee Opposition Political Party Abbreviation 
Matete, R. B a s oth o Nat i o n al Party BNP 
Mphanya, N. B a sutoland Congress Party BCP 
Malebo, V. M a re m at io u F reedom Party MFP 
Maope, K. L e sotho P e o p l e ' s Congress LPC 
Peete, P. N at i o n a l P ro g res s ive Party NPP 
Makoa, T. Lesotho Educational Party LEP 
Rakuoane, L. P o p u i a r Front Fo r Democracy PFD 
Ralitapole, K. B a s utoland African Congress BAC 
Mpela, T. L e s ot h o L a b o u r Party LLP 
Leneha, R. Lesotho Workers' Party LWP 
Majara, A. New Lesotho Freedom Party NLFP 




I). Moeketse Malebo 15/12/2004 
Malebo is the leader of the MFP. I interviewed him of 15 December 2004. 
QUESTIONNAIRE 
1. i) Since 1993, have the opposition political parties gone weak in Lesotho? If 
the answer is yes, in your opinion, what is the most important cause? 
Answer: (a) Since 1992 a great majority of people looked up to Mokhehle as the 
messiah who would save them from poverty and unemployment. Many people 
had strong belief in him, adored him, and in their minds developed an ideology of 
Congress-ism. It is difficult for the new parties to establish themselves when an 
old one is already well established. (b) Lack of party political funding. (c) Lack of 
grass roots organization and finance by political parties. 
ii) What could be the remedy to overcome the above-mentioned weakness? 
Answer: (a) The Mokhehle era, of Congress-ism is over and a change is 
imminent. 
(b) The political parties must be financed. (c) Well-planned organizational 
campaigns at grass roots level are essential. 
2. Where is your permanent residence? Please give the name of the village or 
town and constituency in the table below. 
Village/Town Constituency name 
Maseru West Machache 
3. Indicate the name of your political party in the table below: 
Name of political party Abbreviation 
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Name of political party Abbreviation 
Marematlou Freedom Party MFP 
4.What is membership of your political party? 
5001-10 000 10 001-15 000 15 001-20 000 20 001 - 30 000 30 001-50 000 >50 001 
V 
5. In three months how many times do you hold public meetings in the 
constituency? 
0 1 to 2 2 to 3 3 to 4 4 to 6 Other 
(Specify) 
V 
6.i) Does your party constitution provide any clause/s on the disclosure of party 
finances and their usages? 















i) Did your political party get into coalition or alliance of any kind with 




Comment on Answer (i) above: The alliance began in 1998 and continued into 
2002 up to the time of election. 
ii) If the answer is yes to i) above, answer the following question: Which 
kind/s of coalition/alliance did your party establish with another/other 
party/s? Tick as many boxes as appropriate. 
Electoral Executive/ Minority Legislative United Mergers 
Alliance Cabinet Executive Coalition Front /Other 
(For Coalition Coalition (For Alliance (Name the 
elections) ( F o r gaining (Being in the supporting (For other) 
majority seats minority, ruling party on resolving 
to control support the various issues the conflict) 
cabinet cabinet in in 
responsible to parliamentary parliamentary 
parliamentary debates). debates). 
majority) 
V 
iii) Do you think that the use of political coalitions/alliances can 
strengthen electoral political participation of opposition parties in 
Lesotho? 
Strongly agree Agree Neutral Disagree Strongly 
disagree 
V 
8. How has Mixed Member Proportional (MMP) electoral system affected 
political participation of the opposition parties in Lesotho? 
Very 
negatively 
Negatively No change Positively Very positively 
V 
9. Do you think poverty has an impact on electoral political participation of 




Disagree Neutral Agree Strongly agree 
V 
10. Below is given a list of possible causes of weak electoral political 
participation of opposition political parties in Lesotho. Please rank these 
possible causes by writing numbers, 1) to 16), in the boxes against them; 
the most important cause must be labelled 1, the second 2, and so on. 
1) Internal divisions and in-fighting conflicts 5 D 
2) Lack of transparency of the electoral system D 
3) The ballot system used D 
4) Lack of democracy, in general, of the Electoral system D 
5) Lack of party political funding 1 D 
6) Lack of efficient leadership 6 D 
7) Government making it difficult for the opposition parties 7 D 
8) The role of the military D 
9) Poverty 2 D 
10) Lack of transparency within the political parties 8 D 
11) Lack of freedom D 
12) Lack of fairness D 
13) Insufficient voter education 
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3 D 
14) Lack of understanding of politics 
15) Illegitimacy of elections 




More comments made by Malebo, M. 
10(2): Malebo commenting on Question 10(2) said that the electoral system 
could not be the cause of the problem of the opposition political parties because it 
is very transparent. He said that the IEC is very transparent; it has very good 
regulations, it gives information to parties prior to doing things. According to him 
the electoral system is very democratic because it allows people who did not 
stand for elections to take seats and participate in Parliament. 
10(3): On Question 10 (3) Malebo said that the ballot system could not be the 
cause of the problem of the opposition political parties. He said that it is, 
however, an unnecessary expense. He suggested that it could be done on plane 
paper with a watermark, and that only the name be written. According to him the 
current system is wasteful, even though it is correct. He further suggested that 
this item be removed from the list of causes. 
Malebo emphasized that he could not categorize items: 10 (2), (3) and (4), that 
are related to the electoral system and the ballot system. He argued that the 
electoral system is very democratic, because it allows women and the disabled 
people to be members of Parliament. 
10(9): Talking about item 10 (9), poverty, Malebo called it a double-wedged knife. 
He said that on the one side of the blade the poor of the poorest do not go to 
vote, He said that those who cannot afford a morsel of bread do not bother to 
vote. On the other side of the blade, people who still have hope of survival, and 
those who still have some water and a little food need to be financed; that is why 
the MFP has budgeted for them. According to the leader of the MFP, the party 
should get funding in order to establish projects for the public, and the party 
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mechanism should see to it that projects are a success. The funding should not 
be free-giving, "liphallelo". 
10(13): About item 10(13), Malebo said that IEC does not answer the question 
"Why do people vote?" it only deceives people. He said that sound voter 
education is required, that teaches people why they vote and not how to vote. 
10(14): About lack of understanding of politics, the leader of MFP said that 
people were poisoned. The problem was that the party members adore the 
political leader, for example, the leader of the BCP was Prime Minister for more 
than five years, although, he assumed his position already ill and weak so much 
that he could not do efficient work. 
10(16): Malebo commented that there is no difference between country and town, 
because all over in the countryside, like in the towns, there are found all sorts of 
people, for example teachers are found in both these places. He therefore cut out 
this item from the possible list of causes of the problem of weakness of 
opposition political parties. 
10(12): The leader of the MFP said that fairness is always there. He said that 
there is party representation in the IEC that will stay for all the five years. For 
these reasons he removed this item from the list of possible causes of the 
problem. 
10(11): According to Malebo, people are very free, and therefore he removed 
this item from the possible list of causes of the problem. 
10(10): The leader of the MFP said that there is lack of transparency within the 
political parties because of the inefficiencies of the Press. He pointed out that, 
some of the newspapers are owned by the political parties, so that in general the 
Press favours various political parties and as a result reporting, about the 
proprietor political party, is not always accurate. 
By-elections: Commenting on the by-elections, Malebo said that many Basotho 
have no understanding of politics, because they say that the government is in 
place already, so there is no need of voting in the by-elections. Malebo said that, 
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with minimal effort it should be possible to place a candidate, but there is no 
campaigning and also lack of funds contributes a lot to the problem. 
According to Malebo, on the other hand government has money, and the 
Ministers use government vehicles and the ruling party has the upper hand 
during campaigning period. Malebo mentioned that, although the ruling party 
wins, it also gets a low score because many people do not vote because their 
belief is that "they already had elected a government what else could be 
demanded of them?" as mentioned above. Malebo said that the second reason 
why the ruling party gets a low score is due to dissatisfaction of the Members of 
Parliament of the ruling party. 
General comments of the leader of the MFP: 
"Parliamentarians get interest free loans and this is likely to cause problems in 
the future, and it makes it difficult for the Prime Minister to replace such people" 
(Malebo: Interview 15/12/2004). Malebo mentioned that when parliamentarians 
have got these loans it is not easy to replace them, even by elections, before they 
can pay back their loans. 
Malebo stated that in 1965 opposition political parties occupied 29 seats with on-
the-ground support of 60% of voters, and the ruling party had 31 seats with on-
the-ground support of 40% of voters. 
Malebo mentioned that he, having been in Parliament twice, in 1998 and then 
currently (from 2002), noticed that it is difficult to understand the reason for 
elections. According to him, the Lesotho Parliament is like 'a mickey mouse' or 
mockery. Malebo stated that for thirty years the opposition raised no good 
opposition in Parliament. Malebo mentioned that the Parliament did not have 
committees and that comparatively Botswana was far ahead. He emphasized 
that the Parliamentary Reform Committee is a must, and that there must be 
Parliamentary committees. He said that the former committees were not effective. 
He said that they had begun establishing effective committees. 
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II). Lekhetho Rakuoane 16/12/2004 
Rakuoane is the leader of the PFD. I interviewed him of 16 December 2004. 
QUESTIONNAIRE 
1. i) Since 1993, have the opposition political parties gone weak in Lesotho? 
If the answer is yes, in your opinion, what is the most important cause? 
The leader of the PFD, Rakuoane said that he had two reasons why opposition 
political parties seemed to be weak: (a) there was no democracy, and (b) that the 
main opposition political party was not ready to play its role in Parliament. 
(a) Rakuoane argued that for a long time in Lesotho there was no democracy, so 
much that a culture of no democracy had developed. Under those circumstances 
people do not want to be in the opposition, everybody fights to be in the ruling 
position. Rakuoane said that on the ground the opposition was about 6% less 
than the ruling party, the LCD. 
(b) The main opposition party, the BNP, is not ready to play its role in 
Parliament, instead it is always complaining about the voter turnout. According to 
Rakuoane, for this reason, the small parties cannot support the main opposition 
party. Rakuoane said, in short, that there is no unity. 
ii) What could be the remedy to overcome the above-mentioned weakness? 
Rakuoane stated that the remedy to the above situation is sustainability of the 
democratic process that has just started, as it will change the culture and 
eventually the role of the opposition political parties will be clearer. Finally 
Rakuoane said that unity of opposition political parties will be enabled. 
Rakuoane gave an example of what the opposition political parties could do in 
the 2005 local government elections where there was an opportunity of placing 
1000 candidates; opposition parties could unite and get lots of seats. Rakuoane 
mentioned that those local government elections would be a yardstick for testing 
or predicting the performance of the opposition political parties in the 2007 
general elections. Rakuoane said that it was unfortunate that Lesotho is a poor 
country, and that if a Councillor could earn M500 per month he would be like in 
full time employment. 
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2. Where is your permanent residence? Please give the name of the village 
or town and constituency in the table below. 
Village/Town Constituency name 
Mants'onyane Mants'onyane 
3. Indicate the name of your political party in the table below: 
Name of political party Abbreviation 
Popular Front for Democracy 
(Khoetsa ea Sechaba sa Basotho) 
PFD 
4. What is membership of your political party? 
5001-10 000 10 001-15 000 15 001-20 000 20 001 - 30 000 30001-50 000 >50 001 
V 
5. In three months how many times do you hold public meetings in the 
constituency? 
0 1 to 2 2 to 3 3 to 4 4 to 6 Other 
(Specify) 
V 
6. i) Does your party constitution provide any clause/s on the disclosure of 
party finances and their usages? 
No, it does not Yes, it does Other answer (Specify) 
V 
ii) If the answer is 'Yes' in i) above, how often are disclosure reports given 
to the public? 
Every 3 
months 







1. Did your political party get into coalition or alliance of any kind with 
another/other political party/s in the period '1993 - 2006'? 
Yes No 
V 
2. If the answer is yes to i) above, answer the following question: 
Which kind/s of coalition/alliance did your party establish with 
another/other party/s? Tick as many boxes as appropriate. 
Electoral Executive/ Minority Legislative United Mergers 
Alliance Cabinet Executive Coalition Front /Other 
(For Coalition Coalition (For Alliance (Name the 
elections) ( F or gaining (Being in the supporting (For other) 
majority seats minority, ruling party on resolving 
to control support the various issues the 
cabinet cabinet in in conflict) 
responsible to parliamentary parliamentary 
parliamentary debates). debates). 
majority) 
V V V V 
3. Do you think that the use of political coalitions/alliances can 
strengthen electoral political participation of opposition parties in 
Lesotho? 
Strongly agree Agree Neutral Disagree Strongly 
disagree 
V 
8. How has Mixed Member Proportional (MMP) electoral system affected 
political participation of the opposition parties in Lesotho? 





Negatively No change Positively Very positively 
V 
9. Do you think poverty has an impact on electoral political participation of 
opposition parties in Lesotho? 
Strongly 
disagree 
Disagree Neutral Agree Strongly agree 
V 
10. Below is given a list of possible causes of weak electoral political 
participation of opposition political parties in Lesotho. Please rank these 
possible causes by writing numbers, 1) to 16), in the boxes against them; 
the most important cause must be labelled 1, the second 2, and so on. 
(1) Internal divisions and in-fighting conflicts 3 D 
(2) Lack of transparency of the electoral system 1 0 D 
(3) The ballot system used D 
(4) Lack of democracy, in general, of the Electoral system 9 D 
(5) Lack of party political funding 4 D 
(6) Lack of efficient leadership 1 D 
(7) Government making it difficult for the opposition parties 5 D 
(8) The role of the military D 
(9) Poverty 2 D 
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(10) Lack of transparency within the political parties 8 D 
(11) Lack of freedom 13D 
(12) Lack of fairness 1 1 D 
(13) Insufficient voter education 7 D 
(14) Lack of understanding of politics 6 D 
(15) Illegitimacy of elections 12D 
(16) Party strength is built up either in towns or countryside only 1 4 D 
General comments of the leader of the PFD: 
In connection with question no.7, Rakuoane stated that, 
7(1): Alliances/Coalitions: During the 1993 general elections had 
established an electoral alliance with the Kopanang Basotho Party (KBP), and 
that PFD had always been in alliance with the Communist Party of Lesotho 
(CPL) and the candidates of the CPL stood for elections as the PFD 
candidates; 
7(2): Alliances/Coalitions: the PFD with a few other opposition political 
parties, under the umbrella of an alliance popularly known as 'Khokanyana-
ea-Phiri', had informal alliance with the ruling party, the Lesotho Congress for 
Democracy (LCD) during the time of the Independent Political Authority (IPA) 
- an extra parliamentary body. Rakuoane stated that the Khokanyana-ea-Phiri 
was a legislative coalition. 
7(3): Alliances/Coalitions: After 2002 elections, the PFD supported the 
ruling party on changing the Parliamentary 5th Amendment of powers of Public 
Service Commission. That was another case of legislative alliance, however, 
it was only on that parliamentary motion. 
8: MMP: In response to question number 8, the PFD Leader, stated the their 
small political party has its leader heading the Parliamentary Reform 
Committee. Rakuoane, also, mentioned that in the Pan-African Parliament, 
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Lesotho is the only country that has representatives of four, 4, political parties, 
while other countries have a maximum of two, 2, parties represented. 
9: Poverty: Responding to question number 9, Rakuoane said that poverty 
adversely affects people. The PFD Leader stated that people vote for the 
ruling party in order to secure their jobs and the unemployed people vote to 
get jobs. According to Rakuoane, political parties are not able to establish and 
run party offices due to lack of funds. Rakuoane mentioned that, under such 
circumstances, it is difficult to do party work efficiently. Rakuoane said that 
government should provide enough political party funding, and Rakuoane 
stated that there is comparatively better political party funding in South Africa 
and in Zimbabwe. According to Rakuoane, in Lesotho, a ruling party 
patronizes the masses, and the opposition parties usually find it difficult to get 
good support from the masses. 
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III). Kelebone Maope 24/12/2004 
Mr Maope is the leader of the LPC and I interviewed him on 24 December 
2004, in the morning. 
QUESTIONNAIRE 
1. i) Since 1993, have the opposition political parties gone weak in Lesotho? 
If the answer is yes, in your opinion, what is the most important cause? 
Quoting Maope, in the interview, he said: "the BNP ruled badly, in the opinion of 
people, for a long time and people got polarized". Maope said that people's views 
switched to the other extreme, of peace, and that it was still the state of affairs. 
According to him the electors chose one party and rejected the other, and as 
such there was still no room for other parties to win enough supporters. 
Maope mentioned that another setback was that there were no means of 
communication to reach out to the people. He said that the media were weak and 
as an example, he said that one hardly sees media people in Parliament. He said 
that political parties lack resources. 
ii) What could be the remedy to overcome the above-mentioned cause of 
weakness? 
Maope said that the solution was in the hands of the electors, that is, when they 
begin to feel that they are ruled badly, they will give room to the views of other 
parties, and they will change their opinions and begin to support views of these 
other parties. Maope said that it was an evolutionary process. 
Maope further mentioned that if there could be solutions to the above-mentioned 
problems, then, there could be a change of people's attitudes towards the 
opposition political parties. 
Maope stated that democracy in Lesotho assumes that political parties have a 
role to play, and that even the constitution allows for that, but the rulers neglected 
those facts. According to Maope, there is need for the rulers to change their 
attitudes, and to avail the resources to the political parties. Maope said that the 
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electoral model is still not fair, and the remedy is to move to PR model. According 
to Maope, the Arbitration Award said that there was an agreement in Lesotho to 
move First Past the Post (FPP) seats to be equal to Proportional Representation 
(PR) seats in the next general election of 2007 
2. Where is your permanent residence? Please give the name of the village 
or town and constituency in the table below. 
Village/Town Constituency name 
Ha Maope Seqonoka 
3. Indicate the name of your political party in the table below: 
Name of political party Abbreviation 
Lesotho People's Congress LPC 
4. What is membership of your political party? 
5001-10 000 10 001-15 000 15 001-20 000 20 001 - 30 000 30 001-50 000 >50 001 
V 
5. In three months how many times do you hold public meetings in the 
constituency? 
0 1 to 2 2 to 3 3 to 4 4 to 6 Other 
(Specify) 
V 
6. i) Does your party constitution provide any clause/s on the disclosure of 
party finances and their usages? 





Maope says that there is no clause of disclosure, but the books are audited and 
during the Annual General Meeting (AGM) the disclosure is made to the party 
delegates and thereafter the delegates get back to report to the members in the 
constituencies and branches. 
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ii) If the answer is 'Yes' in i) above, how often are disclosure reports given 











i. Did your political party form a coalition/alliance of any kind with 
another/other political party/s in the period '1993 -2006'? 
Yes No 
V 
ii. If the answer is yes to i) above, answer the following question: 
Which kind/s of coalition/alliance did your party establish with 
another/other party/s? Tick as many boxes as appropriate. 
Electoral Executive/ Minority Legislative United Mergers 
Alliance Cabinet Executive Coalition Front /Other 
(For Coalition Coalition (For Alliance (Name the 
elections) ( For gaining (Being in the supporting (for driving other) 
majority seats to minority, ruling party on towards a 
control a cabinet support the various issues common 
responsible to cabinet in in goal) 
parliamentary parliamentary parliamentary 
majority) debates). debates). 
iii. Do you think that the use of political coalitions/alliances can 
strengthen electoral political participation of opposition parties in 
Lesotho? 




According to Maope people go to elections in order to get jobs. Maope said that 
he strongly agreed as a principle, and that in Lesotho the opposition political 
parties are so weak that, such a principle cannot be used successfully. 
8. How has Mixed Member Proportional (MMP) electoral system affected 
political participation of the opposition parties in Lesotho? 
Very 
negatively 
Negatively No change Positively Very positively 
V 
According to Maope Lesotho's democracy assumes that political parties have a 
role to play, and even the constitution allows for that, but the rulers ignore this 
situation. So, there is need for the rulers to change their attitudes and to avail the 
resources to the political parties. 
9. Do you think poverty has an impact on electoral political participation of 
opposition parties in Lesotho? 
Strongly 
disagree 
Disagree Neutral Agree Strongly agree 
V 
Maope says that the system does not allow candidates to represent the 
constituencies effectively. Candidates fear to criticize the government in fear of 
losing the jobs, as it happens in Lesotho. 
10. Below is given a list of possible causes of weak electoral political 
participation of opposition political parties in Lesotho. Please rank these 
possible causes by writing numbers, 1) to 16), in the boxes against them; 
the most important cause must be labelled 1, the second 2, and so on. 
1. Internal divisions and in-fighting conflicts 
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1 3 D 
2. Lack of transparency of the electoral system 6 0 
3. The ballot system used 
4. Lack of democracy, in general, of the Electoral system 4 0 
5. Lack of party political funding 1 1 D 
6. Lack of efficient leadership 
1 2 D 
7. Government making it difficult for the opposition parties 5 D 
8. The role of the military 1 3 D 
9. Poverty 1 • 
10. Lack of transparency within the political parties 
16D 
11. Lack of freedom 2 D 
12. Lack of fairness 
8 D 
13. Insufficient voter education 1 0 D 
14. Lack of understanding of politics 3 D 
15. Illegitimacy of elections 9 D 
16. Party strength is built up either in towns or country side only 1 5 D 
General comments of the leader of the LPC 
Maope said that the ruling party does not use the electoral model as it was 
agreed upon. Maope said, as an example, that candidates of the opposition 
parties are denied certain benefits such "constituency benefits". So, they 
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cannot perform effectively. Maope further said that the responsibility of the 
parliamentarians from the opposition political parties is much greater than that 
of the parliamentarians of the ruling party, because they look after all the 
constituencies and not only single constituencies, and give reports to these 
constituencies. In other words the LCD government did not accept the MMP 
system, and it is like they were forced into it. 
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IV) Mr Ntsukunyane Mphanya 25/12/2004 
Mr Mphanya is the leader of the BCP. I interviewed him on 25 December 2004. 
QUESTIONNAIRE 
1. i) Since 1993, have the opposition political parties gone weak in Lesotho? If 
the answer is yes, in your opinion, what is the most important cause? 
Mphanya said that the opposition political parties are weak and that it is not their 
fault, the fault lies with the government because the government is weak and it is 
difficult to criticize a weak government especially when it is entrenched and he 
gave the following reasons: 
a) This government is not original; it took over from another, they 
did not start this thing (problem). 
b) Government has no policy that opposition political parties can 
criticize. 
c) Government relies on foreign powers to do its business in the 
country. 
d) Government of a poor country is unfortunate because politicians 
look for their opportunities more than the public interests, and it 
is like that in Lesotho. 
e) This government works hard to establish capitalist elite out of 
social structures. Also, the leaders of the ruling party are in the 
forefront of this elite. 
Because of these reasons, the Parliamentary Bills they, government, table in 
parliament are not clear. The Government is confused in the sense that it does 
not know whether what it does is in the public interest or not. 
ii) What could be the remedy to overcome the above-mentioned cause of 
weakness? 
Mphanya came up with the following remedies: 
a) Clear and sound laws: The laws should not be elusive. Mphanya 
said that although in Lesotho land is an important economic asset, it 
is not known who regulates the use of land, as an example, all of 
the following Ministries have authority on the regulation of land, 
170 
Ministries of Agriculture, Education, Home Affairs, Local 
Government, Tourism, and Communication. Mphanya said that 
when the Ministry of Agriculture plans to use a piece of land, one 
may not be surprised to find housing going on there or a school or a 
mining industry coming up there. According to Mphanya there is no 
clear law on the use of land in Lesotho. Parliament must be in a 
position to make sound laws. There must be places for farming, 
crop or animal farming, housing, and so on. 
b) There should be clear policies. 
c) About other remedies Mphanya said that other remedies could be 
found in his book of 2004, "A brief history of the Basutoland 
Congress Party". 
2. Where is your permanent residence? Please give the name of the village 
or town and constituency in the table below. 
Village/Town Constituency name 
Ha Mphanya Mapoteng in Nokong 
constituency 
Bela-Bela 
3. Indicate the name of your political party in the table below: 
Name of political party Abbreviation 
Basutoland Congress Party BCP 
Mphanya said that the name of BCP is still Basutoland Congress Party, because 
in the past Basotho residents were in Lesotho that was the present Free State, 
up to Qwaqwa and chief Mopeli reported, in the past and even today, to Thaba-
Bosiu. During the colonial period, the colonizers called a piece of Lesotho, 
Basutoland. So, what is over there now is not Lesotho but Basutoland. According 
to Mphanya that is why they wanted to regain the ceded land. That was why in 
1912 when ANC was established, the Paramount Chief of Lesotho, Letsie, was a 
member. 
4. What is membership of your political party? 
5001-10 000 10 001-15 000 15 001-20 000 20 001 - 30 000 30 001-50 000 >50 001 
V 
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Mphanya said that splits of the party had a negative impact on the party 
membership, because a number of party members got confused and 
disarrayed. However, there is still a big number of party supporters. 
5. In three months how many times do you hold public meetings in the 
constituency? 





Mphanya said that meetings are held every Thursday of the week because they 
include reports of development projects. 
6. i) Does your party constitution provide any clause/s on the disclosure of 
party finances and their usages? 





Mphanya stated that there are four structures of the committees, each part 
dealing with money: Sub-Branch / Village committee; Branch committee; 
Constituency committee, and National Executive committee. According to 
Mphanya the party is aiming at sponsoring the village projects with moneys 
collected from the party buildings, and so on. According to Mphanya the money 
will be invested in Boliba Corporative, and every member of the party will be a 
shareholder. 
Mphanya said that disclosure is made only to members of the party. 
ii) If the answer is 'Yes' in i) above, how often are disclosure reports given 
to the public? 
Every 3 Every 6 Every 12 Other Period 




i. Did your political party form a coalition/alliance of any kind with 
another/other political party/s in the period '1993 -2006'? 
Yes No 
V 
Mphanya said that, negotiations for merger with the former BCP 
breakaway parties are going on. According to him the negotiations 
began in 2003. 
ii. If the answer is yes to i) above, answer the following question: 
Which kind/s of coalition/alliance did your party establish with 
another/other party/s? Tick as many boxes as appropriate. 
Electoral Executive/ Minority Legislative United Mergers 
Alliance Cabinet Executive Coalition Front /Other 
(For Coalition Coalition (For Alliance (Name the 
elections) ( F o r gaining (Being in the supporting (for driving other) 
majority seats to minority, ruling party on towards a 
control a cabinet support the various issues common 
responsible to cabinet in in goal) 
parliamentary parliamentary parliamentary 
majority) debates). debates). 
Do you think that the use of political coalitions/alliances can 
strengthen electoral political participation of opposition parties in 
Lesotho? 
Strongly agree Agree Neutral Disagree Strongly 
disagree 
V 
phanya said 'No' in the case of Lesotho because he argued that in Lesot 
there are three political parties, BCP, BNP and Marema-Tlou with different 
policies. According to him the policies vary from East to West. Mphanya said that 
if BNP sticks to its old policies, it cannot easily be in alliance with BCP, but if it 
can use the latest policies that one of its former leaders, Leabua, had resorted to 
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when they built Lesotho Bank, Agricultural Development Bank, and so on, which 
happened to be BCP policies, then it can be in alliance with BCP. Mphanya said 
that PFD had a policy of BNP because it broke away from BNP established by 
the youth of BNP). 
According to Mphanya the ruling party must be accommodative. The rulers must 
know that the opposition political parties are Basotho and their views must be 
heard. Mphanya said that Botswana has stable government because their 
constitution says that the opposition must be in parliament. 
8. How has Mixed Member Proportional (MMP) electoral system affected 
political participation of the opposition parties in Lesotho? 
Very 
negatively 
Negatively No change Positively Very positively 
V 
According to Mphanya MMP had a negative impact on the opposition political 
parties. The opposition parties were at fault; the question of who were to go to 
parliament was not discussed within the parties. The members of Executive 
committees felt that they had to be in parliament and poverty was the reason why 
they wanted to be in parliament. 
Mphanya said that opposition parties had to talk to their alliances, farmers, 
workers, traditional organizations, corporations, and street vendors. However, the 
opposition political parties did not talk to these supporters who ultimately got 
confused and disappointed. 
9. Do you think poverty has an impact on electoral political participation of 
opposition parties in Lesotho? 
Strongly 
disagree 
Disagree Neutral Agree Strongly agree 
V 
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Mphanya says that Lesotho is a poor country and government does not teach the 
people that when they work they will be freed from poverty, but teaches them to 
rely on donations from outside. The parliamentarians also teach people to build 
up committees to receive donations. The ruling party distributes the donations 
and this affects choice of people. 
Always when elections are close, instead of developing Agriculture, government 
brings in food, clothing, and so on, the donations from outside. So, people will 
vote for the government that gives them food. Donations are given to ruling party 
members who can certify that by producing membership cards. That recently, in 
November 2005, happened in Nokong constituency, and Red Cross cancelled 
the offer after getting the report. In the village of Mapoteng, there are senior 
citizens aged and disabled, 90 years of age, and also who do not get these 
donations. So, these donations are dangerous because they are not fairly 
distributed. These donations must be distributed by neutral bodies like the Red 
Cross, churches, chiefs directly and not by political parties. All political parties 
must have a say in the request for and distribution of donations. 
10. Below is given a list of possible causes of weak electoral political 
participation of opposition political parties in Lesotho. Please rank these 
possible causes by writing numbers, 1) to 16), in the boxes against them; 
the most important cause must be labelled 1, the second 2, and so on. 
1. Internal divisions and in-fighting conflicts • 
2. Lack of transparency of the electoral system 3 D 
3. The ballot system used 4 D 
4. Lack of democracy, in general, of the Electoral system D 
5. Lack of party political funding 5 D 
6. Lack of efficient leadership • 
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7. Government making it difficult for the opposition parties 6 D 
8. The role of the military D 
9. Poverty 1 • 
10. Lack of transparency within the political parties D 
11. Lack of freedom D 
12. Lack of fairness 7 D 
13. Insufficient voter education 8 D 
14. Lack of understanding of politics 9 D 
15. Illegitimacy of elections D 
16. Party strength is built up either in towns or country side only 2 D 
Answering question 10(16), Mphanya said that 85% of Basotho are in the 
countryside. 
General Comments of the leader of BCP 
According to Mphanya in Lesotho there is need for establishment of a 
constitutional court. Mphanya said that there is a problem of illegitimacy of 
elections, such as in 1998. He further said that the case of Ukrain is like that of 
Lesotho in 1998. According to Mphanya, a poor country is unfortunate because 
military intervention by SADC was not necessary, talks had to be made in order 
to come to an agreement; in Ukrain the law was amended and elections will be 
held on 26 December 2004. Mphanya said that the expectation was that the Pan 
African Parliament would have in it the Pan African Court. 
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V) Dr Khauhelo Raditapole 30/12/2004 
Dr Khauhelo Raditapole is the leader of Basutoland African Congress. I 
interviewed her on 30 December 2004. 
QUESTIONNAIRE 
1. i) Since 1993, have the opposition political parties gone weak in Lesotho? 
If the answer is yes, in your opinion, what is the most important cause? 
There should be three political parties in Lesotho: 
a) The splinter parties are a major cause of the weakness, 
because there are now too many opposition political parties 
failing to pull together. 
b) Poor funding or non-funding of political parties is another 
cause of weakness. The electoral party funding is not enough 
for the opposition political parties. These parties are not able to 
establish institutionalised structures such as the village, 
branch, constituency organizations of the party; and the 
strength of a party is in these structures. These structures 
need funds to be maintained. In the past BCP used to have 
district offices. Lack of these structures causes lack of 
legitimacy of opposition political parties. 
c) Politics of poverty is another cause of weakness of opposition 
political parties. The ruling party can control everything 
because it has money, for example it can control employment. 
So, people support the ruling party for security reasons. 
ii) What could be the remedy to overcome the above-mentioned cause of 
weakness? 
The following could be the remedy: 
a) Reducing the number of splinter groups/parties and having a 
meaningful opposition. 
b) Funding a few parties will be meaningful. 
c) Addressing the issue of poverty. 
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d) Improving the laws so as to facilitate empowering the private 
sector. If the laws can be reviewed, that cause the ruling party to 
control everything, projects and so on, the opposition parties can 
have the opportunity of undertaking projects without frustration. 
For instance, when one attempts to undertake a project and one 
has no identification by government, there will be no success. 
2. Where is your permanent residence? Please give the name of the village 
or town and constituency in the table below. 
Village/Town Constituency name 
Teya-Teyaneng ha Rats'iu Teya-Teyaneng No. 24 
3. Indicate the name of your political party in the table below: 
Name of political party Abbreviation 
Basutoland African Congress B.A.C. 
4. What is membership of your political party? 
5001-10 000 10 001-15 000 15 001-20 000 20 001 - 30 000 30 001-50 000 >50 001 
7 
5. In three months how many times do you hold public meetings in the 
constituency? 
0 1 to 2 2 to 3 3 to 4 4 to 6 Other 
(Specify) 
7 
It is di fficult to comment because main y we hold the party caucuses. We are 
currently building the party. 
6. i) Does your party constitution provide any clause/s on the disclosure of 
party finances and their usages? 





ii) If the answer is 'Yes' in i) above, how often are disclosure reports given 












i. Did your political party form a coalition/alliance of any kind with 
another/other political party/s in the period '1993 -2006'? 
Yes No 
7 
We are currently trying to find out which kind of coalition is 
suitable. 
ii. If the answer is yes to i) above, answer the following question: 
Which kind/s of coalition/alliance did your party establish with 
another/other party/s? Tick as many boxes as appropriate. 
Electoral Executive/ Minority Legislative United Mergers 
Alliance Cabinet Executive Coalition Front /Other 
(For Coalition Coalition (For Alliance (Name the 
elections) ( F o r gaining (Being in the supporting (for driving other) 
majority seats to minority, ruling party on towards a 
control a cabinet support the various issues common 
responsible to cabinet in in goal) 
parliamentary parliamentary parliamentary 
majority) debates). debates). 
iii. Do you think that the use of political coalitions/alliances can 
strengthen electoral political participation of opposition parties in 
Lesotho? 




8. How has Mixed Member Proportional (MMP) electoral system affected 
political participation of the opposition parties in Lesotho? 
Very 
negatively 
Negatively No change Positively Very positively 
V 
The MMP has positively affected the political participation of the opposition 
political parties. However, we have not yet taken the advantage of the system 
because we still have the old attitudes. For example, the opposition political 
parties wrote an invitation letter requesting the Secretary General of the Common 
Wealth to invite old (with respect to use of the system) countries like New 
Zealand to send people to Lesotho to give their experiences of the system to 
Basotho. But the Prime Minister of Lesotho refused saying that we are 
disgruntled opposition. 
9. Do you think poverty has an impact on electoral political participation of 
opposition parties in Lesotho? 
Strongly 
disagree 
Disagree Neutral Agree Strongly agree 
V 
Poverty created a new society of Basotho; even for registration of old senior 
citizens the officers came from the ruling party - for employment. 
The question of overseeing "good governance, and refusal of government put in 
place by force": Who oversees this? Demonstrations are not allowed in Lesotho. 
10. Below is given a list of possible causes of weak electoral political 
participation of opposition political parties in Lesotho. Please rank these 
possible causes by writing numbers, 1) to 16), in the boxes against them; 
the most important cause must be labelled 1, the second 2, and so on. 
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1. Internal divisions 2 D 
2. Lack of transparency of the electoral system a D 
3. The ballot system used 9 D 
4. Lack of democracy, in general, of the Electoral system 1 0 D 
5. Lack of party political funding 3 D 
6. Lack of efficient leadership 4 D 
7. Government making it difficult for the opposition parties 1 D 
a. The role of the military 1 6 D 
9. Poverty 5 D 
10. Lack of transparency within the political parties 6 D 
11. Lack of freedom 6 D 
12. Lack of fairness 6 D 
13. Insufficient voter education 7 D 
14. Lack of understanding of politics 6 D 
15. Illegitimacy of elections 1 1 D 
16. Party strength is built up either in towns or country side only 1 2 D 
Dr Ralitapole's comments on question no.10. 
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10(2): The system is transparent; it only has to be known by the people. The 
people from SADC will come to copy this system, MMP, know it, and get its 
benefits even before we can do because we denied ourselves that opportunity. 
10(3): The ballot system is negotiated by IEC with the political parties, so it is not 
a problem. 
10(6): There is general lack of leadership in Lesotho, for example in churches, 
and in many other organizations. So, organizations that are brought up by the 
same people will lack good leadership. 
10(7): Lack of environment conducive for effective functioning of political parties 
and recognition of the role of opposition parties is the number 1 cause of 
weakness of opposition parties. The ruling party should not see opposition as 
enemy. The media can facilitate this environment. Internal divisions and in-
fighting conflicts are outcomes of this problem in 10(7). 
10(10): I can place sub -questions 10(10), 10(11) and 10(14) under one sub-
question called "Lack of democratic culture in parties". A party will be ruling at the 
end, so it must start now to practice democratic culture; give reports and so on. 
Most of the parties are patriarchal; for instance, people do not see a party if one 
does not say 'Ntate Ntsu, Mandela, and so on. So, the people should not fear that 
a leader is being toppled over. 
10(13): It is a ploy by the ruling party. The less the people know the easier you 
can control them. 
10(15): The only legitimate and normal elections are two, the 1965 and 1970 
general elections. People were normal. The environment changed after 1970. 
After 1993 elections the British said that there would be splits created within the 
opposition. 
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VI) Chief Peete Peete 12/01/2005 
Chief Peete Peete is the leader of the National Progressive Party. I interviewed 
him on 12 January 2005. 
QUESTIONNAIRE 
1. i.) Since 1993, have the opposition political parties gone weak in Lesotho? 
If the answer is yes, in your opinion, what is the most important cause? 
Opposition political parties are not weak. The ruling party has more 
opportunities than the other parties. The political parties are not equal 
because of terrain. This situation makes living conditions unequal in 
different areas. Because of these differences the ruling party always 
gets donations, and opportunities of revisiting its specific areas of 
interest, for example education, and as such it is able to improve its 
political methodologies or approaches. 
ii) What could be the remedy to overcome the above-mentioned cause of 
weakness? 
In a democratic situation the ruling party has to give equal 
opportunities with respect to: knowledge, effectiveness, exposure to 
the outside world, to being in position, to getting funds, and so on. NPP 
and other opposition political parties pointed out to the local 
international organizations that there is imbalance between the ruling 
party and the opposition parties in relation to the preparations for the 
elections. These parties must get equal opportunities mentioned 
above. 
The ruling party Ministers use government vehicles, as an example, in 
directly campaigning. These Ministers have time to impose whatever 
they want without prior discussion with the opposition parties. 
2. Where is your permanent residence? Please give the name of the village 
or town and constituency in the table below. 
Village/Town Constituency name 
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Village/Town Constituency name 
Kolojane Bela-Bela 
3. Indicate the name of your political party in the table below: 
Name of political party Abbreviation 
National Progressive Party NPP 
4. What is membership of your political party? 
5001-10 000 10 001-15 000 15 001-20 000 20 001 - 30 000 30 001-50 000 >50 001 
5. In three months how many times do you hold public meetings in the 
constituency? 
0 1 to 2 2 to 3 3 to 4 4 to 6 Other 
(Specify) 
V 
The working committee holds meetings 4 to 5 times a year and the constituency 
committee at least twice a month. The area (tikoloho/libaka) committee holds 
meetings at least twice a month. The party makes contributions: Membership; 
money collected by the committee for any extringencies, e.g. trips; concerts, and 
so on. Because the collections are so meagre, some of the collections are 
seldom announced. 
6. i) Does your party constitution provide any clause/s on the disclosure of 
party finances and their usages? 





ii) If the answer is 'Yes' in i) above, how often are disclosure reports given 
to the public? 
Every 3 Every 6 Every 12 Other Period 




i. Did your political party form a coalition/alliance of any kind with 
another/other political party/s in the period '1993 -2006'? 
Yes No 
V 
The NPP is however, preparing for an alliance with the BNP 
and that will take place when parliament is dissolved getting 
ready for the next elections. There is a law that prohibits 
establishment of alliances or crossing of the flour by the 
opposition parties represented in Parliament 
ii. If the answer is yes to i) above, answer the following question: 
Which kind/s of coalition/alliance did your party establish with 
another/other party/s? Tick as many boxes as appropriate. 
Electoral Executive/ Minority Legislative United Mergers 
Alliance Cabinet Executive Coalition Front /Other 
(For Coalition Coalition (For Alliance (Name the 
elections) ( For gaining (Being in the supporting (for driving other) 
majority seats to minority, ruling party on towards a 
control a cabinet support the various issues common 
responsible to cabinet in in goal) 
parliamentary parliamentary parliamentary 
majority) debates). debates). 
iii. Do you think that the use of political coalitions/alliances can 
strengthen electoral political participation of opposition parties in 
Lesotho? 
Strongly agree Agree Neutral Disagree Strongly 
disagree 
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8. How has Mixed Member Proportional (MMP) electoral system affected 
political participation of the opposition parties in Lesotho? 
Very 
negatively 
Negatively No change Positively Very positively 
9. Do you think poverty has an impact on electoral political participation of 
opposition parties in Lesotho? 
Strongly 
disagree 
Disagree Neutral Agree Strongly agree 
10. Below is given a list of possible causes of weak electoral political 
participation of opposition political parties in Lesotho. Please rank these 
possible causes by writing numbers, 1) to 16), in the boxes against them; 
the most important cause must be labelled 1, the second 2, and so on. 
1. Internal divisions D 
2. Lack of transparency of the electoral system 3 D 
3. The ballot system used D 
4. Lack of democracy, in general, of the Electoral system 1 D 
5. Lack of party political funding 1 D 
6. Lack of efficient leadership D 
7. Government making it difficult for the opposition parties 4 D 
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8. The role of the military D 
9. Poverty 1 • 
10. Lack of transparency within the political parties D 
11. Lack of freedom 4 D 
12. Lack of fairness Contributes very little. D 
13. Insufficient voter education 5 D 
14. Lack of understanding of politics Contributes very little. D 
15. Illegitimacy of elections 6 D 
16. Party strength is built up either in towns or countryside only D 
contributes very little but cannot be left out. 
General comments of the leader of the NPP 
Comparing advantages of democratic involvement in day-to-day affairs and also 
the relations of the ruling party with the opposition political parties in Lesotho and 
South Africa, it is found that South Africa is more open in democracy than 
Lesotho where there is no openness. South Africa gives opportunities to 
opposition parties to go out on exposure, it gives more funds to opposition parties 
than it gives to the ruling party. In Lesotho the allowances are not equal, even 
though the M150 is common; the ruling party in addition has the constituencies 
allowances. 
The law that prohibits the opposition parties, particularly those which got into 
parliament as a result of the proportional representation, from establishing 
alliances, shows that the parties are not fully equal. 
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(VII) Ranthomeng Paul Matete 19/01/2005 
Matete is the General Secretary of Basotho National Party and I interviewed him 
on 19 January 2005. 
QUESTIONNAIRE 
1. i.) Since 1993, have the opposition political parties gone weak in Lesotho? 
If the answer is yes, in your opinion, what is the most important cause? 
• Lack of resources 
• The distributive capability of the government shifts focus to the ruling 
party. 
ii) What could be the remedy to overcome the above-mentioned cause of 
weakness? 
• Political party funding 
• The ruling party should not monopolize state facilities (e.g. radio & 
transport) 
2. Where is your permanent residence? Please give the name of the village 
or town and constituency in the table below. 
Village/Town Constituency name 
Morija Matsieng No.44 
3. Indicate the name of your political party in the table below: 
Name of political party Abbreviation 
Basotho National Party BNP 
4. What is membership of your political party? 
5001-10 000 10 001-15 000 15 001-20 000 20 001 - 30 000 30 001-50 000 >50 001 
V 
5. In three months how many times do you hold public meetings in the 
constituency? 
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0 1 to 2 2 to 3 3 to 4 4 to 6 Other 
(Specify) 
V 
6. i) Does your party constitution provide any clause/s on the disclosure of 
party finances and their usages? 





report to party 
conference 
ii) If the answer is 'Yes' in i) above, how often are disclosure reports given 
to the public? 
Every 3 Every 6 Every 12 Other Period 
months months months (Specify) 
V 
7. 
i. Did your political party form a coalition/alliance of any kind with 
another/other political party/s in the period '1993 -2006'? 
Yes No 
V 
ii. If the answer is yes to i) above, answer the following question: 
Which kind/s of coalition/alliance did your party establish with 
another/other party/s? Tick as many boxes as appropriate. 
Electoral Executive/ Minority Legislative United Mergers 
Alliance Cabinet Executive Coalition Front /Other 
(For Coalition Coalition (For Alliance (Name the 
elections) ( F o r gaining (Being in the supporting (for driving other) 
majority seats to minority, ruling party on towards a 
control a cabinet support the various issues common 
responsible to cabinet in in goal) 
parliamentary parliamentary parliamentary 
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majority) debates). debates). 
V 
iii. Do you think that the use of political coalitions/alliances can 
strengthen electoral political participation of opposition parties in 
Lesotho? 
Strongly agree Agree Neutral Disagree Strongly 
disagree 
V 
About November 2004 we made an agreement with the NPP to have relations of 
both inside and outside Parliament. The type of alliance we want to establish with 
NPP is not a merger, but another type whose modalities we are still going to work 
out. 
8. How has Mixed Member Proportional (MMP) electoral system affected 
political participation of the opposition parties in Lesotho? 
Very 
negatively 
Negatively No change Positively Very positively 
V 
Some problems, however, of the attitude of failing to accept, mainly from the 
ruling party, make things difficult. The ruling party even now maintains that its 
parliamentarians are more legitimate than those of the proportional 
representation. This is the main problem. 
9. Do you think poverty has an impact on electoral political participation of 
opposition parties in Lesotho? 
Strongly 
disagree 
Disagree Neutral Agree Strongly agree 
V 
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10. Below is given a list of possible causes of weak electoral political 
participation of opposition political parties in Lesotho. Please rank these 
possible causes by writing numbers, 1) to 16), in the boxes against them; 
the most important cause must be labelled 1, the second 2, and so on. 
1. Internal divisions 1 3 D 
2. Lack of transparency of the electoral system 6 D 
3. The ballot system used s D 
4. Lack of democracy, in general, of the Electoral system 9 D 
5. Lack of party political funding 1 D 
6. Lack of efficient leadership 1 2 D 
7. Government making it difficult for the opposition parties 3 D 
8. The role of the military 1 6 D 
9. Poverty 2 D 
10. Lack of transparency within the political parties 14D 
11. Lack of freedom 1 0 D 
12. Lack of fairness 7 D 
13. Insufficient voter education 1 s D 
14. Lack of understanding of politics 8 D 
15. Illegitimacy of elections 4 D 
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16. Party strength is built up either in towns or countryside only 1 1 D 
Comments of the General Secretary of the BNP, Matete, P. R. 
10(iii): This is in two parts: In 1998 the ballot paper seemed to have been 
manipulated and was not uniform as it had two different textures for one and the 
same elections. Hence the paper began to be called "Pampiri sekokoto" or a hard 
version and a soft version. The question was, why were their two versions 
brought for one and the same election? 
The balloting system itself: We have been accusing the IEC of giving itself 
monopoly of developing the ballot paper, when it is the responsibility of the IEC 
and the stakeholders - political parties. Perhaps today it is better because parties 
are invited, although eventually their views are thrown away. 
The remedy to this problem is that the IEC and government must acknowledge 
that preparation for elections is the responsibility of all stakeholders and not only 
one side. 
10(v): Lack of political party funding: The remedy to this problem is that, the state 
should provide political party funding to build competitive democracy. 
10(ix): Remedy to poverty: Sound economic policies can alleviate poverty. 
Currently there are no sound policies. Overwhelming, majority of people live 
under misery and poverty. This situation influences their support to their parties, 
particularly financially. On the other hand the ruling party uses the state facilities 
to promote its image. 
10(xv): The remedy to illegitimacy: If stakeholders can get the opportunity to 
exercise their full responsibility over the process of elections, unlike what is taking 
place now, the legitimacy of elections would be enhanced. 
10(xv): Up to now the BNP is still not satisfied with the conduct and outcome of 
both the 1998 and 2002 general elections. After 1998, the elections were 
postponed thrice. It seemed the ruling party did not want elections to be held; 
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they purposefully delayed the elections. The government made it difficult for the 
IPA to prepare for the elections. When the elections had to be held within 15 to 
18 months, they were delayed for three years. 
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VIII) General Secretary of LWP 26/01/2005 
Rosa Leneha is the General Secretary of the LWP. I interviewed her on 26 
January 2005. 
QUESTIONNAIRE 
1. i.) Since 1993, have the opposition political parties gone weak in Lesotho? 
If the answer is yes, in your opinion, what is the most important cause? 
• Because of maturity the ruling party is bigger than opposition and they 
don't have rights like them. 
ii) What could be the remedy to overcome the above-mentioned cause of 
weakness? 
• The opposition must have the same rights as the ruling party, so that 
they can work hard. 
2. Where is your permanent residence? Please give the name of the village 
or town and constituency in the table below. 
Village/Town Constituency name 
Ha Ntsabane/Berea Khafung No.23 
3. Indicate the name of your political party in the table below: 
Name of political party Abbreviation 
Lesotho Workers Party LWP 
4. What is membership of your political party? 
5001-10 000 10 001-15 000 15 001-20 000 20 001 - 30 000 30 001-50 000 >50 001 
V 
5. In three months how many times do you hold public meetings in the 
constituency? 
0 1 to 2 2 to 3 3 to 4 4 to 6 Other 
(Specify) 
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0 1 to 2 2 to 3 3 to 4 4 to 6 Other 
(Specify) 
V 
6. i) Does your party constitution provide any clause/s on the disclosure of 
party finances and their usages? 





ii) If the answer is 'Yes' in i) above, how often are disclosure reports given 











i. Did your political party form a coalition/alliance of any kind with 
another/other political party/s in the period '1993 -2006'? 
Yes No 
V 
ii. If the answer is yes to i) above, answer the following question: 
Which kind/s of coalition/alliance did your party establish with 
another/other party/s? Tick as many boxes as appropriate. 
Electoral Executive/ Minority Legislative United Mergers 
Alliance Cabinet Executive Coalition Front /Other 
(For Coalition Coalition (For Alliance (Name the 
elections) ( F o r gaining (Being in the supporting (for driving other) 
majority seats to minority, ruling party on towards a 
control a cabinet support the various issues common 
responsible to cabinet in in goal) 
parliamentary parliamentary parliamentary 
majority) debates). debates). 
195 
iii. Do you think that the use of political coalitions/alliances can 
strengthen electoral political participation of opposition parties in 
Lesotho? 
Strongly agree Agree Neutral Disagree Strongly 
disagree 
V 
8. How has Mixed Member Proportional (MMP) electoral system affected 
political participation of the opposition parties in Lesotho? 
Very 
negatively 
Negatively No change Positively Very positively 
V 
9. Do you think poverty has an impact on electoral political participation of 
opposition parties in Lesotho? 
Strongly 
disagree 
Disagree Neutral Agree Strongly agree 
V 
10. Below is given a list of possible causes of weak electoral political 
participation of opposition political parties in Lesotho. Please rank these 
possible causes by writing numbers, 1) to 16), in the boxes against them; 
the most important cause must be labelled 1, the second 2, and so on. 
1. Internal divisions 1 4 D 
2. Lack of transparency of the electoral system 1 6 D 
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3. The ballot system used 2 D 
4. Lack of democracy, in general, of the Electoral system 3 D 
5. Lack of party political funding 1 D 
6. Lack of efficient leadership 
7. Government making it difficult for the opposition parties 8 0 
8. The role of the military 6 0 
9. Poverty 1 5 0 
10. Lack of transparency within the political parties 1 3 D 
11. Lack of freedom 4 D 
12. Lack of fairness 5 D 
13. Insufficient voter education 11D 
14. Lack of understanding of politics 
12D 
15. Illegitimacy of elections 9 D 
16. Party strength is built up either in towns or countryside only 1 QD 
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IX) LEP representative in the IEC 26/01/2005 
Thakane Makoa is the representative of the LEP in the IEC. I interviewed her on 
26 January 2005. 
QUESTIONNAIRE 
1. i.) Since 1993, have the opposition political parties gone weak in Lesotho? 
If the answer is yes, in your opinion, what is the most important cause? 
• It seems the ruling party has more power than the opposition political 
party. 
ii) What could be the remedy to overcome the above-mentioned cause of 
weakness? 
• If the opposition parties mixed or brought together their numbers after 
elections, it would be easy to overcome the weakness just because they 
will have more numbers than the ruling party. 
2. Where is your permanent residence? Please give the name of the village 
or town and constituency in the table below. 
Village/Town Constituency name 
Lower Thamae Stadium Area No.31 
3. Indicate the name of your political party in the table below: 
Name of political party Abbreviation 
Lesotho Education Party LEP 
4. What is membership of your political party? 
5001-10 000 10 001-15 000 15 001-20 000 20 001 - 30 000 30 001-50 000 >50 001 
V 
5. In three months how many times do you hold public meetings in the 
constituency? 
0 1 to 2 2 to 3 3 to 4 4 to 6 Other 
(Specify) 
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0 1 to 2 2 to 3 3 to 4 4 to 6 Other 
(Specify) 
V 
6. i) Does your party constitution provide any clause/s on the disclosure of 
party finances and their usages? 





ii) If the answer is 'Yes' in i) above, how often are disclosure reports given 










i. Did your political party form a coalition/alliance of any kind with 
another/other political party/s in the period '1993 -2006'? 
Yes No 
V 
ii. If the answer is yes to i) above, answer the following question: 
Which kind/s of coalition/alliance did your party establish with 
another/other party/s? Tick as many boxes as appropriate. 
Electoral Executive/ Minority Legislative United Mergers 
Alliance Cabinet Executive Coalition Front /Other 
(For Coalition Coalition (For Alliance (Name 
elections) ( For gaining (Being in the supporting (for the other) 
majority seats to minority, ruling party driving 
control a cabinet support the on various towards a 
responsible to cabinet in issues in common 
parliamentary parliamentar parliamentar goal) 
majority) y debates). y debates). 
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iii. Do you think that the use of political coalitions/alliances can 
strengthen electoral political participation of opposition parties in 
Lesotho? 
Strongly agree Agree Neutral Disagree Strongly 
disagree 
V 
8. How has Mixed Member Proportional (MMP) electoral system affected 
political participation of the opposition parties in Lesotho? 
Very 
negatively 
Negatively No change Positively Very positively 
V 
9. Do you think poverty has an impact on electoral political participation of 
opposition parties in Lesotho? 
Strongly 
disagree 
Disagree Neutral Agree Strongly agree 
V 
10. Below is given a list of possible causes of weak electoral political 
participation of opposition political parties in Lesotho. Please rank these 
possible causes by writing numbers, 1) to 16), in the boxes against them; 
the most important cause must be labelled 1, the second 2, and so on. 
1. Internal divisions 1 s D 
2. Lack of transparency of the electoral system 14D 
3. The ballot system used 
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2 D 
4. Lack of democracy, in general, of the Electoral system 16D 
5. Lack of party political funding 1 D 
6. Lack of efficient leadership 5 0 
7. Government making it difficult for the opposition parties 3 D 
8. The role of the military 1 2 D 
9. Poverty 4 0 
10. Lack of transparency within the political parties 6 0 
11. Lack of freedom 7 0 
12. Lack of fairness 9 0 
13. Insufficient voter education 8 0 
14. Lack of understanding of politics 1 QD 
15. Illegitimacy of elections 1 3 D 
16. Party strength is built up either in towns or countryside only 1 1 D 
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X) Matlaselo Tennyson Mpela 12/01/2006 
Mpela is the Deputy Leader of the Lesotho Labour Party (LLP). I interviewed 
Mpela on 12 January 2006. 
QUESTIONNAIRE 
1. i.) Since 1993, have the opposition political parties gone weak in Lesotho? 
If the answer is yes, in your opinion, what is the most important cause? 
• Yes. Firstly, opposition political parties do not have a clear mandate from 
the government of Lesotho with respect to what has to be done; in other 
words government does not give the opposition direction about the course 
of action. Secondly, the system of MMP is not well accepted in Parliament, 
for example the leader of the opposition has not yet been given his due 
respect such as being given a vehicle, and so on, by government. 
• The members of Parliament of the ruling party undermine the opposition 
members of Parliament by calling them losers. 
ii) What could be the remedy to overcome the above-mentioned cause of 
weakness? 
• The remedy: The constitution must be amended in order to enable smooth 
handling of matters. The question of Parliamentary transition should be 
fully addressed. 
2. Where is your permanent residence? Please give the name of the village 
or town and constituency in the table below. 
Village/Town Constituency name 
Maseru Stadium Area No.31 
3. Indicate the name of your political party in the table below: 
Name of political party Abbreviation 
Lesotho Labour Party LLP 
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4. What is membership of your political party? 
5001-10 000 10 001-15 000 15 001-20 000 20 001 - 30 000 30 001-50 000 >50 001 
V 
5. In three months how many times do you hold public meetings in the 
constituency? 
0 1 to 2 2 to 3 3 to 4 4 to 6 Other 
(Specify) 
V 
6. i) Does your party constitution provide any clause/s on the disclosure of 
party finances and their usages? 





ii) If the answer is 'Yes' in i) above, how often are disclosure reports given 
to the public? 
Every 3 Every 6 Every 12 Other Period 
months months months (Specify) 
V 
7. 
i. Did your political party form a coalition/alliance of any kind with 
another/other political party/s in the period '1993 -2006'? 
Yes No 
V 
ii. If the answer is yes to i) above, answer the following question: Which 
kind/s of coalition/alliance did your party establish with another/other 
party/s? Tick as many boxes as appropriate. 
Electoral Executive/ Minority Legislative United Mergers 
Alliance Cabinet Executive Coalition Front /Other 
(For Coalition Coalition (For Alliance (Name the 
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elections) ( For gaining (Being in the supporting (for driving other) 
majority seats to minority, ruling party on towards a 
control a cabinet support the various issues common 
responsible to cabinet in in goal) 
parliamentary parliamentary parliamentary 
majority) debates). debates). 
V 
iii. Do you think that the use of political coalitions/alliances can 
strengthen electoral political participation of opposition parties in 
Lesotho? 
Strongly agree Agree Neutral Disagree Strongly 
disagree 
V 
8. How has Mixed Member Proportional (MMP) electoral system affected 
political participation of the opposition parties in Lesotho? 
Very 
negatively 
Negatively No change Positively Very positively 
V 
9. Do you think poverty has an impact on electoral political participation of 
opposition parties in Lesotho? 
Strongly 
disagree 
Disagree Neutral Agree Strongly agree 
V 
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10. Below is given a list of possible causes of weak electoral political 
participation of opposition political parties in Lesotho. Please rank these 
possible causes by writing numbers, 1) to 16), in the boxes against them; 
the most important cause must be labelled 1, the second 2, and so on. 
1.Internal divisions a D 
2.Lack of transparency of the electoral system 3 D 
3.The ballot system used 9 D 
4.Lack of democracy, in general, of the Electoral system 1 D 
5.Lack of party political funding s D 
6.Lack of efficient leadership 2 D 
7.Government making it difficult for the opposition parties 4 D 
a.The role of the military 1 6 D 
9.Poverty 1 D 
10. Lack of transparency within the political parties 1 0 D 
11. Lack of freedom 11D 
12.Lack of fairness 7 D 
13.Insufficient voter education 6 D 
14. Lack of understanding of politics 1 D 
15.Illegitimacy of elections 6 D 
16. Party strength is built up either in towns or countryside only 2 D 
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More comments made by Mpela 
Mpela asserts that there is a fear that the opposition parties are denied their 
rights, for example the present leader of the opposition, Kelebone Maope, has 
not been given the rights of a leader, and as a result they become apathetic. 
Mpela contends that Lesotho politics has broken up Basotho into two nations, the 
central government and the local government nations; it looks like there is no 
mechanism to coordinate the two institutions and one could ask why such a thing 
happens during the period of civilization. In Lesotho there are the elite and they 
are ethno-demotic; they are rich when others are poor. 
According to Mpela the undermining of the opposition members of Parliament 
weakened the opposition because as a result of that, they feared to take part 
during the parliamentary debates. 
Mpela wrapped his responses by saying that, Basotho do not have independent 
government of their own; governance is done by foreigners, Basotho have no 
'ownership of government'; elections are funded with donations and grants. 
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XI) Antony C. Manyeli 02/03/2006 
Manyeli is the Leader of the National Independence Party (NIP). I interviewed 
Manyeli on the 2nd March 2006. 
QUESTIONNAIRE 
1. i.) Since 1993, have the opposition political parties gone weak in Lesotho? 
If the answer is yes, in your opinion, what is the most important cause? 
• Yes. The opposition has gone weak and the following are the causes: 
i) There are too many political parties; ii) Most of the founders established 
the political parties for no purpose or reason; and there are no policies to 
give guidance or to regulate forming of political parties. 
ii) What could be the remedy to overcome the above-mentioned cause of 
weakness? 
The following could be remedies: 
a) There should not be very many political parties in Lesotho. 
b) There must be legislation regulating the establishment of 
political parties. Manyeli said that he mentioned on 2nd March 
2006, in Parliament, that there is lack of principled leadership of 
political parties. 
2. Where is your permanent residence? Please give the name of the village 
or town and constituency in the table below. 
Village/Town Constituency name 
Mokhokhong Maama No. 40 
3. Indicate the name of your political party in the table below: 
Name of political party Abbreviation 
National Independence Party NIP 
4. What is membership of your political party? 
5001-10 000 10 001-15 000 15 001-20 000 20 001 - 30 000 30 001-50 000 >50 001 
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5001-10 000 10 001-15 000 15 001-20 000 20 001 - 30 000 30 001-50 000 >50 001 
This party does not use membership and there are no membership cards. 
Manyeli says that they use a different approach from others; everybody who 
agrees with them is welcome. Manyeli said that Basotho still do not understand 
politics; he gave an example of Winston Churchill who was proud to vote for a 
party which was not his. 
5. In three months how many times do you hold public meetings in the 
constituency? 
0 1 to 2 2 to 3 3 to 4 4 to 6 Other 
(Specify) 
V 
6. i) Does your party constitution provide any clause/s on the disclosure of 
party finances and their usages? 





For the past 22 years there has not been annual general meeting (AGM). 
ii) If the answer is 'Yes' in i) above, how often are disclosure reports given 










i. Did your political party form a coalition/alliance of any kind with 




ii. If the answer is yes to i) above, answer the following question: 
Which kind/s of coalition/alliance did your party establish with 
another/other party/s? Tick as many boxes as appropriate. 
Electoral Executive/ Minority Legislative United Mergers 
Alliance Cabinet Executive Coalition Front /Other 
(For Coalition Coalition (For Alliance (Name the 
elections) ( F o r gaining (Being in the supporting (for driving other) 
majority seats to minority, ruling party on towards a 
control a cabinet support the various issues common 
responsible to cabinet in in goal) 
parliamentary parliamentary parliamentary 
majority) debates). debates). 
iii. Do you think that the use of political coalitions/alliances can 
strengthen electoral political participation of opposition parties in 
Lesotho? 
Strongly agree Agree Neutral Disagree Strongly 
disagree 
V 
8. How has Mixed Member Proportional (MMP) electoral system affected 
political participation of the opposition parties in Lesotho? 
Very 
negatively 
Negatively No change Positively Very positively 
V 
9. Do you think poverty has an impact on electoral political participation of 
opposition parties in Lesotho? 





Disagree Neutral Agree Strongly agree 
V 
10. Below is given a list of possible causes of weak electoral political 
participation of opposition political parties in Lesotho. Please rank these 
possible causes by writing numbers, 1) to 16), in the boxes against them; 
the most important cause must be labelled 1, the second 2, and so on. 
1.Internal divisions 1 D 
2.Lack of transparency of the electoral system 1 6 D 
3.The ballot system used D 
4.Lack of democracy, in general, of the Electoral system 1 s D 
5. Lack of party political funding 1 D 
6. Lack of efficient leadership 1 D 
7.Government making it difficult for the opposition parties 8 D 
8.The role of the military 1 6 D 
9.Poverty 1IH 
10. Lack of transparency within the political parties 1 D 
11. Lack of freedom 16D 
12.Lack of fairness 16D 
13.Insufficient voter education 
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1 D 
14.Lack of understanding of politics 
15.Illegitimacy of elections 
16. Party strength is built up either in towns or countryside only 
1 D 
1 6 D 
2 D 
Comments of the leader of the NIP, A. C. Manyeli 
i) Manyeli said that the attitude of the ruling party was not welcoming 
to the opposition parties and that began in the Interim Political 
Authority (IPA). He further mentioned that on arrival of the 
opposition in Parliament after the 2002 elections, legislation, 
enabling parties to be called by different names, was passed. The 
members of Parliament (MPs) of the ruling party are called by 
constituency names, and the MPs of the opposition political parties 
are called Members of Parliament only. 
ii) Manyeli said that MPs of the ruling party get constituency 
allowances and those of the opposition parties do not get anything. 
iii) The MPs of the ruling party get secretaries while the MPs of the 
opposition do not have them. 
iv) Manyeli quoted Benjamin Disraeli saying "The privileged and the 
people form two nations". Manyeli said that Lesotho Parliament is 
like two nations of the ruling party MPs and the MPs of the 
opposition. Manyeli also quoted Edmund Buck saying "Parliament is 
not a congress of ambassadors with different and sometimes 
opposing interests, a parliament is a deliberative assembly of one 
nation with one interest; a member may be elected from 
Burmingham, but when he is in parliament he is a Member of 
Parliament and not of Burmingham". Manyeli said that he had just 
made the above quotations to Parliament in the morning hours of 
the 2nd March 2006 the day I interviewed him. 
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v) Commenting on question no.9 of the questionnaire, Manyeli said 
when Government strategy is poverty reduction and the national 
objective is poverty eradication, their (NIP) strategy is to eradicate 
poverty (and not only to reduce it), and he mentioned that it was 
where they differed with LCD government. 
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XII) 'Manapo Anna Majara 07/03/2006 
'Manapo Anna Majara is the leader of the New Lesotho Freedom Party (NLFP). I 
interviewed Majara on the 7th March 2006. 
QUESTIONNAIRE 
1. i.) Since 1993, have the opposition political parties gone weak in Lesotho? 
If the answer is yes, in your opinion, what is the most important cause? 
• Yes. The opposition has gone weak because the opposition political 
parties struggle for themselves and not for the nation. 
ii) What could be the remedy to overcome the above-mentioned cause of 
weakness? 
The following can be a remedy: People should be elected by merit, and 
they should be people who can put forward motions in Parliament and 
should not stay silent in Parliament. 
2. Where is your permanent residence? Please give the name of the village 
or town and constituency in the table below. 
Village/Town Constituency name 
Sekamaneng Berea No. 28 
3. Indicate the name of your political party in the table below: 
Name of political party Abbreviation 
New Lesotho Freedom Party NLFP 
4. What is membership of your political party? 
5001-10 000 10 001-15 000 15 001-20 000 20 001 - 30 000 30 001-50 000 >50 001 
V 
5. In three months how many times do you hold public meetings in the 
constituency? 
0 1 to 2 2 to 3 3 to 4 4 to 6 Other 
(Specify) 
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0 1 to 2 2 to 3 3 to 4 4 to 6 Other 
(Specify) 
V 
6. i) Does your party constitution provide any clause/s on the disclosure of 
party finances and their usages? 





ii) If the answer is 'Yes' in i) above, how often are disclosure reports given 
to the public? 
Every 3 Every 6 Every 12 Other Period 
months months months (Specify) 
V 
7. 
i. Did your political party form a coalition/alliance of any kind with 
another/other political party/s in the period '1993 -2006'? 
Yes No 
V 
ii. If the answer is yes to i) above, answer the following question: Which 
kind/s of coalition/alliance did your party establish with another/other 
party/s? Tick as many boxes as appropriate. 
Electoral Executive/ Minority Legislative United Mergers 
Alliance Cabinet Executive Coalition Front /Other 
(For Coalition Coalition (For Alliance (Name the 
elections) ( F o r gaining (Being in the supporting (for driving other) 
majority seats to minority, ruling party on towards a 
control a cabinet support the various issues common 
responsible to cabinet in in goal) 
parliamentary parliamentary parliamentary 
majority) debates). debates). 
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iii. Do you think that the use of political coalitions/alliances can strengthen 
electoral political participation of opposition parties in Lesotho? 
Strongly agree Agree Neutral Disagree Strongly 
disagree 
V 
8. How has Mixed Member Proportional (MMP) electoral system affected 
political participation of the opposition parties in Lesotho? 
Very 
negatively 
Negatively No change Positively Very positively 
V 
It could be good only when the right MPs were elected. 
9. Do you think poverty has an impact on electoral political participation of 
opposition parties in Lesotho? 
Strongly 
disagree 
Disagree Neutral Agree Strongly agree 
V 
10. Below is given a list of possible causes of weak electoral political 
participation of opposition political parties in Lesotho. Please rank these 
possible causes by writing numbers, 1) to 16), in the boxes against them; 
the most important cause must be labelled 1, the second 2, and so on. 
1.Internal divisions 1 6 D 
2.Lack of transparency of the electoral system 3 D 
215 
3.The ballot system used 1 0 D 
4.Lack of democracy, in general, of the Electoral system 1 D 
5.Lack of party political funding 3 D 
6.Lack of efficient leadership 1 6 0 
7.Government making it difficult for the opposition parties 1 6 0 
8.The role of the military 1 6 0 
9.Poverty 1 D 
10. Lack of transparency within the political parties 2 D 
11. Lack of freedom 1 1 D 
12.Lack of fairness s D 
13.Insufficient voter education 8 D 
14.Lack of understanding of politics 7 D 
15.Illegitimacy of elections 6 D 
16. Party strength is built up either in towns or countryside only D 
Comments of the leader of the NLFP, Majara, A. M. 
Commenting on no. 10.3 Majara said that usually complaints are about the 
ballot system. The ballot system must be changed. 
About no. 10.6 Majara said that the leaderships of political parties need 
support in order to raise their efficiency. 
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Appendix 6 
Analysis of the placement of electoral candidates by opposition parties in the 
2002 election 
CANDIDATES PLACED FOR 2002 ELECTIONS: YES/NO 
Constituency 
No BAC BCP BNP LEP LLP LPC LWP MFP NIP NLFP NPP PFD 
2 y y y n n y n y n n y y 
3 y y y n n y n y n n y y 
5 y y y n n y n y n n y y 
8 y y y n n y y y n n y y 
20 y y y n y y y y y n y y 
22 y y y n n y y y n n y y 
25 y n y n n y n y n n n y 
26 y y y y n y y n n y y y 
29 y y y n y y y y n y y y 
32 y y y n n y y y n n y y 
35 y y y n n y y y n y y y 
42 y n y y n y n y n y y y 
43 y n y y n y n y n y y y 
50 y y y n n y y y n n n y 
52 y y y n n y y y n y n y 
53 y y y y n y y y n y y y 
57 y y y n n y n y n n n y 
58 y y y y y y y y n n n y 
59 y y y n y y n y n y y y 
62 n y y y n y n n n n n y 
68 y y y n n y n y n n n y 
71 y y y n y y n y n n n y 
75 y n y n n y n n n n n y 
78 y n y n n y N y n n y y 
Source: IEC Report 28 - CSRS of 19 June 2002. 
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Appendix 7 
Dependency and post dependency theories 
Lesotho is one of the least developed countries and poverty seems to impact 
negatively on the activities of the opposition political parties. According to Ruttan 
in Kotze and Labuschagne (1995: 94,95), in poor countries with per capita 
incomes below $750 there is a positive relationship between political 
development and economic development. The theories discussed below explain 
why the African countries continue to be dependent on developed countries and 
one of these theories gives the alternative way forward. The researcher believes 
that information about the theories discussed below will be useful to the reader. 
a) Dependency theory 
Nyango'ro (1989: 83) states that the American Economic Review (1970) 
describes dependency theory as a situation in which the economy of certain 
countries is conditioned by the development and expansion of another economy 
under which the former is subjected. Nyango'ro asserts that dependency theory 
denies the appropriateness of emphasis on trade excluding financial, 
technological, and cultural-political considerations. Also dependency theory 
denies the view of the causative nature of trade. According to this theory, trade is 
the derived effect of the basic forms of penetration: financial, technological, and 
political-cultural. 
According to Webster (1990: 84) dependency theory was developed in the 1960s 
through the work of a number of academics and development economists who 
were not happy with the continued economic failure in Latin American countries. 
Further, Webster asserts that they dismissed the notions of modernisation theory 
that a lack of development could be caused by lack of appropriate modernising 
values and that exposure to the developed countries could positively benefit the 
Third World. According to Webster (1990: 85) and Nyangoro (1989: 83) one of 
the leading theoreticians of dependency has been Andre Gundar Frank. 
Further, Nyango'ro (1989: 83) summarises the assumptions explaining the above 
phenomenon as follows: 
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1. Concentration of a peripheral nation's value structure upon a metropolitan 
partner will produce concentration of trade. 
2. Political and cultural values will shape consumption preferences and 
production habits and will increase demand for goods from the dominant 
metropolitan country. 
3. The means of production obtained from that country would shape 
economic development to require further inputs from the source of capital, 
thus forming a "vicious circle of dependence". 
All the above three assumptions are valid in the case of Lesotho and this is why 
this country continuously depends on foreign aid as also indicated below by 
Huxtable & Villal'on (1998: 280 - 284). 
Nyango'ro (1989: 83) further emphasizes that according to dependency theory, 
foreign connection is seen as having a negative impact on the development 
profile of the peripheral society. The economic relationships of the peripheral with 
core countries promoted development of underdevelopment of the Third World 
countries. 
According to Huxtable & Villal'on (1998: 280 - 284) there is the critical juncture 
between disintegration and reconfiguration. These authors note that the 
economies of African states are not able to generate adequate wealth to satisfy 
the material needs of their citizens and these countries continuously depend on 
foreign aid and the INGOs. The African countries import most capital and many 
consumer goods and this behaviour aggravates their debts and balance-of-
payments problems. Further, these authors assert that the African countries are 
dependent on the IFIs, the World Bank and IMF to pay their debts and to finance 
their balance-of-payments. Additionally these authors contend that the most 
often cited external threat to the African state is the IFI's imposition of structural 
adjustment programs (SAPs). These countries are given loans if they agree to 
implement and adhere to the liberal economic principles demanded by the IFIs 
(Huxtable & Villal'on 1998: 282), (Nyango'ro & Shaw in Huxtable & Villal'on 1998: 
28 -34). 
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Johan Graaff and Dawid Venter in Coetzee (2001: 83) contend that Frank's 
stagnationist view on the interrelationship of the core and periphery forms the 
weakest part of the dependency theory. They say it is weak because it depicts 
the core as having absolute power and the periphery being completely 
powerless. They assert that in this view, there is no interaction between the two 
parts; the one is dominant over the other. Further, they say that this theory has 
been disproved with the examples that follow. A number of Third World countries, 
such as the East Asian "tigers" (Taiwan, South Korea, Hong Kong, and 
Singapore), Brazil, Mexico and some other Latin American countries grew at a 
dramatic rate in the previous 15 years despite their original peripheral status. The 
approaches used by these countries were different from those used in other Third 
World countries notably African countries as will be indicated later. So, it might 
not be accurate to say that the theory was disproved with those few given 
examples. 
b) Development theory 
Nyango'ro (1989: 86) contends that another aspect of dependency theory is the 
dependent development that builds upon the new dependence a' la Dos Santos. 
Nyango'ro (1989: 86) states that Dos Santos' analysis moved one step ahead of 
Frank's notion and identified the infusion of finance and technology into 
peripheral production - from simple extraction to manufacturing of industrial 
goods, although still in a dependent form. Agricultural production also takes 
place. According to Nyango'ro (1989: 86), Evans defines dependent development 
as: "a special instance of dependency, characterised by the association of 
alliance of international and local capital. The state also joins the alliance as an 
active partner, and the resulting triple alliance is still a fundamental factor in the 
emergence of dependent development". 
Nyango'ro asserts that while both Frank and Dos Santos fully recognize the role 
of international capital in the production structure of the peripheral economy, 
there is no explicit recognition of the role of the state as an active participant in 
the organization of production. Nyango'ro contends that the most significant 
element in the definition of dependent development is the role of the peripheral 
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state in the economy. Also Nyango'ro cites Brazil and Mexico in Latin America 
as, perhaps, having the most developed form of dependent development. 
According to Nyango'ro (1989: 92) only two major works (Swainson, 1980; 
Marcussen and Torp, 1982) have attempted to apply the concept to African 
development. Swainson's work has shown the fallacy of applying the theory to 
Kenya. On the other hand Marcussen and Torp's have tried to apply the theory 
with mixed results. Nyango'ro tested the validity and applicability of the theory 
applied to sub-Saharan Africa. According to Nyango'ro (1989: 93) theoretically it 
is plausible that any increase in the manufacturing capacity of the peripheral 
economy may lead to more sectoral differentiation and possibly to increased 
productivity in the economy via the multiplier effect. However, looking back ten 
years, the economy of African countries had essentially stagnated or declined 
(Nyango'ro 1989: 93). The evidence provided by Marcussen and Torp reveals the 
difficulty of applying dependent development theory to Africa. Nyango'ro asserts 
that using Peter Evan's (1979: 32) basic criterion for dependent development, no 
African country fit the bill: 
"Dependent development" will be used to refer to cases where capital 
accumulation and diversified industrialization of more than superficial sort are not 
only occurring in a peripheral country but are dominating the transformation of its 
economy and social structure". Development theory so far has not applied to 
Lesotho. 
c) Disaggregating capitalism in Africa 
Nyango'ro (1989: 100, 101) makes an attempt to reconstruct development theory 
from the perspective of internally generated capitalist development forces in 
Africa by examining the evolution of the internal development structure. He calls 
this process disaggregating capitalism in Africa. 
Nyango'ro contends that a principal test to find out if a society is capitalist or not 
can be conducted by examining Marx's theoretical-historical examination of 
capitalism against socio-economic reality, as it exists in Africa today. According to 
Nyango'ro (1989: 107), Marx stated in "Pre-capitalist Economic Formations" that, 
"One of the prerequisites of wage labour and one of the historic conditions for 
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capital is free labour and the exchange of free labour against money, in order to 
reproduce money and convert it into values, in order to be consumed by money, 
not as use value for entertainment but as use value for money. Another 
prerequisite is the separation of free labour from the objective conditions of its 
realization - from means and material of labour. This means above all that the 
worker must be separated from the land, which functions as his natural 
laboratory. This means the dissolution both of free petty landownership and of 
communal landed property, based on oriental commune (1964: 7)". 
Further, Nyango'ro (1989: 109) asserts that like Marx, Max Weber stressed that 
modern capitalism does not develop from extensive trade or accumulation. 
Nyango'ro notes that it is at this point that world-system/dependency theory 
differs from Marxian/Weberian formulations. Further Nyango'ro contends that 
both in Marxian and Weberian formulations trade is regarded as a contributing 
factor but not a necessary one. 
According to Nyango'ro (1989: 109) Weber listed six elements characterising the 
evolution of modern capitalism: 
1. Private appropriation by entrepreneurs of all the means of production, 
separation of the workers from the means of production; 
2. Formally free labour, but compelled to sell its labour; 
3. Rational technology based on calculation and knowledge, especially 
mechanization; 
4. Market exchange not burdened by irrational restraints; 
5. Calculable law in both adjudication and state administration; 
6. A rational monetary system and the general commercialisation of 
economic life. 
Nyango'ro (1989: 109, 110) asserts that a better way of analysing modern 
capitalism and its historical evolution and its application to the Third World 
especially to Africa, should be based on the synthesis between the Weberian 
institutional theory of capitalism and the Marxian social theory of capitalism. 
Nyango'ro asserts that this approach could enable easy understanding of 
development of capitalism in Africa and the rest of the Third World. 
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Ake (1976) in Nyango'ro (1989: 110) suggests that in Africa there is a juxta-
position of three modes of production: 
i. Primitive community mode 
ii. The simple commodity mode of production 
iii. The capitalist mode of production. 
Hyden in Nyango'ro (1989: 112) contends that Africa fails to develop because 
capitalism has failed to break down the pre-capitalist barriers that still exist in the 
Third World countries. According to Nyango'ro (1989: 114) in Africa open villages 
have autonomous existence with land ownership being essentially communal 
under traditional arrangement. Additionally, Nyango'ro asserts that this communal 
ownership of the means of production historically has hindered capitalism from 
destroying the African peasant or "natural economy" given the direct access to 
land. So, African countries fail to develop capitalism or socialism because of the 
existing pre-capitalist social relations. In Lesotho the simple commodity mode of 
production predominates. 
In the few textile industries that Lesotho has, 100% shares belong to the foreign 
capitalists and they employ about 45, 000 workers. The textile goods are 
manufactured for export. In the rest of the industries such as mining, 
telecommunications, milling, brewery, etc. the Government does not hold more 
than 30% shares, in most of them it has 20% shares. Also in Lesotho almost 
every household has a piece of farming land. Lesotho is still one of the least 
developed countries (LDCs). So, development of the local bourgeoisie and the 
proletariat is a very slow process. 
Nyango'ro (1989: 116) asserts that the dominance of simple commodity 
production means that capitalism in Africa still has a long way to go. Also 
Nyango'ro contends that part of the problem of underdevelopment in Africa could 
be explained as the failure of capitalist production to take root, whilst not denying 
that some forms of capitalist production exist in Africa. Another reason for the 
failure of capitalism is Africa's low socio-economic base; the absorptive capacity 
of Africa's industry in terms of both labour and materials is severely limited 
Nyango'ro (1989: 119). Thus the inability of the excess labour, which vacates 
land, to find employment in urban areas has further economic constraints that 
undermine capital's expansionary nature. 
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According to Ometoruwa (2008: 8) in Public Eye weekly newspaper, the 
President and Chief Executive Officer of the Africa Finance Corporation (AFC), 
the mission of AFC is to reduce poverty through private-sector initiative on the 
African continent. The important question to answer is whether the private 
companies are mainly local or foreign. Ometoruwa asserts that the lack of basic 
infrastructure and industrial capacity remains one of the biggest problems in 
Africa, for it sustains poverty and undermines the continents ability to compete 
with the rest of the world. 
Ake (1996: 133) contends that the structural adjustment programmes (SAPs) 
undertaken by African countries continue to weaken the state in Africa due to 
their one-sided emphasis on privatisation, denationalisation, and reliance on 
market forces. He asserts that these SAPs weaken the state even politically, 
undermining its legitimacy as it happened in Zambia, Gabon and Nigeria. 
According to Gordon et al (2007: 130) economic performance of many African 
countries under SAPs did not improve and much of the borrowing from IMF/World 
Bank was not repayable. In 1996 the IMF and World Bank launched the Heavily 
Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) Initiative in order to relieve the debt burdens of 
the poorest countries (Gordon et al 2007: 130). 
Nyango'ro (1989: 146) posits that the World Bank's insistence on policy reform in 
agriculture and privatisation of the economy as a basis for economic 
development falls short of addressing the real issues confronting African states. 
He contends that there can be no serious change unless the socio-political 
structure is radically changed. Further, he suggests the appropriate way to deal 
with the issue as to disaggregate the complex set of interrelationships between 
the state and international capital and between the state and the civil society. Ake 
(2000: 160) asserts that in Africa democratisation should begin with the 
transformation of the state and later the new political processes could be 
introduced. Also Ake gives the reason that, the post-colonial state in Africa 
perhaps is more than its predecessor literally an instrument of oppression. 
Ake (1996: 132) asserts that the suitable democracy for Africa would have four 
characteristics that follow: 
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1. A democracy in which people have some real decision-making power over 
and above the formal consent of electoral choice; 
2. A social democracy that puts emphasis on concrete political, social, and 
economic rights, as opposed to liberal democracy that emphasises 
abstract political rights; 
3. A democracy that puts as much emphasis on collective rights as it does on 
individual rights. 
4. A democracy of incorporation. It should be as inclusive as possible. 
Nyango'ro (1989: 148) contends that the absence of a clearly defined national 
bourgeoisie in Africa calls for the state to play a leading role in effecting economic 
development. According to Nyango'ro (1989: 148 & 149) in Africa there should be 
state intervention in the economy. However, this intervention should be less 
regulatory and more developmental as it was done in modern Japan. Also state 
intervention resulted in great acceleration of industrialisation in Brazil, Mexico and 
other newly industrialising countries (NICs) (Nyango'ro 1989: 152 & 153). 
Internal contradictions within the feudal system will enable development of 
capitalism/socialism (Glezerman s.a.: 153). According to Hyden in Nyango'ro 
(1989: 112) the "capturing" or destruction of peasantry by classes representing 
higher forms of sociotechnological reproduction has historically been the 
beginning of the end of the "natural economy". The capture of the peasants by 
the government, since there is no bourgeoisie, will facilitate establishment of 
capitalism. 
As a matter of comparison to Hyden's thesis, in his 'lecture iv' around 1966 
Glezerman (s.a.: 153) quotes Lenin in an article called "Karl Marx": "Marx 
deduces the inevitability of transformation of capitalist society into socialist 
society wholly and exclusively from the economic law of motion of contemporary 
society". He explained that Marx deduced the need for abolishing capitalist 
system from operation of its laws and that would lead to its negation like any 
obsolescent phenomenon. So, in the case of Africa, feudalism or the current 
mode of production could be replaced by capitalism/socialism as explained in the 
above quotation made by Glezerman. 
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According to Marx and Engels teachings, a revolution is not exported/imported 
(Glezerman s.a.: 209), it takes place from within the country on the basis of 
internal revolutionary developments, because social class contradictions develop 
in the country. So, Africa needs to develop its bourgeoisie and the proletariat. 
Only assistance can be offered to sustain what has been achieved. Also, at this 
point, according Marxist-Leninist teachings, as in Glezerman (s.a.: 198, 
211&212) it is possible for the Third World countries to bypass a stage of 
development and reach the next through assistance of the developed ones; for 
example, Uzbek, Turkmenian, Kirghiz and other republics of the former Soviet 
Union did build socialism having bypassed capitalism. Copying from the Marxist-
Leninist theory of revolution above, the case of building capitalism or socialism in 
Africa requires a guiding theory/ies that should be acceptable to the African 
states/political parties. 
According to Ake (1996: 138) the democracy movement in Africa opposes 
authoritarian elitism and construction of development as a strategy of power and 
exploitation. He says that this movement does not yet have an articulated political 
theory. However, Ake contends that its theory posits the inescapable connection 
of the political and the economic, and the priority of the political and that came 
out clearly in the Arusha conference that developed the African Charter. 
Further, Ake asserts that the African Charter for Popular Participation indicates 
the absence of democracy as the main cause of the crisis of underdevelopment 
in Africa. Further, Ake (1996: 139) urges the African countries to realize that their 
greatest resource is their people and it is through their active and full participation 
that Africa can overcome the challenges that face it. It is very important for 
African political parties to organise short course political training for their people. 
For example, the Electoral Institution of Southern Africa (EISA) offers some 
training throughout the SADC region. 
Ake (2000: 126, 127) notes that confusion exists among scholars of development 
about the relation between democracy and development; some say there is no 
relation. Further, Ake contends that the world was impressed by the achievement 
under authoritarian rule by the newly industrialising countries (NICs) notably, 
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Thailand, Taiwan, South Korea and Singapore. Also the dramatic performance of 
China in the past 15 years reinforced that view (Ake 2000: 127). 
According to Nyango'ro (1989: 149, 150) many of the pitfalls related to the state 
intervention in the economy are peculiar to Africa. He advises that African state 
intervention should be less regulatory and more developmental as mentioned 
above. In this way, Nyango'ro encourages the Africans to go for a 
developmental state. He cites a good example of the modern Japan. Japan did 
not go for capitalism or socialism. The state prioritised and assisted certain 
industries. 
Nyango'ro (1989: 156) calls for a new development strategy in Africa, to 
restructure Africa's relationship with international economy - inevitably moving 
toward less association. Ake (2000: 185) asserts that while in Africa democracy 
movement is taking the direction of liberal democracy of multi-party electoral 
competition, social democracy is more feasible in Africa. Indeed social 
democracy could be the key to the solution of the problems facing African states, 
but this requires the political parties to train their people. This theory is applicable 
to the case of Lesotho, although there could be some limitations, such as the 
relationship between political development and economic development. 
Theoretically, political development does occur independently of economic 
development and vice versa. According to Adelman and Morris in Kotze and 
Labuschagne (1995: 95) political and economic differentiation and specialisation 
are increasingly associated with more liberal and more democratic political 
systems than with the authoritarian systems. 
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